People v. Lewis
| Decision Date | 21 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 46574,46574 |
| Citation | 330 N.E.2d 857,60 Ill.2d 152 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James A. LEWIS, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (Ronald P. Alwin and Gail Moreland, Asst. Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago , for the People.
James W. Jerz, Elgin, for the Illinois State's Attorneys Association, Amicus curiae, on rehearing.
Stephen A. Schiller, Chicago (John Beal, Chicago of counsel), for the Chicago Crime Commission, Amicus curiae, on rehearing.
The defendant, James A. Lewis, was found guilty of armed robbery in a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County and sentenced to a term of 4 to 10 years in the penitentiary. The appellate court affirmed (People v. Lewis (1974), 17 Ill.App.3d 188, 308 N.E.2d 59), and we have allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal.
Defendant argues that he was denied due process of law in that he was forced to choose between his right to effective assistance of counsel and his statutory right to trial within 120 days pursuant to section 103--5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, par. 103--5(a)), which provides in part that 'every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant * * *.' The resolution of this issue requires a chronological review of the pertinent events from the time of defendant's arrest through the trial 117 days later.
Defendant was arrested and charged with armed robbery on November 7, 1971. He remained in custody thereafter. On December 8, he appeared for a preliminary hearing. The lawyer who had previously filed an appearance for him did not appear, but defendant nevertheless demanded an immediate hearing. The court thereupon appointed the public defender to represent him. At the conclusion of the hearing at which four occurrence witnesses testified, the court made a finding of probable cause, and defendant was held over to the grand jury. The grand jury heard testimony on January 27 and February 15, 1972, and returned a four-count armed-robbery indictment on February 24, which was the 109th day of his incarceration. At his arraignment the following day the public defender was once again appointed to represent him when he indicated that he did not have a lawyer and did not have the funds to retain one. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges against him.
The cause was set for trial on Thursday, March 2, which was the 116th day following his arrest. On that date, the assistant public defender advised the court that he was not ready for trial since he had first become aware of the case only six days earlier on the previous Friday, February 25. He told the court that notwithstanding his warnings to the defendant that he was not fully prepared and that going to trial under such conditions would be 'precarious,' the defendant nevertheless had persisted in answering ready for trial. The court thereafter made specific inquiry of the defendant on two occasions if he still persisted in answering ready for trial on that date in spite of what his counsel had advised him, and the defendant unequivocally indicated that he was ready and wanted the trial to proceed that day. Following defendant's waiver of trial by jury, the court instructed the State to tender any material to defendant's counsel that 'he would normally have if he had been able to file discovery.' In response to these directions, the prosecutor turned over transcripts of testimony at the preliminary hearing as well as transcripts of the grand jury testimony. Subsequently, the prosecution also delivered copies of police reports in its possession. After a luncheon recess, the court denied a motion by the public defender to withdraw as counsel. Defense counsel then sought and was granted time to consult with two of the State's witnesses. Following such consultation, the court was informed that the assistant public defender who had represented defendant at the preliminary hearing would assist in the defense of the case. In the proceedings which followed, the defendant was represented by two assistant public defenders.
Defendant was thereafter permitted to file motions to suppress identification testimony and to quash the arrest. The trial court denied both motions after hearing testimony of four witnesses concerning the circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest and the police identification procedures which followed.
The trial itself commenced on the following day, March 3, which was the 117th day after defendant's arrest and the 8th day following the indictment. During the trial the State presented the testimony of the same four occurrence witnesses who had previously testified before the grand jury and at the preliminary hearing. The evidence showed that on July 6, 1971, at approximately 11 a.m., defendant and two other men entered a tavern at 3302 East 92nd Street in Chicago armed with a shotgun and a revolver. After announcing a holdup, the men ordered an employee at gunpoint to open a cash register and proceeded to remove the cash. Additional cash was forcibly taken from two of the patrons in the tavern, and defendant also took several bottles of whiskey. Defense counsel conducted a rather extensive cross-examination of each of the witnesses which included reference to their prior testimony either at the preliminary hearing or before the grand jury. Testifying in his own behalf, defendant denied being in the...
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People v. Wright
...purposes is insufficient to substantiate a claim of prejudice. Such a claim cannot be based on mere conjecture. (People v. Lewis (1975), 60 Ill.2d 152, 158, 330 N.E.2d 857.) We conclude, therefore, that the late disclosure was, at most, a violation of Rule 412 which was harmless under the c......
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People v. Boyd
...fair trial, and, having chosen to proceed, his present argument is nothing more than technical obfuscation.' " People v. Lewis (1975), 60 Ill.2d 152, 156-157, 330 N.E.2d 857, 860 quoting People v. Johnson (1970), 45 Ill.2d 38, 43-44, 257 N.E.2d 3, 7. Cf. McGautha v. California (1971), 402 U......
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...are forced to choose between the two constitutional rights of speedy trial and effective assistance of counsel. (People v. Lewis (1975), 60 Ill.2d 152, 156-57, 330 N.E.2d 857; People v. Williams (1974), 59 Ill.2d 402, 405-06, 320 N.E.2d 849.) We stated in People v. Johnson (1970), 45 Ill.2d......
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