People v. LaVearn
| Decision Date | 17 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 98721,98721 |
| Citation | 528 N.W.2d 721,448 Mich. 207 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph Lawrence LaVEARN, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and Carolyn Breen, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for the People.
Bell & Gardner, P.C. by Athina T. Siringas, Detroit, for defendant.
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and felony-firearm. However the Court of Appeals reversed the convictions and remanded the case for a new trial on the ground that the defendant had been denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for consideration of the defendant's other claims.
In its opinion of reversal, 1 the Court of Appeals provided this factual account:
Defendant's convictions stem from the June 20, 1991, shooting death of Steven Walker in the City of Detroit. The decedent and six other men were gathered in front of a house on Hasse Street around 1:50 A.M. The house was in the middle of the block about three hundred feet west of Nancy, the cross street to the east. Witnesses testified at trial that this area was known for drug trafficking. A car drove past the group to the end of the street and turned north so that it was positioned with its driver's side perpendicular to and facing the group. Five seconds after the car stopped, the driver, allegedly defendant, commenced shooting out of the driver's side window. Three or four shots rang out and after a pause, two more, following which the car sped off. One of the shots killed Steven Walker. One of the men jumped in a vehicle and gave chase. He caught up with defendant's vehicle and shot at it, wounding the defendant in the leg. Defendant's fourteen-year-old brother, Jason, was a passenger in the car and was also wounded. Defendant and his brother were apprehended by found $192 and two grams of cocaine in defendant's sock. Several spent nine-millimeter casings were retrieved from the car and matched with three found on the street near the home where the shots were fired. [201 Mich.App. at 680-681, 506 N.W.2d 909.]
The defendant was charged with first-degree (premeditated) murder, 2 and possession of a firearm during the commission of that felony. 3 Following an unsuccessful motion to quash the information, the defendant was tried before a jury, which convicted him of first-degree murder and felony-firearm.
During the trial, the defense presented two witnesses, but the defendant did not testify. After the parties had rested, defense counsel argued to the jury that the prosecution had presented only circumstantial evidence, had offered no motive, and had failed to present evidence of premeditation. Further, defense counsel emphasized weaknesses in the identification testimony (the defendant and his brother are white males, but the prosecution testimony was inconclusive regarding both the race and gender of the person who shot the decedent).
After twenty-six minutes of deliberation, the jury found the defendant guilty, as charged. He was sentenced to the mandatory terms of life for first-degree murder and two years for felony-firearm.
On the defendant's motion, the Court of Appeals remanded this case for a Ginther 4 hearing on the question whether the defendant was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. 5 The trial judge's successor conducted an evidentiary hearing at which trial counsel, the defendant, and three other witnesses testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, he denied the defendant's motion for new trial.
Following the remand, the Court of Appeals reversed. It found that defense counsel's failure to present an intoxication defense and his failure to call the defendant as a witness on his own behalf warranted a new trial:
Testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing held with regard to defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel revealed that before trial defense counsel was aware of defendant's claim of intoxication and aware that defendant had witnesses who could corroborate the fact that he was intoxicated on the night of the shooting. Defense counsel testified that defendant told him that he was "quite drunk" at the time of the shooting. Furthermore, at least two people who were with defendant just before the shooting told defense counsel that defendant had been drinking that night. Additionally, defense counsel, who had previously represented defendant in connection with two or more drunken driving charges, was well aware of defendant's longstanding drinking problem.
Witnesses who testified at the evidentiary hearing indicated that just before the shooting, defendant was "really drunk." Defendant testified that he had been drinking heavily the day of the shooting and that he had a longstanding drinking problem. Defendant also indicated that he wanted to testify in his own behalf at trial to explain why he was in the neighborhood where the shooting occurred and that he was drunk when the shooting occurred.
After reviewing the record, we believe defense counsel's failure to present an intoxication defense deprived defendant of a defense that might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. If defendant had been able to show through his witnesses and through his own testimony that he was intoxicated at the time of the shooting, such evidence would have justified acquittal of first-degree murder. Defendant's voluntary intoxication would have negated the element of premeditation and deliberation necessary to convict him of first-degree murder. Counsel's failure to present the witnesses and to put defendant on the stand to testify in his own behalf deprived defendant of a substantial defense. Defendant has successfully established his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. [201 Mich.App. at 684-685, 506 N.W.2d 909.]
The Court of Appeals concluded by saying that, in light of the reversal on the ineffective-assistance issue, it was not necessary to address the other claims raised by the defendant.
The prosecutor has filed an application for leave to appeal.
The standard for determining whether a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel is provided in People v. Pickens, 446 Mich. 298, 521 N.W.2d 797 (1994), in which we adopted the standard stated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984):
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
In this case, the Court of Appeals indicated that it was drawing the standard from People v. Tommolino, 187 Mich.App. 14, 17, 466 N.W.2d 315 (1991). Since Tommolino also adopted the Strickland standard, there is no need to discuss further whether an appropriate standard has been employed in this case.
In its opinion of reversal, the Court of Appeals observed that voluntary intoxication can be a defense to first-degree premeditated murder, and that the record of the Ginther hearing confirms that significant evidence could have been presented in support of such a defense. All of that is true. The defendant's trial attorney could have employed an intoxication defense, which, if successful would have reduced the conviction to second-degree murder. 6
However, intoxication was not the only available defense in this case. As noted above, the prosecution witnesses were unable to agree on the race of the occupants of the car from which the shots were fired, and there was even some uncertainty regarding the gender of the shooter. The trial record gives no hint of a motive, and there was at least a short gap of time between the events immediately surrounding the crime and the defendant's apprehension in Hazel Park. Using these facts, defense counsel argued to the jury that it is far from certain that a person who is driving a car is the same person who controlled a vehicle at some earlier point.
Defense counsel had at least two choices for a defense strategy--intoxication and misidentification. In truth, however, neither had a significant likelihood of success. The potential defense of intoxication would have been weakened by the apparent purposefulness of the defendant's actions. Further, neither the report of the arresting officer nor the hospital records provided any support for an intoxication defense. 7 And, of course, even a successful intoxication defense would have reduced the first-degree murder charge only to second-degree murder.
The more general defense based on reasonable doubt and possible misidentification was also probably doomed from the outset. The shell casings in the defendant's car matched those found at the scene, and the fact that the defendant himself was evidently shot as he fled the scene provided significant confirmation of the prosecution's case. 8
Asked at the Ginther hearing to explain why misidentification was used as a defense, counsel mentioned the absence of corroborating testimony from the arresting officer or the hospital. He also noted that the intoxication defense ...
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