People v. Lawson

Decision Date26 June 1980
Docket NumberNo. 78-1357,78-1357
Citation407 N.E.2d 899,41 Ill.Dec. 401,86 Ill.App.3d 376
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois
Parties, 41 Ill.Dec. 401 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George E. LAWSON, Defendant-Appellant.

Ralph Ruebner, Deputy State App. Defender, Patricia Unsinn, Asst. State App. Defender, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago, Marcia B. Orr, Myra J. Brown, William Gamboney, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel, for plaintiff-appellee.

LINN, Presiding Justice:

At the conclusion of a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, George Lawson, was convicted of murder. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 9-1.) Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 18 to 30 years.

On appeal, defendant contends: (1) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the State committed plain error when it elicited, as substantive evidence of his guilt, a witness's prior inconsistent statements inculpating defendant; (3) the testimony of a State's witness was rehabilitated improperly with evidence of prior consistent statements; (4) evidence of police officer's efforts to arrest defendant lacked probative value and admitting such evidence was prejudicial; (5) he was denied a fair trial when the trial court refused to call a witness as a court's witness; (6) he was restricted improperly in efforts to present relevant evidence to the jury; (7) he was denied a fair trial by the State's closing argument; (8) his right to be presumed innocent was violated when the State commented on his failure to present the testimony of alibi witnesses; (9) he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney labored under a per se conflict of interest.

We affirm. An analysis of the factual background is required since defendant raises a reasonable doubt issue.

The evidence discloses that during the early morning hours on July 16, 1976, Lalice Stanley was in his apartment when he was shot with a .38 caliber gun. He sustained a bullet wound to his neck which lacerated his larynx and caused his death. Defendant was charged with Stanley's murder.

At trial, during opening statements, defense counsel informed the jury that the evidence would show that Lenora Dean, who was present during the shooting, first told the police and the grand jury that defendant shot Stanley but later, at defendant's bond hearing, told the court that defendant did not shoot Stanley. The jury also was advised that Dean had been indicted for perjury. Defense counsel further asserted the evidence would show that the three persons who were present in Stanley's apartment when he was shot were angry with defendant and conspired to falsely identify defendant as the murderer.

The State's witness, Terry Ann Jones, was present in Stanley's apartment when he was shot. On direct examination, she testified that she had known Stanley for approximately four years, but she did not know defendant. On July 16, 1976, Jones lived with James Henley, who also was present in Stanley's apartment when the shooting occurred. Stanley was Lenora Dean's boyfriend.

Jones further stated that on the evening of July 15, 1976, prior to the shooting incident, she was with Henley, Dean, and Stanley in the central courtyard of her apartment building. They were there about ten minutes when Dean began to break defendant's car window. Defendant's car was parked in a lot about 25 feet away from them. From the porch of his building, defendant yelled to Dean to stop damaging his car. Defendant then came downstairs and Stanley grabbed him. A struggle ensued, although no blows were exchanged and no weapons were displayed. As defendant walked towards an apartment building he said, "I'm not going to take no ass whipping, I'm not; going to get my gun." Defendant's wife, who was carrying a knife, started to fight with Dean. Jones asserted she stopped the fight and no one was hurt.

Jones further testified that after defendant left the area, sometime between 10:30 p. m. and 11:30 p. m., she, Henley, Dean and Stanley went to Jones' apartment to check on her children. The group then went to Dean's apartment to play cards. Dean and Stanley were living together at this time. As Stanley walked to the back of the apartment to get a chair, Jones heard a loud noise and Stanley dropped the chair. Jones ran to the screen door and saw defendant with a gun in his hand standing outside the door. Henley walked up behind Jones and looked out the door. Defendant then left the area. Jones stated she was face to face with defendant and a light outside the screen door provided illumination. There also were lights on inside the apartment.

Jones further stated that after defendant left the area, she turned to look at Stanley who was laying on the floor and bleeding from the neck. Henley placed towels over Stanley's neck and Dean called the police. At the close of Jones' direct examination, she identified defendant as the man she saw standing outside Dean's screen door.

On cross-examination, Jones admitted she had been subpoenaed to testify. She denied that she had been "getting high" on the night of the incident. Jones recalled a conversation she had with Investigator Dahlberg on the morning of July 16, 1976, but she could not remember telling him that Dean had a knife. Defense counsel showed Jones a transcript of her conversation with Dahlberg and then asked her whether she had told Dahlberg that she had seen Dean with a knife. Jones denied ever giving a statement in which she said she saw Dean produce a knife and attack anyone. When asked if she saw Dean with a knife, Jones stated, "I saw her comprehend me the knife." (sic) Upon further questioning, Jones asserted the only time Dean had the knife was during the earlier struggle with defendant's wife. Dean had taken the knife away from defendant's wife. Dean then threw the knife down on the ground.

Jones further testified that she could not recall any other persons in the courtyard during the struggle, but she did remember seeing some people on the porch. Jones also stated she was not too far about ten feet from defendant when he said he was going to get his gun. At that time, Henley was sitting on the bench and Dean was approximately 35 feet away, near the parking lot.

Jones stated further that between the time defendant initially left the group, she saw defendant twice: first, when he was struggling with Henley; and second, after he had shot Stanley. She could not recall telling Investigator Goldberg (sic) that after defendant left, saying he would get his gun, he returned to the courtyard carrying a stick. She also could not remember telling Goldberg (sic) that the victim "backed up and we all left."

After Jones was shown a copy of her written statement, she admitted making the statement to Investigator Dahlberg, but again asserted she did not see defendant return to the courtyard prior to the shooting. When asked if she was saying the statement was false Jones said, "I'm not saying that, I say that I didn't see him come back, maybe at that time everybody was all upset, I probably did make that statement I did make it." Jones then admitted she saw defendant return to the courtyard a second time and that the statement she had made previously was accurate.

Jones then described that defendant returned with a stick to the courtyard approximately 10 to 15 minutes after he first left the area. Jones was then standing near a bench, Dean was standing near Jones' building, and Stanley was standing next to defendant, about 15 feet from Jones. She did not see defendant with a gun. She saw defendant hit Stanley with the stick, but she could not see where Stanley was hit. Jones further asserted she did not see Stanley stab defendant. Stanley "backed down" from the fight, defendant left the area, and the group went to Dean's apartment to play cards.

Jones identified a diagram of Dean's apartment which she had drawn. She also stated that from where she was seated in Dean's kitchen, she could not see the screen door. When Stanley was walking with a chair towards the kitchen, Jones, Dean, and Henley were seated at the table in the kitchen.

Jones asserted she was at the table after she heard the gun fire and saw Stanley spin around and fall into the living room. When Stanley fell, Dean was standing near the table, and Henley followed behind Jones while she ran to the door.

Jones again stated she saw defendant standing outside the front room screen door, with a gun in his hand. She also admitted she had told the grand jury she had seen defendant with a gun. Defense counsel questioned Jones as to whether she had told Inspector Deloughery that she did not see a gun and Jones responded that he had not asked her about a gun. She also stated she could not remember Investigator Dahlberg. She did remember speaking with police officers about the incident in Dean's apartment. She also recalled speaking with other police officers about the incident at the police station. Jones admitted she had told Investigator Dahlberg that she had heard a gun shot, saw Stanley fall, went to the door, and saw defendant.

On further cross-examination of Jones, the following colloquy took place:

"Q. And you're saying you do not recall telling Inspector Deloughery that you didn't see a gun in the hands of the man at the door?

A. I said he didn't ask me about a gun.

Q. So, you're positive that you never told him you didn't see a gun?

A. I didn't hear.

Q. Are you positive you never told Inspector Deloughery that you didn't see a gun?

A. I don't understand what you're saying.

Q. Mrs. Jones, I was, what I'm asking, you're sure

A. yes

A. I told the police at the house that I seen the gun (sic)."

Jones further stated that defendant stood outside the screen door "around one or two minutes, it wasn't that long, just until he turned around, around, about one or...

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  • People v. Bowman
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 20, 2005
    ...if their opinion is based on their personal observation of and experience with intoxication. People v. Lawson, 86 Ill.App.3d 376, 397, 41 Ill.Dec. 401, 407 N.E.2d 899, 916 (1980). A trial court has the discretion to decide whether evidence is relevant and admissible and that decision will n......
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    ...against Joe Burrows. And the code does not prohibit in any way my talking to him, Judge." See also People v. Lawson (1980), 86 Ill.App.3d 376, 405-08, 41 Ill.Dec. 401, 407 N.E.2d 899 (defendant was not denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel in that no conflict of interest w......
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