People v. Lester
| Decision Date | 21 July 2016 |
| Citation | 36 N.Y.S.3d 288,141 A.D.3d 951,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05593 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Daniel W. LESTER, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
141 A.D.3d 951
36 N.Y.S.3d 288
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 05593
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Daniel W. LESTER, Appellant.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
July 21, 2016.
Susan Betzjitomir, Bath, for appellant.
Mary E. Rain, District Attorney, Canton (Marquetta Christy of counsel), for respondent.
Before: LAHTINEN, J.P., EGAN JR., LYNCH, DEVINE and MULVEY, JJ.
EGAN JR., J.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Richards, J.), rendered July 7, 2014, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree.
Defendant waived indictment and agreed to be prosecuted pursuant to a superior court information charging him with vehicular manslaughter in the first degree and driving while ability impaired by drugs. Defendant thereafter pleaded guilty to vehicular manslaughter in the first degree—in full satisfaction of both the superior court information and other potential charges stemming from a December 2013 incident wherein defendant, while operating a motor vehicle under the influence of various drugs, struck and killed a bicyclist. The underlying plea agreement included a waiver of the right to appeal, and County Court agreed to impose a prison term of 4 to 12 years and to release defendant to probation supervision pending sentencing—subject to certain terms and conditions. Such terms and conditions included, insofar as is relevant here, that defendant refrain from taking any prescription medications that had not in fact been prescribed for him, “abide by a curfew
and be in [his] established residence between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. daily” and submit to random drug testing. In this regard, defendant expressly advised County Court that he was only taking two prescribed medications—Gabapentin and Hydrochlorothiazide.
County Court, in turn, advised defendant that any additional prescription medications had to be approved by the Probation Department before such prescriptions could be filled. County Court also warned defendant that if he “br[oke] the rules” and violated any of the terms imposed by the court or the Probation Department, the court would not be bound by the terms of the plea agreement and could sentence defendant to up to 15 years in prison.
Following a brief recess in the proceedings, defendant was returned to court because he tested positive for Suboxone. Although defendant had not disclosed that he had a prescription for this particular medication during his prior colloquy with County Court, defense counsel subsequently represented that defendant did have a valid prescription for this drug but “unilaterally decided to stop taking it and flushed it” approximately two weeks earlier. Defendant confirmed counsel's understanding, stating, “I just decided to quit taking it.” Despite defendant's initial failure to disclose this medication and his subsequent failed drug test, County Court continued defendant's release under supervision—reminding him of his obligation to test negative for unauthorized drug use.
Approximately one month later, the Probation Department filed a uniform court report alleging that defendant violated the terms of his release by violating his curfew and twice testing positive for Suboxone. A bench warrant was issued and, after County Court found that defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his release, defendant was remanded to the local jail pending sentencing. County Court thereafter imposed an enhanced sentence of 5 to 15 years in prison, prompting this appeal.
We affirm. Initially, we reject defendant's challenge to the validity of his waiver of the right to appeal. As the Court of Appeals recently reiterated, “a trial court need not engage in any particular litany when apprising a defendant pleading guilty of the individual rights abandoned” (People v. Sanders, 25 N.Y.3d 337, 341, 12 N.Y.S.3d 593, 34 N.E.3d 344 [2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). Rather, all that is required is “that defendant's full appreciation of the consequences and understanding of the terms and conditions of the plea, including a waiver of the right to appeal, are apparent on the face of the record” (id. at 340, 12 N.Y.S.3d 593, 34 N.E.3d 344 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). Here, as
reflected in the plea colloquy, County Court explained that defendant's right to appeal was separate and distinct from the other rights forfeited in...
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