People v. Lewis
Decision Date | 06 May 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 79-710,79-710 |
Citation | 406 N.E.2d 11,84 Ill.App.3d 556,40 Ill.Dec. 310 |
Parties | , 40 Ill.Dec. 310 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henderson LEWIS, a/k/a Charles Jackson, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Lawrence Wolf Levin, Martin S. Agran, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.
Bernard Carey, State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee; Marcia B. Orr, Pamela L. Gray, Richard F. Burke, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel.
Following a jury trial defendant, Henderson Lewis, was found guilty of the offense of solicitation and was sentenced to a term of three years in the penitentiary. On appeal he argues: that statutory provisions governing the use of eavesdropping equipment were not complied with; that the offense of solicitation is unconstitutional as a denial of first amendment rights; that the tape recording and transcript of the solicitation were improperly admitted into evidence; that remarks by the assistant State's Attorney to defense counsel jeopardized defendant's right to a fair trial; and, finally, that defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Prior to trial a hearing was held on defendant's motion to quash the consent for use of eavesdropping equipment and to suppress the resultant tape recordings. An assistant State's Attorney testified that on the morning of June 20, 1977, he spoke with a Chicago police officer and two brothers, Braulio and George Negron, who claimed to have been solicited by defendant to set fire to a warehouse. Following the conversation with the brothers, the assistant State's Attorney executed the documents, (see Ill. Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, pars. 14-2(a), 108A-1, 108A-3) required to secure judicial approval for the proposed eavesdropping of the next meeting between the Negrons and defendant. He then spoke to the State's Attorney, Bernard Carey, on the telephone and, after informing him of the facts of the case, the contents of the application, and the time period requested for the eavesdropping (12:30 p. m. June 20 to 11:00 a. m. June 21), the assistant State's Attorney was granted authorization to submit an application for judicial approval. The assistant State's Attorney then went to the chambers of Judge James Bailey, who after speaking to each of the parties the assistant State's Attorneys, the police officer, and the Negron brothers authorized the order approving the use of eavesdropping equipment for the limited time requested.
Following the testimony of the assistant State's Attorney, both Bernard Carey and Judge Bailey were called. Each verified the above described events. Defendant's motion was denied and the case proceeded to trial.
A co-owner of Union Van Lines testified that a man, whom he identified in court as defendant, stored personal belongings and furniture in Union's warehouse on North Broadway in Chicago. Defendant deposited $35.00 to cover, in part, required insurance charges of $2.40 a month for minimum coverage of $2000. Defendant's goods were stored in the second floor of the warehouse. A second owner testified that he directed his secretary to send an invoice to defendant which indicated that $2.40 had been deducted from defendant's $35.00 deposit to cover the monthly premium for $2000 worth of insurance.
Braulio Negron testified that on June 17, 1977, defendant, in his red "T-Bird," took Braulio to the warehouse on North Broadway, where defendant told Braulio that he wanted the warehouse burned to collect the insurance money. After promising to discuss it with his brother George, Braulio left defendant and went to Officer Salyers, who at one time had arrested both of the brothers. Braulio stated that he told the officer of defendant's proposal because he had just completed a probation period and did not want further trouble. The following day, Braulio and George met with defendant who offered them $100 and the "T-Bird" after the job was complete. On June 20, Braulio consented to wear wiretap equipment, and after receiving judicial authorization, the police outfitted him with a tape recorder and receiver.
Braulio, accompanied at a distance by a police surveillance vehicle, found defendant sometime before midnight on June 20. They set a meeting for between 1:15 and 1:30 a. m. that night at a different location. At that time Braulio, wearing the taping equipment, asked defendant to repeat his proposal for his brother George. Once again defendant talked of burning the building, and he gave Braulio $6.00 for gasoline. Braulio returned to the surveillance vehicle and gave the money to the police officer.
Officer Kenny, an investigator for the State's Attorney's office, testified that he placed the recording equipment on Braulio. He identified People's Exhibit 7 as the tape removed from Braulio and marked by another officer at about 1:45 a. m. Another tape was identified as that made in the surveillance van from the same Braulio-defendant conversation. Kenny kept both tapes in his possession until he turned them over to Judge Bailey. Subsequent to this testimony, the tape was played. Braulio who had been recalled to the stand, testified that it was a true and accurate recording. George Negron substantially affirmed his brother's testimony but added the admission that he had smoked marijuana prior to the recorded meeting with defendant. Officer Salyers reiterated the above testimony and stated that although he had previously arrested the Negron brothers, no charges were pending at the time of defendant's surveillance and no promises were made in return for Braulio's testimony.
Defendant testified that he had given Braulio money, but to induce him to stay away from "his girl on the corner," not to burn down a building. He denied that it was his voice on the tape making incriminating statements but admitted that he might have heard some of the conversation and that he did say other things on the tape. Defendant maintained he did not offer the Negrons his car to burn the warehouse. Instead, he accused Braulio of stating, without any solicitation on defendant's part, that he intended to set fire to buildings and suggesting that defendant might profit from a particular warehouse fire. The State played the tape in rebuttal. A verdict of guilty was returned and this appeal followed.
Defendant first contends, as he did at the pretrial suppression hearing, that the eavesdropping did not receive proper consent from the State's Attorney. The governing statute provides in relevant part:
"The State's Attorney may authorize an application to a circuit judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity with this Article, an order authorizing or approving the use of an eavesdropping device * * *." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 108A-1.)
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the State's Attorney was consulted and advised by the assistant State's Attorney of the facts of the case and the pendency of the application. Further, the undisputed testimony of both reveals that the State's Attorney authorized and approved the assistant State's Attorney's proceeding with the application. The only question presented is whether it is necessary that the State's Attorney execute the application or appear in person before the judicial officer.
Although it has been held that the legislature contemplated that any assistant State's Attorney could authorize the eavesdropping application (People v. George (1978), 67 Ill.App.3d 102, 106, 23 Ill.Dec. 583, 384 N.E.2d 377, cert. denied sub nom. George v. Illinois (1979), --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 262, 62 L.Ed.2d 181), such an expansive interpretation is not necessary under the facts in the instant case. Rather, the procedures followed here were more than adequate to satisfy the safeguards contemplated by the statute, which requires that authorization of the State's Attorney be garnered for an eavesdropping application. The assistant State's Attorney received that authorization and acted upon it. Contrary to defendant's contention, there is no requirement that the authorization be in writing. While written authorization may be the preferred procedure, if only to forestall litigation of whether or not there was actual authorization, it is not the only way to comply with the statute. (See People v. Swimley (1978), 57 Ill.App.3d 116, 124-25, 14 Ill.Dec. 608, 372 N.E.2d 887, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 281, 58 L.Ed.2d 257 ( ); People v. Marlow (1976), 39 Ill.App.3d 177, 350 N.E.2d 215 ( ); but see People v. Porcelli (1974), 25 Ill.App.3d 145, 148-49, 323 N.E.2d 1 (...
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