People v. Levisen

• Decision Date: 18 January 1950
• Docket Number: No. 31133,31133
• Citation: People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213, 14 A.L.R.2d 1364 (Ill. 1950)
• Parties: , 14 A.L.R.2d 1364 PEOPLE v. LEVISEN et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 213

90 N.E.2d 213

404 Ill. 574, 14 A.L.R.2d 1364

PEOPLE v. LEVISEN et al.

No. 31133.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 18, 1950.

Gilbert K. Hutchens, of Carrollton, and Norbert Hutchens, of Winchester, (Jack A. Alfeld, of Carrollton, and Richard E. Mann, of Winchester, of counsel) for appellants.

Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General, and L. A. Mehrhoff, State's Attorney, of Carrollton (Henry L. Pate, of Tulsola, of counsel) for the People.

CRAMPTON, Justice.

Defendants, the parents of a girl seven years of age, were convicted by the county court of Greene County for violating the compulsory school attendance law. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1947, chap. 122, par. 26-1. They appeal directly to this court, contending (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction and (2) that the statute is unconstitutional.

Appellants are Seventh Day Adventists in religion, believing that the child should not be educated in competition with other children because it produces a pugnacious character, that the necessary atmosphere of faith in the Bible cannot be obtained in the public school, and that for the first eight or ten years of a child's life the field or garden is the best schoolroom, the mother the best teacher, and nature the best lesson book.

The father is a college graduate and a minister in his religion. The mother has had two years of college and some training in pedagogy and educational psychology. The evidence consists solely of a stipulation providing, inter alia, that the child would be in the third grade if she went to the public school; that under the direction of a Seventh Day Adventist institution the mother has been teaching her third-grade work at home for five hours per day and in addition teaches her vocal music; that the child has regular hours for study and recitation; and that she shows proficiency comparable with average third-grade students. The subjects thus being taught and the textbooks from which the instruction is given are set forth in detail. Further provisions recite that appellants refuse to send their child to the public school, and that 'she does not attend and has not attended a parochial or private school.'

The statute in question requires that 'Whoever has custody or control of any child between the ages of seven and sixteen years shall cause such child to attend some public school in the district wherein the child resides * * *.' Provisions are then added exempting 'Any child attending a private or a parochial school where children are taught the branches of education taught to children of corresponding age and grade in the public schools, * * *.' Other provisions, not material here, make exceptions in cases of physical or mental disability, temporary absences for cause, and children over fourteen years of age who are necessarily employed.

Appellants contend the State has failed to prove the child was not attending a 'private school' within the intention of the legislature. They argue that a school, in the ordinary meaning of the word, is a place where instruction is imparted to the young, that a number of persons being taught does not determine whether the place is a school, and that by receiving instruction in her home in the manner shown by the evidence the child was attending a private school. We agree with this construction of the statute. Compulsory education laws are enacted to enforce the natural obligation of parents to provide an education for their young, an obligation which corresponds to the parents' right of control over the child. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042. The object is that all children shall be educated, not that they shall be educated in any particular manner or place. See Commonwealth v. Roberts, 159 Mass. 372, 34 N.E. 402. Here, the child is being taught third-grade subjects, has regular hours for study and recitation, and shows a proficiency comparable with average third-grade students. There is nothing in the record to indicate her education is in any way being neglected. We think the term 'private school,' when read in the light of the mainfest object to be attained, includes the place and nature of the instruction given to this child. The law is not made to punish those who provide their children with instruction equal or superior to that obtainable in the public schools. It is made for the parent who fails or refuses to properly educate his child.

Although the language of the present act has not previously been construed by this court, the scope of similar statutes has been considered by courts of other jurisdictions. In State v. Peterman, 32 Ind.App. 665, 70 N.E. 550, 551, the father of a child being taught in the private home of the teacher was prosecuted for violation of a law requiring children to be sent 'to a public, private or parochial school.' Acts Ind. 1901, p. 470, § 1. The child attended the teacher's home regularly and was taught all the branches taught in the public schools. The teacher did not advertise herself as keeping a private school, had no regular tuition fixed, and did not have or desire to have, any pupils other than the defendant's child. The sole question was whether the child was being sent to a private school, within the meaning of the statute. In holding that the parent had complied with the law the court observed: 'If a parent employs and brings into his residence a teacher for the purpose of instructing his child or children, and such instruction is given as the law contemplates, the meaning and spirit of the law have been fully complied with. This would be the school of the child or children so educated,...