People v. Lee, 14
Decision Date | 02 December 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 14,14 |
Citation | 371 Mich. 563,124 N.W.2d 736 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Willie James LEE, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Samuel H. Olsen, Pros. Atty., Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, Detroit, for the People.
Rolland R. O'Hare, Chairman, Erwin B. Ellmann, Gen. Counsel, By Melba A. Kopel, Detroit, amicus curiae for American Civil Liberties Union.
Marvin Blake, Detroit, for defendant and appellant.
Before the Entire Bench.
Defendant was convicted of possession of narcotics. The circumstances of his arrest are best related by direct quotations from the testimony of the arresting officers:
DIRECT EXAMINATION--SERGEANT CHARLES WOLFENDEN:
'Q. Now, at the time you made this arrest what was your reason for the arrest?
'A. I observed the defendant make a righthand turn off the expressway at Harper and Van Dyke. His license plate, which was attached to the bumper, was bent down in underneath the bumper, and I couldn't read it or actually tell that he had a license plate there.
'Q. In other words, the vehicle you observed had a license plate which was improperly displayed and defaced in a manner that would not identify it?
'A. That's right, sir.
'Q. And for that reason you stopped him?
'A. That's right, sir.
'Q. Did you yourself engage the driver in a conversation?
'A. I did.
'Q. Did you ask for his [driver's] license?
'A. I did.
'Q. And did he display his [driver's] license?
'A. He did.
'Q. And, following that, did you ask him or did you direct him to move so you could make a mechanical check of the mechanical safety of the vehicle?
'A. I talked with the defendnat, and he got out of the car and same back between the cars, where I talked to him, and I went at that time to make a mechanical check.
'Q. And what was your purpose? That is, what part of the vehicle were you checking?
'A. The brakes, sir.
Q. And in order to check the brakes did you have to place yourself in the driver's seat?
'A. I did.
Q. Now, in so doing, describe just what you did and what happened?
CROSS EXAMINATION--SERGEANT CHARLES WOLFENDEN:
'A. We were stopped on the service drive jusg--the service drive of the expressway--just west of Van Dyke. * * *
'Q. Now, what were your duties at that time?
'A. My duties--my specific duties are gambling and vice.
'Q. Gambling and vice. You weren't actually assigned to anything pertaining to traffic?
'A. Well, that takes in my duty also, sir. * * *
'Q. Generally, as a matter of fact, you don't make any stops except for moving violations, is that correct?
'A. That's right, sir.
CROSS EXAMINATION--OFFICER JAMES SINNAMON:
'Q. And were you, yourself, able to read the license plate?
'A. No, I wasn't.
Q. Did you look at it?
* * *
'
* * *
CROSS EXAMINATION--OFFICER CLEMENTS KRAUSE:
'
The foregoing testimony graphically recites the real reason defendant was stopped by the vice squad.
Care must be taken in specifying what we decide in this case. As courts of last resort on occasions must do, we so specify by particularizing what we do not decide. We do not here construe P.A.1949, No. 300, chapter 6, § 715 (C.L.S.1956, § 257.715 [Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 9.2415]), authorizing uniformed police officers on reasonable grounds to stop any motor vehicle and inspect it for defects in equipment, including brakes, for the reason that it clearly is not involved. There is no suggestion in the testimony that the officers had reasonable grounds to make an inspection of the brakes on defendant's car. Nowhere do we find any advertence to the fact that they, in fact, stopped the car in question with a view toward the enforcement of the above statute. Contrariwise, all of the testimony indicates that officers decided to make a mechanical check of the brakes, and for that purpose enter the car after it had been stopped because of the condition of the license plate. The officers were entitled to stop the vehicle for this reason, and had they chosen, to ticket for that violation. This right, however, did not extend to fulfilling the requirement of the quoted statute that there be 'reasonable grounds shown' to stop a motor vehicle 'to inspect the same.'
By reason of this holding, we specifically do not decide whether, had the entry into the motor vehicle been made legally, the narcotics were legally seized.
It is distasteful, indeed, to have to disregard the fact that respondent here possessed narcotics. Their ultimate disposition may have been sale to innocent thrillseeking young people. But distasteful or no, we cannot permit a State statute aimed at control of the operation of unsafe vehicles to be utilized, as appears conclusively from the total record, as a device to supply probable cause, where none exists, to enter a motor vehicle.
Michigan's Constitution, art. 2, § 10 provides:
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