People v. Lee

Decision Date24 April 2012
Docket NumberNo. 1–10–1851.,1–10–1851.
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Raymond LEE, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defender, Julianne Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Chicago, for Appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, County of Cook, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Peter D. Fischer, Sally L. Dilgart, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[360 Ill.Dec. 454]¶ 1 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Raymond Lee was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, arson, home invasion and residential burglary. Subsequently, he was sentenced to natural life in prison for the murders, to be served concurrently with prison terms of 15 years for home invasion and residential burglary, and 7 years for robbery and arson. On direct appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his amended motion to suppress his inculpatory statement; (2) he was denied his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the medical examiner who performed the victims' autopsies and authored the autopsy reports; and (3) under the one-act, one-crime rule, the mittimus should be corrected to reflect only two first-degree murder convictions, one arson conviction, one conviction for home invasion, and one conviction for robbery. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County, but order that the mittimus be corrected.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 This case has an extensive factual background and only the most pertinent facts necessary to resolve the issues are included in this order. On January 3, 2000, elderly brothers Preston (Preston) and Raymond Stofer (Raymond) were robbed and beaten in their home at 1041 W. 112th Place in Chicago, Illinois, and subsequently killed when the home was set on fire. On January 4, 2000, at approximately 10:30 p.m., the defendant was arrested for the crime. On January 6, 2000, while in police custody, the defendant made inculpatory oral and videotaped statements to the police. On January 28, 2000, the defendant, along with codefendants John Mitchell (codefendant Mitchell) and Robert Campbell (codefendant Campbell), were charged with multiple counts of first-degree murder, home invasion, residential burglary, arson and robbery.

¶ 4 On October 31, 2000, the defendant filed motions to quash arrest (motion to quash) and to suppress his inculpatory statements (motion to suppress). On March 8, 2004, the trial court 1 granted the motion to quash, finding that the police had lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant. Thereafter, the State filed a motion for attenuation, arguing that intervening probable cause existed shortly after the defendant's arrest and that his inculpatory statement was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest. On January 5, 2005, at the attenuation hearing, the trial court ruled that the defendant's inculpatory statement was sufficiently attenuated from his illegal arrest. However, upon reconsideration on February 24, 2005, the trial court reversed its previous ruling on the motion for attenuation and found that no attenuation existed. On March 18, 2005, the State appealed the trial court's February 24, 2005 ruling, arguing that probable cause existed for the defendant's arrest. On October 17, 2006, in reversing the trial court's ruling, this court found that the defendant's arrest was supported by probable cause and remanded the matter for a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress. People v. Lee, No. 1–05–0923, 367 Ill.App.3d 1092, 340 Ill.Dec. 865, 929 N.E.2d 169 (Oct. 17, 2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 5 On remand, the defendant filed an amended motion to suppress statements (amended motion to suppress), alleging that his inculpatory statement was involuntary because it was obtained as a product of police coercion and in violation of his constitutional rights. On October 15, 2008, a hearing on the amended motion to suppress was held.2 Sergeant Robert Larson (Sergeant Larson) testified on behalf of the State that on the evening of January 4, 2000, he located the defendant in the vicinity of 112th Place and Aberdeen Street and escorted him to the Area 2 police station. The defendant did not invoke his right to counsel at any time; however, Sergeant Larson stated that he did not advise the defendant of his Miranda rights nor question him regarding the crimes at issue during his contact with the defendant.

¶ 6 Detective Eileen Heffernan (Detective Heffernan) testified that she was assigned to investigate the murders of Preston and Raymond. On January 4, 2000, at approximately 11:30 p.m., she and her partner, Detective Michael Cummings (Detective Cummings), interviewed the defendant at the police station. Upon their arrival in the interview room, Detective Cummings advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, to which the defendant responded that he understood his rights and he agreed to speak with the detectives. During the 45–minute interview, the defendant provided the detectives with the following alibi: the defendant stated that he was at the victims' home at 10:45 a.m. on January 3, 2000, in order to collect money which Preston had owed him. Raymond informed the defendant at the time that Preston was not home, but that the defendant could return at about 12:30 p.m. The defendant then drove around in his car for awhile with codefendant Mitchell, smoked marijuana, and met up with codefendant Campbell and codefendant Campbell's girlfriend, Karen Blue (Karen). The four individuals then stopped at a gas station and later went to codefendant Campbell's house, where the defendant stayed until about 3 p.m. Detective Heffernan further testified that on January 5, 2000, at approximately 9 a.m., food was brought to the defendant and she and Detective Cummings spoke with him for a few minutes in the interview room, during which they informed him that they would investigate his alibi. On January 6, 2000, at approximately 1 a.m., Detectives Heffernan and Cummings had another conversation with the defendant after he waived his Miranda rights. During this 30–minute interview, the detectives informed the defendant that several individuals had implicated him in the murders. At no time did the defendant ever invoke his right to counsel. Detective Heffernan denied that Detective Cummings ever physically struck the defendant or made any verbal threats against him in her presence. She denied ever taunting the defendant with the threat of the death penalty or telling him that he had “better not mess with Detective Cummings because he was crazy and would kill him.” Detective Heffernan also denied seeing Detective Cummings walk back and forth during the interview with a weightlifting belt and snapping it in front of the defendant, nor did Detective Cummings tell the defendant to “be smart” because this was a “double murder” for which he would receive the death penalty, but that [i]t's okay if [he] just went in there to get [his] money and something happened that [he] didn't want to.” The defendant never complained to Detective Heffernan or anyone else that he had been struck or mistreated by the police. He was not handcuffed at any time during the interviews.

¶ 7 Detective Cummings' testimony at the hearing on the amended motion to suppress was substantially similar to Detective Heffernan's testimony. Detective Cummings further testified that during the early evening of January 5, 2000, he introduced the defendant to Detective Graziano, who was also investigating the murders. At noon on January 6, 2000, Detective Cummings informed the defendant of the progress of the investigation, that codefendants Mitchell and Campbell had confessed to the crime and also implicated the defendant, and that Detective Cummings was going to gather evidence from the crime scene and a codefendant's home. Detective Cummings denied telling the defendant that a woman named Felicia had made a dying declaration which implicated the defendant in the double murder, and denied ever striking the defendant or having any physical contact with him. He further denied making any verbal threats against the defendant or referencing the death penalty during the interviews. Detective Cummings stated that the defendant neither invoked his right to remain silent nor requested the presence of an attorney at any time.

¶ 8 Retired detective Phillip Graziano (Detective Graziano) testified that he investigated the murders of Preston and Raymond in January 2000. On January 5, 2000, Detective Graziano was introduced to the defendant, who was not handcuffed and appeared physically and mentally well. Detective Cummings was present at the time and asked the defendant if he needed anything to eat or drink or to use the restroom. On January 6, 2000, at approximately 8 p.m., he and Detective Judge advised the defendant of his constitutional rights, which the defendant acknowledged he understood. Detective Graziano then told the defendant that he knew how and when the crime occurred. Detective Graziano then commented to the defendant that “isn't it better to be known as a liar and a thief than a killer of old men?” He further informed the defendant that he believed that Preston had gotten “the better of [the defendant] during a physical altercation and that the defendant struck Preston's head with a steam iron from the dining room area. Detective Graziano also expressed his belief that the defendant had taken money from Preston's pocket. In response, the defendant stated that he did not set the house on fire and made incriminating statements regarding the events of January 3, 2000....

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