People v. Lee

• Decision Date: 13 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 53879,53879
• Citation: 429 N.E.2d 461,57 Ill.Dec. 563,87 Ill.2d 182
• Parties: , 57 Ill.Dec. 563 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Danny LEE (Jerome Trosclair, Appellee).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 461

429 N.E.2d 461

87 Ill.2d 182, 57 Ill.Dec. 563

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Danny LEE (Jerome Trosclair, Appellee).

No. 53879.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 13, 1981.

Tyrone C. Fahner, Atty. Gen. and Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Chicago (Melbourne A. Noel, Jr., and Mark L. Rotert, Asst. Attys. Gen. and Marcia B. Orr and Robert J. Kaiser, Jr., Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Richard E. Gorman, Chicago (Ronald R. Nosek, Lombard, of counsel), for appellee.

SIMON, Justice:

The defendant's claim that he would be prejudiced by joint trial with his codefendants was not sufficiently substantiated to require severance. Because the trial judge was not specifically told how the defenses were antagonistic, the defendants' joint trial here was proper.

Defendants Jerome Trosclair, Danny Lee, and two others were charged in the circuit court of Cook County with murder for the execution-style slaying of Reginald Bell, Sr., attempted murder for a similar attack upon Darryle Sanders, and armed robbery and burglary. The evidence developed at trial by the testimony of witnesses other than Trosclair's codefendants disclosed that the four defendants invaded a party in an apartment, in search of a man called "Junior," after an earlier request to search the apartment had been rebuffed by the occupants. Once inside the apartment, Trosclair produced a gun and ordered some of the occupants-Stanley Watson, Mary Ann Watson and Dewana Beard-to lie on the floor near Darryle Sanders, who was sleeping. Others in the apartment scurried out the back door or hid in a pantry. Bell got out of the apartment but then returned for his son. After leading the boy to safety, Bell confronted the defendants and asked them to take whatever they wanted but not to hurt anyone. Bell was ordered to join the four lying on the living room floor.

Unable to find their quarry, the defendants took jewelry, wallets, and items of clothing from those on the floor, as well as part of the apartment's component stereo system. Trosclair then gave his pistol to Lee and told Lee to "Kill them all." Upon learning that a pregnant woman was among those on the floor, Lee said that he would kill only two persons. He shot Bell and Sanders. All of the defendants then fled. Bell died and Sanders sustained injuries serious enough to confine him to the hospital for 9 months. Stanley and Mary Ann Watson each testified at trial about what took place and identified Trosclair and Lee.

At trial the four defendants had separate counsel. Lee answered the State's motion for discovery by claiming that he would offer, as a defense, the State's inability to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the affirmative defenses, among others, of necessity and compulsion. Lee and another codefendant moved for severance. The record shows some confusion as to whether Trosclair joined in Lee's motion, but in any event Trosclair's attorney was not present when Lee's motion was heard and did not argue at that time for a severance. These motions for severance were denied. Trosclair answered discovery by claiming as a defense the State's inability to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the morning of jury selection, Trosclair moved for severance. He claimed, without providing any more specific facts, that a codefendant had made statements which the State would use against Trosclair at trial and that his codefendants' defenses were antagonistic to his. In a hearing on the motion Trosclair's counsel said that he believed the codefendants would testify on their own behalf and implicate Trosclair. The court was not informed of what the substance of such testimony would be. The trial judge, stating that there was only a "possibility" of adverse testimony, denied the motion.

During the opening statements, counsel for Trosclair promised that Trosclair would take the stand, tell why he did not commit the crime, and present an alibi. One of the codefendants testified that he was not in the apartment where the murders occurred but saw Trosclair and another man (who was carrying part of the stolen stereo) running outside the building in which the crime was committed. Trosclair asked for a mistrial after this testimony, but the motion was denied.

Trosclair renewed his motion for severance when Lee took the stand and testified that Trosclair had forced him to do the shooting. Lee testified that he feared Trosclair had another gun and would shoot him as well as the persons on the floor if Lee did not do as told. Trosclair declined to cross-examine Lee; he neither took the stand nor made a closing argument. The jury found the two confederates guilty of armed robbery and burglary and Lee and Trosclair guilty of murder, attempted murder, aggravated battery, battery, burglary, and three counts of armed robbery. The appellate court reversed Trosclair's convictions but affirmed those of his codefendants. (86 Ill.App.3d 922, 41 Ill.Dec. 913, 408 N.E.2d 335.) The State sought, and was granted, leave to appeal Trosclair's case under Rule 315 (73 Ill.2d R. 315).

Ordinarily a motion for separate trial of jointly indicted defendants is to be made before trial commences. (People v. Rhodes (1969), 41 Ill.2d 494, 497, 244 N.E.2d 145; People v. Anderson (1909), 239 Ill. 168, 179-80, 87 N.E. 917.) The motion must demonstrate how the defendant is going to be prejudiced by proceeding with a joint trial. Mere apprehensions of prejudice are not enough. (People v. Yonder (1969), 44 Ill.2d 376, 386, 256 N.E.2d 321.) The decision to grant a separate trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 114-8; People v. Canaday (1971), 49 Ill.2d 416, 424, 275 N.E.2d 356.

The general rule is that defendants jointly indicted are to be jointly tried unless fairness to one of the defendants requires a separate trial to avoid prejudice. (People v. Lindsay (1952), 412 Ill. 472, 480, 107 N.E.2d 614.) At least two varieties of prejudice can be readily identified. First, a defendant may be denied his constitutional right of confrontation if, in a joint trial, the State introduces the admission of a codefendant which implicates the defendant. (Douglas v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 415, 419, 13 L.Ed.2d 934, 937, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1077.) Because the defendant cannot call the codefendant to the stand for cross-examination, either a separate trial should be ordered or the admission should be redacted to eliminate any references to the defendant. (Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 134 n.10, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 484 n.10, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1626-27 n.10; People v. Clark (1959), 17 Ill.2d 486, 490, 162 N.E.2d 413.) No admissions of codefendants were entered into evidence by the State against Trosclair, and consequently he did not suffer this kind of prejudice as a result of his joint trial.

Prejudice may also occur when a codefendant takes the stand to point a finger at the defendant as the...