People v. Lee

• Decision Date: 30 November 2018
• Docket Number: No. 1-15-2522,1-15-2522
• Citation: 2018 IL App (1st) 152522,428 Ill.Dec. 423,122 N.E.3d 432
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rodney LEE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2018 IL App (1st) 152522

122 N.E.3d 432

428 Ill.Dec. 423

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Rodney LEE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-15-2522

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FIFTH DIVISION.

November 30, 2018

Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Imran Ahmad, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Annette C. Collins, and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE HALL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant Rodney Lee was convicted of violating the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) ( 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2014) ) for his failure to register as a sex offender and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that SORA's statutory scheme violates federal and Illinois constitutions' due process rights by infringing on registrants' fundamental liberty interests where it places upon them severe restrictions, intrusive monitoring and burdensome registration requirements without providing substantive or procedural due process. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in 1998 and was subsequently required to register as a sex offender. In 2014, defendant was indicted for his failure to register as a sex offender and his trial commenced on May 20, 2015.

¶ 4 At trial, Chicago police detective Matthew Schenatski testified that on August 20, 2014, he was assigned to investigate defendant for failure to register. As part of his investigation, he went to 1108 N. Monticello Avenue, defendant's last known address. When he arrived, the front door was unlocked and ajar. Schenatski walked inside and found the apartment vacant; however, there was a cellular phone and a television with wires running outside to a neighbor's property. On cross-examination, Schenatski agreed that he did not have a search warrant for the two-story building at 1108 N. Monticello Avenue.

¶ 5 Chicago police detective Ruck testified that on September 3, 2014, as part of defendant's failure to register investigation, he interviewed defendant, who had been taken into custody. Detective Ruck administered Miranda warnings, and defendant said that he understood them. Defendant told Ruck that he lived at 1108 N. Monticello Avenue since 2007 and that he was supposed to register every 90 days. Ruck asked defendant why he had not registered since June 2013 and defendant responded that when he went to the police department in September 2013, he was told that he needed $100 to register. Ruck told defendant that the registration fee could be waived and that if he went to the police department, it would have been documented that he tried to register. Defendant then told Ruck that he did not go to the police station but called instead. On cross-examination, Ruck indicated that defendant's statement was made orally.

¶ 6 The parties then stipulated that if called to testify, Chicago police officer Patrick Loftus would identify defendant and testify that he registered him as a sex offender on June 24, 2013. He would identify People's Exhibit Number 1 as a true and accurate copy of the registration form that he completed with defendant, bearing his own signature and defendant's signature on each page. He would further testify that as part of the registration process, he informed defendant of his duty to register every 90 days and that he must register on or before September 22, 2013. Loftus would finally testify that business records maintained by the Chicago Police Department for sex offender registration contain no subsequent registrations or attempts to register by defendant.

¶ 7 The parties further stipulated that if called to testify, Chicago police Officer Figus would testify that he arrested defendant on September 3, 2014, at 9:40 am at 801 North Kedzie Avenue.

¶ 8 People's Exhibit Number 1 and People's Exhibit Number 2, a certified copy of defendant's 1998 conviction, were admitted without objection.

¶ 9 After argument, defendant's motion for a directed finding was denied.

¶ 10 Defendant testified that he lived at 1108 N. Monticello Avenue and during the last 10 years, he had two prior felony convictions: a 2009 failure to report a change in address and a failure to register in 2006. On June 24, 2013, he registered at the police station with Officer Loftus, who told him that the next time he came to register, he would have to pay a $100 registration fee. Defendant testified that Loftus said he would not register him if he did not pay and that although the fee had been waived in the past, he would not waive it again. Defendant called the police station on September 21 or September 22 and explained to the officer who answered the phone that he only had $80. He asked if it would be possible to pay the $80 towards the registration fee and pay the balance later, but the officer told him that he would have to have the full amount in order to register. Defendant decided not to go to the police station because he did not believe they would register him or give him a waiver and he did not want to get arrested. Defendant identified Defense Exhibit Number 1 as a registration fee waiver he received on September 25, 2012, Defense Exhibit Number 2 as a registration fee waiver he received on May 10, 2002, Defense Exhibit Number 3 as a registration fee waiver he received on July 14, 2000, and Defense Exhibit Number 4 as a registration fee waiver he received on July 20, 1999.

¶ 11 On cross-examination, defendant agreed that he received a fee waiver as shown on each of the defense exhibits he previously identified, none of which were executed by Officer Loftus. Defendant reviewed and identified People's Exhibit Number 5, his registration form from December 26, 2012, which he signed with Officer Solomis Karadjias, and People's Exhibit Number 6, his registration form from September 25, 2012, which he signed with Officer Ronald Jenkins. While he conceded that when he called the station in September 2013 he did not ask about a fee waiver or identify himself to the officer on the phone, defendant maintained that he called and was told that if he did not have $100, there was no need to come in.

¶ 12 On redirect, defendant testified that there was no statement in People's Exhibits 4, 5, or 6 that he had to bring money, but he did see that on a registration form in June 2013.

¶ 13 Defense Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 were admitted without objection and the defense rested.

¶ 14 People's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6 were admitted and the State rested in rebuttal.

¶ 15 After argument, the trial court found that defendant had registered several times and was provided several fee waivers. The court found that defendant did not report in person as required, found him guilty of failing to register and continued the matter for post-trial proceedings.

¶ 16 On June 17, 2015, defense counsel filed a motion for new trial, a copy of which is not included in the record. On July 9, 2015, defense counsel notified the court that defendant had prepared a pro se motion to reconsider, dismiss and discharge, and the matter was continued to determine whether counsel wished to incorporate any of defendant's arguments into his motion. On July 28, 2015, defense counsel stated that he would not incorporate any of defendant's pro se points into his motion for new trial. Defendant's pro se motion was filed that day and the trial court allowed defendant to argue his motion in addition to counsel's argument on the motion for new trial.

¶ 17 Defendant argued pro se that his registration period had expired so it was unconstitutional for him to be convicted in 2011.¹ Further, defendant argued that he was not notified that his registration period was extended and it was an unconstitutional extension. Additionally, he argued that his requirement to register beyond the initial 10-year term without any means to petition for removal was unconstitutional; he should be given an individual assessment to determine whether he posed a continuing risk to the public; and the continued registration requirement is a legislative loophole. These failures, as applied to defendant, violated his due process rights and the proportionate penalties clause.

¶ 18 The State argued that defendant had sexually abused his 10-year-old daughter in 1998. Defendant conceded that he failed to register during his first 10-year term and violated SORA, which he was sentenced on in 2006. Defendant was then informed of his duty to continue to register.

¶ 19 Defendant responded pro se before the court that police were supposed to present him with a letter to sign if his registration term was extended. The trial court ultimately denied defendant's pro se motion and noted that defendant did have acts of violence perpetrated since the date of his original conviction in 1998. Defense counsel then addressed the motion for new trial, which was also denied.

¶ 20 During sentencing, the State argued that defendant's failure to register was a Class 2 offense and it was extendable. The State recommended a six-year sentence. The defense countered that defendant's only convictions were older and besides failure to register, he had no convictions since 2011. In allocution, defendant argued that his failure to register should be a Class 3 and not a Class 2.

¶ 21 The trial court sentenced defendant to four years' imprisonment. Defendant's motion to reconsider sentence was denied and this timely appeal followed.

¶ 22 ANALYSIS

¶ 23 On appeal, defendant contends that SORA's statutory scheme violates federal and Illinois due process rights by infringing on registrants' fundamental liberty interests where it places upon them severe restrictions, intrusive monitoring and burdensome registration requirements without providing substantive or procedural due process. In support...