People v. Lewis, 58910

• Decision Date: 30 November 1984
• Docket Number: No. 58910,58910
• Citation: 473 N.E.2d 901,85 Ill.Dec. 302,105 Ill.2d 226
• Parties: , 85 Ill.Dec. 302 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Cornelius LEWIS, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 901

473 N.E.2d 901

105 Ill.2d 226, 85 Ill.Dec. 302

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Cornelius LEWIS, Appellant.

No. 58910.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 30, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 1, 1985.

[85 Ill.Dec. 303] J. Steven Beckett, Reno, O'Byrne & Kepley, P.C., Champaign, for appellant

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Michael A. Ficaro, Mark L. Rotert, Neal B. Goodfriend, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, Steven D. Pearson, Law Clerk, for appellee.

PER CURIAM:

This is the defendant's second appeal before this court. This appeal is taken from an order of the circuit court of Champaign County denying the defendant, Cornelius Lewis, relief on the basis of his post-conviction petition. The defendant was convicted of murder, aggravated kidnaping and armed robbery. On June 22, 1979, the defendant was sentenced to death. On direct appeal to this court, we affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. (People v. Lewis (1981), 88 Ill.2d 129, 58 Ill.Dec. 895, 430 N.E.2d 1346 (hereinafter referred to as Lewis I ).) The United States Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Lewis v. Illinois (1982), 456 U.S. 1011, 102 S.Ct. 2307, 73 L.Ed.2d 1038.

On August 16, 1982, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Macon County, the county in which the original charges against him were filed. The defendant's petition was transferred to Champaign County by order of this court. The post-conviction hearings were held on the petition, and on July 14, 1983, the circuit court of Champaign County issued a written memorandum opinion and order denying defendant's request for post-conviction relief. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, Fourth District. We then granted the State's motion to transfer this appeal directly to this court.

We will not repeat the facts in this case except as they relate to the disposition of the issues the defendant has raised in this appeal.

JURISDICTION

Defendant argues that his right to substantive due process was violated when we transferred this case from the appellate Although Rule 651(a) is concerned with post-conviction appeals, we interpret article VI, section 4(b), of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, sec. 4(b)), the Illinois death penalty statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9--1 et seq.), and Supreme Court Rule 603 (87 Ill.2d R. 603) to mandate uniform statewide appellate review of cases in which the death sentence has been imposed, even when those cases reach the post-conviction appeal stage.

[85 Ill.Dec. 304] court. He contends that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear his post-conviction appeal and [105 Ill.2d 231] that proper jurisdiction lies with the Fourth District Appellate Court. Defendant bases his argument on Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (87 Ill.2d R. 651(a)), which provides in pertinent part: "An appeal from a final judgment of the circuit court in any post-conviction proceeding lies to the Appellate Court in the district in which the circuit court is located."

Article VI, section 4(b), of the Constitution provides in pertinent part: "Appeals from judgments of Circuit Courts imposing a sentence of death shall be directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right." Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, sec. 4(b).

Section 9--1(i) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 9--1(i)) provides: "The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court."

Supreme Court Rule 603 provides in pertinent part: "[A]ppeals by defendants from judgments of the circuit courts imposing sentence of death shall lie directly to the Supreme Court as a matter of right. All other appeals in criminal cases shall be taken to the Appellate Court." 87 Ill.2d R. 603.

Defendant's brief states: "Death penalty cases are certainly significant and controversial cases, but they should not be handled on an ad hoc basis." We agree with the defendant that death penalty cases are too important to be handled on an "ad hoc " basis. It is for this very reason that we cannot accept defendant's position. If we were to allow appeals from post-conviction hearings in death cases to go to the appellate court, those cases might not receive a uniform review.

The defendant, as well as this court, is concerned about "ad hoc " handling of death penalty cases. The defendant argues that at some future date this court, relying on Rule 651, may not take a case directly on a post-conviction appeal, thereby treating a death case on an "ad hoc " basis. However, if defendant's argument regarding jurisdiction were correct, defendant or some other defendant who has been sentenced to death could lose a post-conviction appeal in the appellate court and this court could then deny the petition for leave to appeal. In this respect there could be "ad hoc " treatment of a death penalty case. Also, a defendant whose petition for leave to appeal was denied could allege that he was denied equal protection or denied his right to uniform statewide appellate review of his death sentence.

The Constitution, the legislature and this court have made special provisions for death cases because of their significance. To treat a post-conviction appeal in a death penalty case differently than a direct appeal in a death penalty case would be inequitable.

In two other cases now pending before this court, People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868, and People v. Ruiz, No. 60303, we have granted the State's motion to transfer the case from the appellate court to this court. So to date, there has not been "ad hoc " treatment of any death penalty post-conviction appeal by this court.

BRADY VIOLATION

The next issue to be addressed, which was not addressed in Lewis I, is whether, as defendant argues, there was a violation of the rule set forth in Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. In Brady, the court stated, "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218.

During the police investigation of this case, two negroid hairs suitable for analysis were found. One was found in a ski mask used in the robbery, and the other was found in the back-seat area of the maroon Monte Carlo automobile which was used in the robbery. These two hair samples were compared with hair standards obtained from Cornelius Lewis, Bernice Lewis, and Maurice Farris, three of the people charged with the robbery. All three were black. The standards from the Lewises were obtained in March 1979, while the standard from Farris was obtained in May 1979. The FBI compared these standards with the hair samples found in the ski mask and the car and excluded the Lewises as the source. The tests also excluded Farris as the source of the hair found in the ski mask, but were inconclusive with regard to Farris as the source of the hair found in the car.

The defendant alleges that the prosecutor suppressed an FBI laboratory report dated May 17, 1979. This report contained the results of the tests on the hair standards taken from Cornelius Lewis, Bernice Lewis, and Maurice Farris.

The defendant argues that, without this report, his trial attorney, Kenneth Kinser, was unaware that a hair standard was taken from Farris and analyzed by the FBI. Therefore, Kinser was unaware that Farris was not excluded as the source of the hair sample obtained from the car. The defendant also theorizes that this evidence shows Farris lied when he testified that he drove the car, since the results of the hair analysis suggests that Farris was in the back seat of the car. The defendant bases his theory on the premise that since Farris' hair was analyzed shortly before trial, the prosecutor believed that the wrong man was given immunity. The defendant also believes that since the hair-analysis results excluded him, they also negated his guilt. The defendant further argues that the results of the hair analysis support his theory that Farris was the actual murderer. The defendant concludes that this evidence was therefore material to the punishment he received, since he argues that he could only receive the death penalty if he were the gunman. The defendant's ultimate conclusion is that since the hair-analysis results on Farris were material to his guilt and/or punishment, he was denied due process of law.

The record does not clearly establish whether Kinser received the laboratory report in question. The record does indicate, however, that: (1) Kinser knew the results of the test conducted on Cornelius Lewis' and Bernice Lewis' hair standards; (2) the report of the hair analysis was hand carried from the FBI laboratory in Washington, D.C., to Champaign County, Illinois, where the trial was in session; (3) three copies of the report were delivered to the prosecutor at the courthouse on May 21, 1979; (4) on the day the report was delivered to the prosecutor, Kinser had moved for a mistrial and the atmosphere at the trial was hectic.

In People v. Williams (1980), 91 Ill.App.3d 631, 633-34, 47 Ill.Dec. 119, 414 N.E.2d 1235, the court stated:

"A violation of due process occurs when a prosecutor, regardless of motive, suppresses evidence material to the question of the accused's guilt or innocence after there has been a request for its production. (Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215. To prove there has been a violation it must be shown that the evidence was suppressed following a request for it by the defendant and that the evidence was favorable to the defendant and material either to guilt or to punishment. (Moore v. Illinois (1972), 408 U.S. 786, 92 S.Ct. 2562, ...