People v. Lehman

Decision Date24 March 1955
Docket NumberNo. 33392,33392
Citation125 N.E.2d 506,5 Ill.2d 337
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Richard G. LEHMAN, Plaintiff in Error.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Thomas Allegretti, Chicago (Stephen Lee, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., and John Gutknecht, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Decatur, George W. Schwaner, Jr., Springfield, John T. Gallagher and Rudolph L. Janega, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

The defendant, Richard G. Lehman, was indicted in the criminal court of Cook County upon two separate charges of robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon. In case No. 52-1989, he was charged with the armed robbery of Alvin K. Anderson with a pistol and the theft of $3000 and a truck valued at $3000; in No. 52-1990, he was charged with the armed robbery of Robert T. Curran with a pistol and the theft of $1900 and a truck valued at $3000. In each case the indictment charged that the money and the truck were the property of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company. Defendant waived a jury trial in each case, was found guilty in each, and was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for terms of not less than three nor more than fifteen years, the sentences to run concurrently.

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant a conviction. In No. 52-1990, which was tried first, he contends that detailed evidence of the circumstances attending his arrest was erroneously admitted. In No. 52-1989, stipulations were entered into that if certain witnesses were called to testify, their testimony would be the same as in No. 52-1990. He contends that these stipulations violated substantial requirements of orderly procedure.

In No. 52-1990 Curran testified that he is employed by the Illinois Bell Telephone Company to make collections from public pay telephones; that on June 17, 1952, about 1:00 P. M., upon returning to a company truck after making a collection at a restaurant on North Ridge Avenue, in Chicago, he was pushed from behind and fell forward to the floor; that he looked back and saw defendant, who was holding a revolver in his right hand and a paper bag in his left hand; that defendant had on a pair of sun glasses and was wearing brown dress gloves and 'louvre' shoes interwoven with lattice work; that defendant commanded him to lie face down on the floor of the truck, stating that if he did what he was told nothing would happen to him; that he obeyed and defendant tied his wrists and feet with twine, took the ignition keys, and drove the truck away. Curran testified further that after making a few turns, defendant stopped and another man, later identified as Albert Hynes, entered the truck and drove it; that defendant went back to the receptacles holding the coins collected and poured the money into cardboard boxes; that defendant and Hynes stopped the truck every five or ten minutes, left it for brief periods of time, returned, and resumed driving; that after nearly fifty minutes had elapsed, Hynes left the truck, and defendant sat for a few minutes, and that before has also left the truck, he said to Curran: 'I notice you are married and for the sake of you and your family I would forget and and the better it will be.' Curran further testified that approximately $2000 belonging to his employer was taken from the truck, and also his route book which contained sheets for recording the date of each collection and the amount of money taken from each telephone, and that the book showed collections to be made over a fifty-six day period.

Over objection, Curran testified that on August 12, about 11:30 A. M., while making collections on his route, he observed a 1946 Ford automobile following him; that he communicated with the police and, about 1:00 P. M., saw two police officers, talked to them, returned to his truck, and made approximately thirty collections on Devon Avenue between 1:00 and 3:00 P. M.; that about 3:00 o'clock, after crossing the intersection of Clark Street and Devon Avenue, he heard a 'screeching of tires,' looked through the rear-view mirror and saw the police car forcing the car which had been following him to the crub; that he parked his truck and joined the police officers, where he recognized defendant as the man who robbed him on June 17.

Officer Marvin Carlson testified that about 1:30 P. M. on August 12 he saw defendant and another man riding in a 1946 Ford automobile on Devon Avenue east of California Avenue; that this car was 'tailing' Curran's telephone truck for about an hour and a half; that every time Curran stopped his truck to make a collection and pulled away, the second car would also stop and then follow the truck about half a block to the rear; that about 3:00 P. M., when in the vicinity of Clark Street and Devon Avenue, he and his partner forced the Ford car over to the curb, identified themselves, and ordered the two men to get out of their car with their hands up; that as he was coming around the back end of the car to the sidewalk, he saw defendant drop a gun at the curb which, upon examination, he found was loaded. Carlson testified that Curran nodded that defendant was the man who had previously held him up. Carlson searched the car in which defendant had been riding and found a black leather bag containing a cap, sun glasses, gloves and string or twine. The radio in the car was tuned to police calls. Two pieces of twine were found in defendant's shirt pocket at the police station.

The gun, cartridges, sun glasses, gloves, the twine used to tie Curran on June 17, and the twine recovered from defendant's pocket when arrested were received in evidence. Curran testified that the gun looked like the one defendant pointed at him; that the sun glasses and gloves resembled those worn by defendant on June 17. He identified the twine used to tie him. Carlson also identified the articles, with the exception of the twine used on June 17.

After defense testimony, which consisted of defendant's denial of guilt and an alibi testified to by him and by other witnesses, defendant was found guilty. The prosecution announced its readiness to proceed with indictment No. 52-1989. When the court advised defendant that he could be tried with or without a jury, defendant waived a jury trial and his attorney said, 'We will stipulate most of the testimony will be the same. We have agreed on that.' Anderson, also a collector for the...

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    ...entirely clear as to whether Ms. Baldino was eighteen or nineteen at the time of the incident in Connecticut.) 10. In People v. Lehman, 5 Ill.2d 337, 125 N.E.2d 506 (1955), the Supreme Court of Illinois explained with laudable terseness why propensity evidence is so potentially dangerous: "......
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    ...crime. And so, as a matter of policy, where the testimony has no value beyond that inference, it is excluded." (People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 342, 125 N.E.2d 506.) However, evidence that tends to prove a fact at issue--such as motive, intent, identity or common design--or to establ......
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    ...inference that because a man has committed other crimes, he is more likely to have committed the crime charged. People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 342, 125 N.E.2d 506, 509; People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill.2d 325, 330, 5 Ill.Dec. 817, 819, 362 N.E.2d 288, 290. However, evidence of other ......
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