People v. Lego, 37712

• Citation: 32 Ill.2d 76,203 N.E.2d 875
• Decision Date: 21 January 1965
• Docket Number: No. 37712,37712
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Don Richard LEGO, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Page 875

203 N.E.2d 875

32 Ill.2d 76

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Don Richard LEGO, Plaintiff in Error.

No. 37712.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 21, 1965.

Kenneth J. Brundage, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach and George W. Kenney, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and John Gannon, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for defendant in error.

SOLFISBURG, Justice.

The defendant, Don Richard Lego, was indicted in the criminal court of Cook County on the charge of robbery. He was tried by a jury, found guilty and sentenced by the court to a term in the penitentiary of not less than 25 nor more than 50 years. He prosecutes this writ of error from that judgment.

Defendant complains that he was denied due process of law, contending that a question of insanity was raised and the trial court erred in not conducting a sanity hearing before a jury pursuant to statute.

The basis for defendant's objection is that on the day of trial the public defender informed the court that he had just been handed a note written and signed by the defendant, which stated as follows: 'I feel I am not competent to stand trial due to the fact I suffer from blackout spells.' The attorney for the defendant then moved the court for a Behavior Clinic examination. This motion was denied by the court.

Although there was no formal request for a sanity hearing and no suggestion of insanity as such, defendant argues on appeal that the note and motion for a Behavior Clinic examination was sufficient to require the court to conduct a sanity hearing and that failure to do so was a violation of due process.

The trial, adjudication, sentence or execution of a person charged with a criminal offense, while insane, is a violation of due process of law. (People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239; People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 155, 107 N.E.2d 861; People v. Maynard, 347 Ill. 422, 179 N.E. 833.) This court has held that a formal petition for a sanity hearing is not necessary. The question of a defendant's sanity may be raised by oral suggestions of counsel during the trial, and if made in good faith, it becomes the duty of the court ot conduct a hearing before a jury upon the issue, and the denial thereof is a violation of due process. (People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239; Brown v. People, 8 Ill.2d 540, 134 N.E.2d 760.) A trial judge has a duty to impanel a jury to determine whether an accused is capable of understanding the nature of the charges against him and of co-operating with his counsel whenever facts that give rise to a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's sanity are brought to the attention of the trial court, either from observation of the defendant or from suggestion by counsel. People v. Harper, 31 Ill.2d 51, 198 N.E.2d 825; People v. Richeson, 24 Ill.2d 182, 181 N.E.2d 170; People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239.

Counsel's motion for a Behavior Clinic examination alone was insufficient to raise a bona fide question as to the defendant's capacity to stand trial. (People v. Harper, 31 Ill.2d 51, 198 N.E.2d 825; People v. Cleggett, 22 Ill.2d 471, 177 N.E.2d 187.) The question, therefore, is whether all the facts presented to the trial court were sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's sanity.

At no time did counsel for the defendant state that the defendant was unable to co-operate with him or was unable to comprehend the nature of the charges against him. Defensel counsel did not contend that there were any other factors bearing on defendant's competency; he merely read to the court a self-serving note written by the defendant. The defendant testified lucidly and at great length with myriad details during the trial. His conduct and testimony gave every indication that he was thoroughly oriented, aware of the nature of the proceedings and gave intelligent co-operation to his counsel, both on the hearing of the motion to suppress the confession and during the jury trial itself. In our opinion there were not sufficient facts presented to the trial court to raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's sanity and therefore the trial judge was not required to conduct a sanity hearing.

Prior to the trial on the merits the defendant made a motion to suppress an oral confession reduced to writing, contending that the confession was given as a result of coercion. After hearing, the court denied the motion and the defendant urges error in this ruling.

The law is clear that only voluntary confessions may be used as evidence against an accused and that confessions procured through force, threats or offers of leniency are inadmissible. However, the question of the voluntary character of a confession is for the trial court to determine, and unless it can be said that the decision of the trial court is manifestly against the weight of the evidence, the decision of the trial court will not be disturbed. People v. Weger, 25 Ill.2d 370, 185 N.E.2d 183; People v. Miller, 13 Ill.2d 84, 148 N.E.2d 455; People v. Townsend, 11 Ill.2d 30, 141 N.E.2d 729, 69 A.L.R.2d 371.

The defendant claims that his oral...