People v. Layton
| Decision Date | 14 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 19PDJ056 (consolidated with 20PDJ030) |
| Citation | 494 P.3d 693 |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Complainant, v. Angelique LAYTON, #36480, Respondent. |
Angelique Layton, who also goes by Angelique Layton Anderson ("Respondent"), committed misconduct in four separate matters. In one client matter, she acted incompetently by failing to timely petition for review of a magistrate's order. She also threatened opposing counsel with a disciplinary complaint to gain an advantage in a domestic relations matter. In another case, Respondent failed to exercise basic competence when she ignored rules of civil procedure and rules governing the discovery process. In a third client matter, Respondent acted incompetently by failing to follow rules of procedure, by failing to inquire who had authority to speak for and make decisions on behalf of her client, and by failing to conduct basic investigation into the factual and legal basis for a complaint she brought on her client's behalf. In that same matter, she took direction from a third party while neglecting to consult with her client about the matter; failed to provide her client with a fee agreement or any kind of writing describing her fee; impermissibly revealed information related to her representation of the client; filed a frivolous and groundless lawsuit; failed to make efforts to comply with legally proper discovery requests; and prejudiced the administration of justice. Finally, in her disciplinary proceeding, Respondent falsified an expert rebuttal report by knowingly misrepresenting that her expert authored and signed the report, even though the expert never wrote, reviewed, or signed the report. This misconduct, taken together, warrants suspension for three years.
On August 6, 2019, the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel ("the People") filed with the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge ("the PDJ") a sixteen-claim complaint in case number 19PDJ056.1 Through her then-counsel Manuel J. Solano, Respondent answered the complaint on September 20, 2019.2 A hearing was set for March 31 through April 3, 2020. Solano withdrew in December 2019, and John S. Gleason, entered his appearance for Respondent on May 19, 2020.
In March 2020, at the People's request, the PDJ continued the hearing so that the People could investigate new allegations of misconduct arising out of discovery in case number 19PDJ056. On May 21, 2020, the People filed a second complaint against Respondent, alleging five claims pleaded under case number 20PDJ030. Respondent answered that complaint on June 11, 2020.
The PDJ consolidated the two cases and reset the hearing for November 2 through November 6, 2020. In September 2020, the People moved to dismiss Claims I and II in case number 20PDJ030 (); the PDJ granted the motion and dismissed those claims on September 21, 2020. In late October, the PDJ again continued the hearing, this time at Respondent's request due to a death in her family. The hearing was reset for March 15 to 19, 2021, to take place remotely via the Zoom videoconferencing platform.
The PDJ presided over the March 2021 remote hearing; he was joined on the Hearing Board by lawyers James Brown and Margaret Cordova. Jane B. Cox and Erin R. Kristofco represented the People. Gleason appeared on behalf of Respondent, who also attended. The Hearing Board considered stipulated exhibits S1-S1853 and heard testimony from Devra Carmichael, Christopher Eddlemon, Judge Michelle Kline, Theodore Shih, Arthur Porter, Ghassan Nehme, Jason Huffer, Judge David Gilbert, Charlene Hunter, Jody Brammer-Hoelter, Dr. Charles Shuman, Dr. Michael Gendel, retired Magistrate Peter Stapp, Respondent, Judith Shively, Patricia Bentley, Patricia Anselmo, Nicole Washington, Sarah Matthews, Lewis (Jack) Buck, and Tracy Hurtado.4
Respondent was admitted to practice law in Colorado on July 12, 2005, under attorney registration number 36480. She is thus subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado Supreme Court and the Hearing Board in this disciplinary proceeding.6 Respondent lives and works in Louisville, Colorado, and primarily practices domestic and family law.7
Jenifer Bentley (formerly known as Jenifer Eddlemon) ("Mother") and Christopher Eddlemon ("Father") filed for divorce in Adams County District Court in 2013. Father was represented by Devra Carmichael. In 2016, Mother hired Judith Shively, who represented Mother before Respondent took over as her counsel in September 2017. Shively recalled that Mother and Father, who together had five children, approached each other as though they were "at war," and the register of actions bears that out: according to Carmichael, at least 310 filings in the case have been submitted.8
In April 2017, before Respondent entered an appearance on the case, the parties attended a hearing on a motion that Mother had filed to restrict Father's parenting time. The presiding magistrate noted the "animosity" between the parents and described the situation as "horrendous."9 The hearing focused specifically on the parents’ interaction with their oldest son, C.E. The magistrate found that C.E., who had "real and ongoing issues" with Father, was on the runaway list, and that Mother "exacerbated" these ongoing issues by "allowing C.E. to do whatever the hell he wants to do," including simply leaving Father's house.10 The magistrate denied Mother's motion.
On June 9, 2017, the court held another hearing, this time to decide allocation of parental responsibilities and decision-making for several of their children, including C.E. As relevant here, the magistrate awarded Father sole parental responsibility and decision-making authority for C.E. and reduced Mother's parenting time with C.E. to once a week in a supervised therapeutic setting.11
Carmichael moved to enforce that parenting time order in September 2017, alleging that Mother had interfered in Father's parenting time by keeping C.E. from him. Around that same time, Shively asked Respondent to take over Mother's representation. Shively's trust in and communication with Carmichael had become "strained," she explained, and she hoped that Respondent, armed with a fresh perspective, would facilitate constructive cooperation with Carmichael. Respondent accepted, and she filed a substitution of counsel on September 28, 2017.12
Though Respondent had entered her appearance, she was not able to attend the hearing on Father's motion to enforce parenting time, which was scheduled for November 3, 2017. Shively attended in her stead. The court entered an oral ruling that day but issued a written order on November 21, 2017, adopting Carmichael's proposed order. Among other findings, the court concluded that C.E. had run away and that Mother had interfered with Father's parenting time.13 The court ordered Mother to pay Father's costs and attorney's fees within sixty days, but it did not set a sum certain for those fees or costs.14
On December 1, 2017, Respondent filed a "Request for Review of Magistrate's Decision" with the district court, which construed Respondent's filing as a request for an extension of time to file a petition for review.15 The district court granted Respondent "an extension of 14 days from the date of [its] order"—which was dated December 7, 2017—to file her petition for review.16 Respondent did not file a petition for review within those fourteen days, however. Instead, on December 27, she filed a "Request for Clarification of Extension of Time to File Request for Review." In that submission, she claimed that she had initially intended to request an extension of thirty days, in addition to the twenty-one days for appeal—totaling fifty-one days in all—which she needed in order to obtain the transcript and prepare a response.17 Yet she did not order the transcript at that time. Further, she asked the district court to clarify its order of December 7, contending that it did not "indicate what date the request for review [was] due."18
Also on December 27, Respondent filed a "Motion to Restrict and/or Modify Parenting Time Under C.R.S. § 14-10-129." On its face, the motion was unclear whether it sought to restrict Father's parenting time or merely to modify Father's parenting time. The motion alleged that C.E. had run away from Father on at least seven occasions since July 2017 and had been homeless at times. It expressed Mother's belief that if C.E. "is forced to return to his father's home for parenting time, he will suffer imminent emotional and physical harm that will place him in danger," as C.E. would likely then run away from Father and thus "could be in imminent physical danger from the cold, and from any miscreants who might harm a young boy who is homeless including human trafficking, and drug dealers."19 The motion also stated that Mother feared that Father might physically abuse or lock up C.E.20 Relying on C.R.S. § 14-10-129(4), the district court ordered a hearing on the motion within fourteen days.21
At the disciplinary hearing, Respondent explained her rationale for moving to restrict parenting time or, in the alternative, to modify parenting time. She recounted that despite earlier court findings, she and Mother believed that Father had assaulted C.E. in summer 2017. "I tend to believe victims," she declared. According to Mother, she said, C.E. had been "on the run" and "living under a bridge in Boulder" from summer 2017 until Christmas 2017, when he had appeared on Mother's doorstep. Because Mother realized that she would be in violation of the standing parenting time order if she allowed C.E. to stay at her home, she asked Respondent to take...
To continue reading
Request your trial