People v. Lewis
| Docket Number | SC 162743,COA 349774 |
| Decision Date | 21 July 2023 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARCUS LAVELL LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Kent CC: 18-007500-FH, 18-007727-FH
Elizabeth T. Clement, Chief Justice, Brian K. Zahra, David F Viviano, Richard H. Bernstein, Megan K. Cavanagh, Elizabeth M. Welch, Kyra H. Bolden, Justices
On January 11, 2023, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the January 21, 2021 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. For the search of a home to be constitutionally reasonable there must be a sufficient nexus between the criminal activity and the home. In this case there was an insufficient nexus between defendant's illegal drug activity and his residence. Therefore, the search of his home was without probable cause and thus unconstitutional. In addition, if a search warrant affidavit does not contain a minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal activity and the residence, the search warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, rendering the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule inapplicable. I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the "minimally sufficient nexus" test was met here. Because the Court denies leave to appeal instead, I respectfully dissent.
On July 28, 2018, two detectives with the Grand Rapids Police Department were conducting surveillance outside a party store in an area known for drug trafficking. The detectives watched one man, Shawn Osborn, get into a vehicle driven by defendant, Marcus Lewis, and then observed what the detectives believed to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction. Osborn then got back into the car he had arrived in with his companion, Brandon Jones, and the two drove away. Defendant drove away separately.
Osborn and Jones were followed to a nearby grocery store parking lot by the police, who executed a traffic stop. Osborn was in possession of crack cocaine and said that he had just purchased it for $20 from a man he knew as "Mel."
Meanwhile, the police also executed a separate traffic stop of defendant's vehicle. Defendant's vehicle and person were searched. No drugs or drug paraphernalia were discovered in the vehicle. Defendant had $81 dollars in cash in his possession. One officer called the number that Osborn had provided for "Mel" and defendant's phone rang. Officers used the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN) and discovered that one of defendant's known aliases was "Mel." Using LEIN, law enforcement also discovered that defendant had a criminal record, which included a conviction for possession with intent to deliver controlled substances from June 2009, a conviction for delivery or manufacture of cocaine from March 2005, and a conviction for delivery or manufacture of cocaine from July 2002. Defendant was on federal probation for the June 2009 conviction. Following the traffic stop, defendant was arrested.
The next day, Detective Ross VandenBerg swore out an affidavit as part of a request for a search warrant for defendant's home. The affidavit detailed the detective's experience in law enforcement and narcotics investigations. It provided the circumstances leading to defendant's arrest, defendant's criminal record, and the fact that he was on federal probation. Next, it provided defendant's address, noting that when defendant left the party store parking lot, he "drove north" in the direction of that address. The detective then explained the difference between "user" traffickers and "profit" traffickers.[1] According to the detective, "profit" traffickers are capable of selling large amounts of narcotics and maintain a base of operations that generates paper trails and contains equipment to process controlled substances, such as scales and cutting and packaging materials. The detective explained that "through his training and experience," he was aware of the various ways that drug traffickers maintain records and might keep the records in "secret locations within the home[]" or in the control of "seemingly innocent persons located at the residence at the search location." This was also consistent "with other information about traffickers using safe houses to traffic and store their controlled substances." The detective indicated that, in his training and experience, drug dealers do not carry all their product or proceeds on their person so they "may leave [it] in a place that they believe is safe from law enforcement."
On the basis of the affidavit, a magistrate issued a search warrant for defendant's apartment. In defendant's apartment, the police found and seized cocaine, heroin, plastic sandwich bags, cutting agents, and a digital scale.
Thereafter the prosecution charged defendant with delivery of a controlled substance less than 50 grams in relation to the drug transaction with Osborn. See MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). And, in a separate file, the prosecution charged defendant with two counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance less than 50 grams in regard to the narcotics found in defendant's apartment. See MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). The cases were eventually consolidated. Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of his home, arguing that the police "lacked probable cause to believe that defendant was a drug trafficker who had drugs and equipment at his residence." The trial court denied the motion, and the evidence was admitted at trial. Defendant was convicted as charged.
Defendant appealed, arguing that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches was violated because the search warrant failed to establish a nexus between the alleged drug trafficking activity and his home.[2] The Court of Appeals concluded that, whether there was probable cause or not, the officers who executed the search warrant acted in good-faith reliance on the search warrant and, therefore, application of the exclusionary rule was inappropriate. People v Lewis, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 21, 2021 (Docket No. 349774). This Court ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address:
(1) whether the search warrant affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the alleged drug trafficking and defendant's home, see Illinois v Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); compare United States v Brown, 828 F.3d 375 (CA 6, 2016), with United States v White, 874 F.3d 490 (CA 6, 2017), and United States v Reed, 993 F.3d 441 (CA 6, 2021); and (2) if not, whether the officers relied on the search warrant in good faith. People v Goldston, 470 Mich. 523 (2004). [People v Lewis, 509 Mich. 881, 881 (2022).]
This Court reviews the trial court's application of Fourth Amendment principles de novo. People v Hammerlund, 504 Mich. 442, 451 (2019). A reviewing court should generally pay great deference to a magistrate's determination of probable cause. People v Russo, 439 Mich. 584, 604 (1992).
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [US Const, Am IV.][3]
"[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." Payton v New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Florida v Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (). The warrant procedure is intended to "minimize[] the danger of needless intrusions" into private areas, and especially the home. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586.
"A magistrate shall only issue a search warrant when he or she finds that 'there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" People v Franklin, 500 Mich. 92 101 (2017), quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The task is for the issuing magistrate to "make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . ., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. In the federal circuit courts,[4] the requirement that there be a "fair probability" that contraband will be found in a "particular place" is often referred to as the "nexus" requirement. United States v Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (CA 6, 2004) ( ) (quotation marks and citations omitted).[5] As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained, to establish an adequate nexus, "[t]he connection between the residence and the evidence of criminal activity must be specific and concrete, not vague or generalized." Brown, 828 F.3d at 382 (quotation marks and citation omitted). If the affidavit fails to demonstrate a sufficient nexus, then a judge may not issue a search...
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