People v. Lawson

• Decision Date: 19 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. 1-97-2943,1-97-2943
• Parties: , 233 Ill.Dec. 24 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gerald L. LAWSON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 125

700 N.E.2d 125

298 Ill.App.3d 997, 233 Ill.Dec. 24

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gerald L. LAWSON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-97-2943.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Third Division.

Aug. 19, 1998.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James Fitzgerald, Jessica R. Ball, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Rita A. Fry, Public Defender of Cook County (Robert C. Drizin, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice GORDON delivered the opinion of the Court:

The People of the State of Illinois appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Cook County granting the motion of defendant, Gerald Lawson, to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. For the reasons given below, we affirm.

FACTS

In March 1996 defendant Gerald Lawson was charged by an eighteen-count information with one count of robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 1994)); one count of armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 1994)); six counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a), 5/12-4(b)(1), 5/12-4(b)(2), 5/12-4(b)(10) (West 1994)); one count of aggravated battery of a senior citizen (720 ILCS 5/12-4.6(a) (West 1994)); one count of aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 1994)); seven counts of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1994)); and one count of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4 (720 ILCS 5/9-1) (West 1994)). In May 1997 defendant filed a "motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence." He argued that his arrest in February 1996 was made without a warrant and his conduct before his arrest "was such as would not reasonably be interpreted by the arresting officers as constituting probable cause that [defendant] had committed or was about to commit a crime." He requested that the circuit court quash his arrest and suppress from introduction into evidence any physical evidence, statements (written, oral or "gestural"), witnesses, and any other "knowledge and the fruits thereof" which had been obtained as the direct or indirect product of his arrest.

The cause came before the circuit court for a hearing on defendant's motion in May 1997. The sole witness to testify at the hearing was Chicago Police Officer John Griffin. Officer Griffin testified that he was on duty in his marked squad car on February 17, 1996 at approximately 2:00 p.m. At that time, while in the general area of the intersection of 71st and St. Lawrence Streets, he received a radio message to the effect that a robbery had just occurred at a dry-cleaning store at 6445 Cottage Grove and a man had been shot. He received a description of a "male, black six fee [sic ] tall, wearing a dark coat and blue jeans" who had left the scene of the crime headed west on 65th Street from Cottage Grove. He also learned from the broadcast that the offender "had fought with one of the victims and was possibly injured."

Griffin testified that upon receiving the radio message he immediately activated his emergency lights and drove north on St. Lawrence "at a high rate of speed" in order to cut the suspect off on 65th Street. Griffin testified that he arrived at the intersection of 65th and Champlain Streets within a minute or a minute and a half from the time that he heard the message. When he arrived at that intersection he turned east onto 65th Street.

As Griffin turned onto 65th Street, he observed an approximately six foot tall black male wearing blue jeans and a dark coat, walking westbound on 65th Street nearing Langley Avenue (one block east of him). Griffin identified defendant in court as the person he saw. Where Griffin first saw defendant, he estimated that defendant was no more than 800 feet from the scene of the crime, between one and two minutes after the crime had occurred. When Griffin saw defendant, defendant looked at him and made a "sudden" right turn onto Langley. Griffin turned onto Langley, drove past defendant, exited his vehicle, and told defendant to stop.

Defendant stopped as Griffin requested. Almost simultaneously, a police tactical unit drove up and stopped behind defendant. As Griffin approached defendant, he noticed that defendant had what appeared to be a cut on his forehead, from which he was bleeding, as well as a cut and scratches on his hand, "as if he had been in a fight." The tactical team performed a protective pat-down of defendant, because they had been led to believe that the offender had a weapon. The tactical officers recovered two twenty-dollar bills from defendant's pocket, which had what appeared to be blood on them. After the tactical officers had a conversation with defendant, the nature of which Officer Griffin did not recall, they placed defendant in their squad car and transported him back to the scene of the crime. Griffin followed in his own car. He was not certain whether defendant was handcuffed before being placed in the car, but stated that defendant was not free to leave custody. At the scene of the crime the victims identified defendant.

Griffin admitted that he did not see defendant violate any laws and he did not have an arrest warrant for defendant. He admitted that no weapon had been found on defendant, nor a mask or hat. Griffin admitted having received information over the radio that the offender was possibly wearing a mask; he was uncertain whether he had heard that the offender was wearing a hat. He admitted the incident occurred during the winter, and that before defendant was stopped Griffin had received no information about the coat the offender was wearing other than its color. Griffin was not certain whether the tactical officers questioned defendant about the marks on his head or hands before they placed him in their squad car. He admitted that the apparent blood stains on the money recovered from defendant were one of the reasons that defendant was detained and returned to the scene of the crime.

With the testimony of Officer Griffin defendant rested; the State presented no evidence. The court stated that it was "bothered" by the fact that there was no evidence as to the basis for the radio broadcast. It noted that "[w]arrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable and the State bears the burden of showing that warrantless seizure comes with [in] one of [the] exceptions to the warrant requirement." The court stated that it was "unquestionable" that officer Griffin had a "reasonable and articulable basis for stopping" defendant and subjecting him to a pat-down search, in light However, the court stated that this analysis was different from an "in pocket search. And it is ludicrous to suggest that he did not go in his pockets. That he felt something and thought it was a weapon that [sic ] because of course there is no testimony to that effect. And so he searched him. And utilizing the fruit of that search, one might conclude that he arrested him." The court also noted that although the police can rely on radio broadcasts, "that does not mean that Courts can rely upon it without anything else. * * * [T]he suppression record must show, the basis of reliability, in some way, other than it came across the radio." The court took the motion under advisement and requested the State to submit authority for the proposition that the arrest could be upheld without proof of the reliability of the underlying broadcast description "even to the extent of a Terry stop. * * * I want to know whether or not this suppression record must show, the reliability, the basis of knowledge of [the] person, who supplied that information."

[233 Ill.Dec. 27] of the facts that he was approximately two blocks away from the scene of an armed robbery and met the "broad general description" of the offender. The court stated that it did not "have any problem with this policeman patting the defendant down."

The cause was continued to May 9, then to May 16. The record does not contain any written brief the State may have filed. On May 16 the court sustained defendant's motion "with reluctance" on the basis that (1) there was no evidence in the record to establish "who it was that informed the source officer of the information that was subsequently broadcast," and (2) there was no "basis, at all, for determining the reliability of that person or the adequacy or sufficiency of the description given."

The State's motion for reconsideration was denied, and the State appealed. It argues that the circuit court misconstrued the law and that the arrest was proper because the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest. In the alternative, it argues that defendant's "temporary detention" and transport to the crime scene was "a reasonable seizure that did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights." We affirm.

ANALYSIS

On a motion to suppress the defendant bears the burden of proof that the search and seizure were unlawful. People v. Williams, 164 Ill.2d 1, 12, 206 Ill.Dec. 592, 645 N.E.2d 844, 848 (1994). However, "[w]arrantless searches are per se unreasonable; thus, when respondent challenges a warrantless search and demonstrates that he was doing nothing unusual at the time of the search, the State must demonstrate the legal justification for the search." In re C.K., 250 Ill.App.3d 834, 836, 189 Ill.Dec. 601, 620 N.E.2d 569, 571 (1993). Accord People v. Rushing, 272 Ill.App.3d 387, 390, 208 Ill.Dec. 553, 649 N.E.2d 609, 611 (1995) ("[o]nce a defendant challenges a warrantless search, it becomes the State's burden" to show that the search is constitutional); People v. Crowell, 94 Ill.App.3d 48, 50, 49 Ill.Dec. 623, 418 N.E.2d 477, 478 (1981) ("when the evidence demonstrates that the defendant was doing nothing unusual at the time of the arrest and that the arresting officer neither possessed a warrant for the arrest of the defendant nor observed the defendant violate any law, the burden of proving the validity of the arrest shifts to the State"). Trial court rulings with respect to motions to quash arrest and...