People v. Lennon

• Decision Date: 11 July 1888
• Citation: 71 Mich. 298,38 N.W. 871
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. LENNON.

38 N.W. 871

71 Mich. 298

PEOPLE v. LENNON.

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 11, 1888

Appeal from circuit court, Mackinac county; J. H. STEERE, Judge.

Indictment against Phillip Lennon, for assault upon Herbert Ryerse with intent to commit great bodily harm. Verdict of guilty, and judgment of confinement in the penitentiary for two years from which defendant appeals. Moses Taggart, Atty. Gen., and Henry Hoffman, Pros. Atty., for the People.

MORSE J.

Lennon was convicted in the circuit court for the county of Mackinac of an assault upon one Herbert Ryerse, with intent to do said Ryerse great bodily harm less than the crime of murder. There was another count in the information filed against him charging him with an assault with intent to commit the crime of murder. By the verdict he was acquitted upon this count. The errors assigned relate to the charge of the court.

The court charged the jury upon the subject of self-defense among other things, as follows: "And if you believe, from the evidence in this case, that at the time of the alleged assault the defendant Lennon was first attacked by the complaining witness, and that the circumstances, as they then appeared to him, were such as in reason would and did justify or induce in his mind a probability of a belief that he was to receive from Ryerse some great bodily harm, and in doing what he did he was acting under the instincts of self-preservation, he would not be guilty of the offenses charged in this case. But in that connection you ought to remember that human life is not to be lightly regarded. A man cannot avail himself of this fact in order to escape the penalty of such acts as were provoked by his own unlawful act. And if a man kills or attempts to kill him, or unlawfully attacks or injures another through mere cowardice, or under circumstances not warranted to induce in his mind a reasonable fear of injury, and which would be considered to arise from a want of courage, or an unwarrantable cowardice under the circumstances, situated as the party attacked was, and as the circumstances then presented themselves to him, the law of self-defense would not apply, and would not justify such an act." I do not think it proper that a jury should be authorized to determine the standard of courage in a case of self-defense, or whether the party attacked, in what he did in his defense, acted cowardly, and therefore without warrant. There is no question of courage or cowardice in the case. I am aware that the rule laid down by the trial court has been sustained in some cases, collected and reported in Horrigan & Thompson's Cases of Self-Defense; but the doctrine, or the reason given for it, is not in accord with the principles of self-defense as now almost universally held and enunciated by the courts of this country. The question to be determined is, did the accused, under all the circumstances of assault, as it appeared to him, honestly believe that he was in danger of his life, or great bodily harm, and that it was necessary to do what he did in order to save himself from such apparent threatened danger? If so, the inquiry is ended. It can and ought to make no difference as to whether he was a bold, strong man, used to affrays and personal encounters, or a weak, timid man, unacquainted with broils or assaults, as to the sufficiency of...