People v. Lewis
| Decision Date | 20 May 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 36740,36740 |
| Citation | 198 N.E.2d 812,30 Ill.2d 617 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Raymond LEWIS, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Donald W. Ford, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago , for defendant in error.
Defendant, Raymond Lewis, after waiving a jury, was tried by the criminal court of Cook County and found guilty of the unlawful sale and possession of narcotics, for which crime he was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 10 to 15 years. By this writ of error, which was taken under advisement prior to January 1, 1964, he contends that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the court erred in permitting proof of other offenses committed subsequent to the crime for which he was tried.
The indictment returned against defendant charged him with the sale and possession of narcotics on April 30, 1959, and, at the trial, Federal narcotics agent Everett Leek testified that he had purchased narcotics from defendant on that date, while accompanied by an informer named Froman. According to Leek, he and the informer sought out defendant in a Chicago tavern where Leek represented that he wanted to purchase some narcotics and was told by defendant that he could arrange for such a purchase at a price of $120. The three men, Leek, Froman and defendant, then entered Froman's car and drove to another tavern. Federal agent Theodore Heisig, who remained in the background throughout the transaction, followed in another vehicle. Defendant left the second tavern for a short period, then returned and told Leek and Froman that he had the narcotics. Thereafter, they returned to Froman's car and, while they were riding, defendant gave Leek a cellophane bag containing a white powder. After this defendant left the car and Leek and Froman drove to a pre-arranged rendezvous with Heisig where the powder was field tested. Subsequent chemical analysis by a Federal chemist, who testified at the trial established that the powder was heroin. Heisig testified at the trial and corroborated Leek to the extent his observations permitted. The informer did not appear or testify.
After relating the events of April 30, 1959, Leek, over the objections of defendant, testified to subsequent purchases of narcotics from defendant on May 7, May 27, and June 2, 1959, and also told the details of defendant's arrest on the latter date. Heisig, whose participation consisted largely of surveillance in all instances, was also permitted to testify to the subsequent sales, as was the chemist, the latter testifying that heroin had been purchased on each occasion.
The defense testimony consisted solely of defendant's denial of sales of narcotics to Leek on April 30, May 7 and June 2, 1959, and his outright admission of a sale to Leek on May 27, 1959.
Defendant's contention that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon two grounds. First, that the failure of the People to call the informer as a witness gives rise to an inference that his testimony would have been unfavorable to the prosecution and, second, that defendant's testimony denying the crime of April 30, 1959, should have prevailed over that of agent Leek. On the record of this case, we do not find that either point is well taken.
People v. Strong, 21 Ill.2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765, upon which the first claim is besed, involved a completely different factual situation. There the defendant Strong testified that he had been supplied with the narcotics in question by a government informer, and since it was only the informer who could meet or refute such testimony it was our holding that the failure to call him as a witness could give rise to an inference against the State. Here there is no parallel or analogous circumstance. There is no obligation on the People to call an informer as a witness, and the strength of any adverse inference flowing from his failure to do so is to be determined by the trier of the facts. In this case the inference did not require a finding of not guilty. Cf. People v. Morrison, 23 Ill.2d 201, 177 N.E.2d 833; People v. Aldridge, 19 Ill.2d 176, 166 N.E.2d 563.
In contending that his denial of the crime should be accepted as true, defendant rationalizes that his...
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People v. Burdine, s. 77-363
...inadmissible as inferring the commission of other crimes independent of and disconnected from the offense charged. (People v. Lewis (1964), 30 Ill.2d 617, 198 N.E.2d 812.) We note, however, that an exception is recognized where the evidence tends to aid in the identification of the accused ......
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People v. Delgado
...evidence tends to aid in the identification of the accused as the person who committed the particular crime charged. People v. Lewis, 30 Ill.2d 617, 198 N.E.2d 812 (1964). There was no error in the admission of the checks in this case since they fall well within the exception to the general......
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People v. Longstreet
... ... ' Although evidence of other offenses is ordinarily inadmissible, a recognized exception to the general rule exists where the evidence tends to aid in the identification of the accused as the person who committed the particular crime charged.' (People v. Lewis, 30 Ill.2d 617, 621, 198 N.E.2d 812, 814.) Thus, even though 'a prior criminal record may be inferred from the use of police photographs, their admission into evidence or testimony in reference thereto, is not error per se.' (People v. Coleman, 17 Ill.App.3d 421, 431, 308 N.E.2d 364, 371.) We ... ...
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People v. Pendleton, 78-1866
... ... Generally evidence of other offenses is inadmissible except, however, where the evidence tends to aid in the identification of the accused as the person who committed the crime charged. (People v. Lewis (1964), 30 Ill.2d 617, 621, 198 N.E.2d 812.) The admission into evidence or testimony of police photographs is not error per se, even if an inference of defendant's prior criminal activity could be drawn by the jury. (People v. Longstreet (1974), 23 Ill.App.3d 874, 881, 320 N.E.2d 529.) ... ...