People v. Lee

• Decision Date: 02 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 97239.,97239.
• Citation: 821 N.E.2d 307,213 Ill.2d 218,290 Ill.Dec. 256
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Ivory LEE, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

821 N.E.2d 307

213 Ill.2d 218

290 Ill.Dec. 256

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Ivory LEE, Appellant.

No. 97239.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

December 2, 2004.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Martin J. Ryan, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, John Schmidt, State's Attorney, Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin, Jonathan J. Silbermann, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, David E. Mannchen, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, of counsel), for the People.

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Ivory Lee, was convicted in the circuit court of Sangamon County of second degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1998)) and two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 1998)) involving two victims, Wile and Willis Trotter. The aggravated battery with a firearm count for the shooting of Willis Trotter is not at issue here. Regarding Wile Trotter, defendant was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for the second degree murder conviction, a Class 1 felony, and 15 years' imprisonment for the aggravated battery with a firearm conviction at issue here, a Class X felony, thus receiving a greater sentence on the lower class felony. The appellate court affirmed in part and vacated the aggravated battery with a firearm conviction on one-act, one-crime grounds. People v. Lee, 311 Ill.App.3d 363, 243 Ill.Dec. 958, 724 N.E.2d 557 (2000).

We denied defendant's first petition for leave to appeal but, pursuant to our supervisory authority, we remanded the cause for further consideration in light of People v. Crespo, 203 Ill.2d 335, 273 Ill.Dec. 241, 788 N.E.2d 1117 (2001). On remand, the appellate court "adhered" to its original opinion, affirming the second degree murder conviction and vacating the aggravated battery with a firearm conviction. 343 Ill.App.3d 431, 278 Ill.Dec. 219, 797 N.E.2d 1137. We then granted defendant leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), and now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant was indicted with (1) three counts of first degree murder of Wile Trotter: (a) intentional murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1998)), (b) knowing murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1998)), and (c) felony murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1998)); (2) one count of aggravated battery with a firearm of Wile Trotter; (3) one count of aggravated battery with a firearm of Willis Trotter; and (4) one count of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 1998)). The State later dismissed the counts of felony murder and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon.

The evidence elicited at defendant's jury trial showed the following. On the evening of February 6, 1997, defendant and several of his friends went to a party at the Sky Harbor Inn in Springfield. The group took along a handgun for protection, but initially left it in the car. Approximately one hour after the group arrived at the party, twin brothers Wile and Willis Trotter, who were allegedly known for carrying guns, also arrived at the party. Defendant presented evidence that Wile and Willis had previously shot at defendant and his friends, pointed a gun at one or more of them without shooting, and shot at other people. Following the arrival of Wile and Willis, defendant and two of his friends went to their cars to get some drinks. At this time, defendant retrieved the handgun from his friend's car and put it in his waistband. The three then returned to the party.

Shortly thereafter, defendant's group decided to leave the party. Once outside, Willis began arguing with one of defendant's friends. The two yelled at each other and exchanged profanities. According to the statements of defendant and two of his friends, Willis appeared to reach for a gun inside his pocket during the argument. Defendant stated that because he believed Willis was reaching for a gun, he pulled the handgun from his waistband and shot Willis.

Defendant also believed that Wile was reaching for a gun in his coat. Defendant shot Wile three times. Defendant and his group then fled the scene. When police arrived, Wile told them that two of the others in the group had shot him. Police found no weapons at the scene. Shortly thereafter, the police stopped a car and a passenger, later identified as defendant, ran from the car toward some nearby houses. Police searched the remaining members of defendant's group who were also in the car, but did not find any weapons. The group was taken to the police station for questioning. Defendant was later arrested. He initially claimed that he was inside the Sky Harbor Inn at the time of the shooting. When police told him other witnesses contradicted this claim, he signed a statement where he admitted to shooting Wile and Willis. However, he claimed the shootings were in self-defense.

Defendant was convicted of the second degree murder of Wile Trotter, aggravated battery with a firearm of Wile Trotter, and aggravated battery with a firearm of Willis Trotter. The second degree murder conviction arose as a lesser-mitigated offense of first degree murder. The jury found that defendant believed circumstances existed to justify the use of deadly force, but also found that defendant's belief was unreasonable. The court sentenced defendant to 20 years' imprisonment for second degree murder and 15 years' imprisonment for aggravated battery with a firearm of Wile Trotter, and 18 years' imprisonment for aggravated battery with a firearm of Willis Trotter. The 20- and 15-year sentences were to run concurrent to each other, but consecutive to the 18-year sentence. Defendant appealed, arguing that: (1) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not shoot the Trotters in self-defense; and (2) his convictions for second degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm of Wile were based on the same physical act.

The appellate court affirmed in part and vacated in part. Lee, 311 Ill.App.3d 363, 243 Ill.Dec. 958, 724 N.E.2d 557. We denied defendant's leave to appeal. In the exercise of our supervisory authority, we vacated the appellate court's judgment and directed the court to reconsider its decision in light of People v. Crespo, 203 Ill.2d 335, 273 Ill.Dec. 241, 788 N.E.2d 1117 (2001). Following remand, the appellate court reached the same result. 343 Ill.App.3d 431, 278 Ill.Dec. 219, 797 N.E.2d 1137. The appellate court rejected defendant's self-defense argument, concluding that the State proved his belief that the circumstances justified the use of deadly force was unreasonable. 343 Ill.App.3d at 437, 278 Ill.Dec. 219, 797 N.E.2d 1137.

The appellate court noted that the Crespo defendant, like defendant here, committed a series of closely related but separate acts when he stabbed one of the victims three times in rapid succession. 343 Ill.App.3d at 438, 278 Ill.Dec. 219, 797 N.E.2d 1137. Here, defendant shot Wile Trotter three times. As in Crespo, the charging instrument did not apportion the separate acts into separate crimes. 343 Ill.App.3d at 439, 278 Ill.Dec. 219, 797 N.E.2d 1137. The appellate court recognized that in Crespo the State could have charged each stab wound as a separate crime, but did not. 343 Ill.App.3d at 439, 278 Ill.Dec. 219, 797 N.E.2d 1137. Nor did the State argue that theory to the jury. 343 Ill.App.3d at 439, 278 Ill.Dec. 219, 797 N.E.2d 1137. Similarly, the State did not charge each gunshot in this case as a separate crime. 343 Ill.App.3d at 439, 278 Ill.Dec. 219, 797 N.E.2d 1137. Defendant's convictions for second degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm of Wile were, therefore, based on the same physical act. 343 Ill.App.3d at 438-39, 278 Ill.Dec. 219, 797 N.E.2d 1137. The appellate court then vacated the aggravated battery conviction, stating that the one-act, one-crime principle should inure to the benefit of the State, not defendant. 343 Ill.App.3d at 441, 278 Ill.Dec. 219, 797 N.E.2d 1137. Defendant again petitioned for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315), and we granted the petition.

Other relevant facts will be introduced as they become pertinent to our analysis.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Self-Defense

First, we address defendant's argument of self-defense. Self-defense is an affirmative defense, and once a defendant raises it, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense, in addition to proving the elements of the charged offense. People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill.2d 104, 127, 207 Ill.Dec. 21, 646 N.E.2d 587 (1995). The elements of self-defense are: (1) that unlawful force was threatened against a person; (2) that the person threatened was not the aggressor; (3) that the danger of harm was imminent; (4) that the use of force was necessary; (5) that the person threatened actually and subjectively believed a danger existed that required the use of the force applied; and (6) the beliefs of the person threatened were objectively reasonable. 720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 1998); see also Jeffries, 164 Ill.2d at 127-28, 207 Ill.Dec. 21, 646 N.E.2d 587. If the State negates any one of these elements, the defendant's claim of self-defense must fail. Jeffries, 164 Ill.2d at 127-28, 207 Ill.Dec. 21, 646 N.E.2d 587.

The parties' arguments on this point center on the reasonableness of defendant's belief that the circumstances warranted the use of deadly force. This issue involved credibility determinations made by the jury. It is the function of the jury as the trier of fact to assess the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. People v. Tenney, 205 Ill.2d 411, 428, 275 Ill.Dec. 800, 793 N.E.2d 571 (2002). The jury must also resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. Tenney, 205 Ill.2d at 428, 275...