People v. Lindsey, 031620 COSC, 18SC620
| Party Name | The People of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. William Arthur Lindsey. Respondent |
| Attorney | Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Respondent: Ridley, McGreevy & Winocur, PC Robert T. Fishman Denver, Colorado Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Criminal Defense Bar: JLongtin Law, LLC Je... |
| Judge Panel | JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court. JUSTICE HART dissents, and JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ and JUSTICE GABRIEL join in the dissent. JUSTICE HART dissents, and JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ and JUSTICE GABRIEL join in the dissent. JUSTICE HART, dissenting. I am authorized to state that JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ and JU... |
| Case Date | March 16, 2020 |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 15CA1368
Judgment Reversed
Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent: Ridley, McGreevy & Winocur, PC Robert T. Fishman Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Criminal Defense Bar: JLongtin Law, LLC Jennifer E. Longtin Denver, Colorado
JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court. JUSTICE HART dissents, and JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ and JUSTICE GABRIEL join in the dissent.
¶1 Any experienced attorney would have realized that the trial court was not going to grant another motion to continue in this case. This was at least the seventh trial setting, the case had been pending for approximately three years (prompting another judge to remark that it was likely the oldest case pending in Jefferson County), David G. Tyler was William Arthur Lindsey's fourth attorney in this case, and Judge Todd Vriesman and his predecessor had admonished Tyler and Lindsey no fewer than three times during the previous twelve months that there would be no more continuances.
¶2 A month before trial, Tyler moved to withdraw from the case, but his motion was denied after a hearing in front of a different judge who found no irreconcilable conflict. On the eve of trial, Tyler filed another motion, this one challenging Lindsey's competency. The factual assertions in this motion were the same factual assertions on which Tyler relied during the hearing on the motion to withdraw ten days earlier: Lindsey had failed to be completely forthright with him, to keep promises to furnish information and funds for an effective defense, and to diligently work and communicate with him. In all the years the case had been pending, this was the first time anyone had ever raised a question about Lindsey's competency. And, during the hearing on the competency motion, just as during previous hearings, Lindsey was lucid and coherent, showing no signs of incompetency.
¶3 Tyler believed that our competency statutes required the trial court to either make a preliminary finding regarding competency or indicate that there was insufficient evidence to do so. He was aware that if the court made a preliminary finding (either of competency or incompetency) and he objected to it or, alternatively, if the court determined there was insufficient information to make a preliminary finding, the statutory scheme required the court to order a competency evaluation, which, in turn, would necessarily postpone the trial. But Judge Vriesman found that the motion's factual assertions had nothing to do with competency and did not support a good-faith doubt about Lindsey's competency. Accordingly, consistent with his and his predecessor's previous warnings about no more continuances, Judge Vriesman refused to postpone the trial. The case thus proceeded to a jury trial, where Lindsey was convicted of securities fraud and theft. Lindsey then appealed, and a division of the court of appeals vacated his convictions.
¶4 Because we perceive no abuse of discretion by the trial court, we now reverse the division's judgment. We conclude that, while trial courts must guard against second-guessing a competency motion that's "in writing" and contains the "specific facts" that form the basis of counsel's "good faith doubt" about the defendant's competency-i.e., a motion that satisfies the threshold requirements in section 16-8.5-102(2)(b), C.R.S. (2019)-they retain sufficient discretion to reject the rare competency motion grounded in an attorney's inadequate proffer.
I. Facts and Procedural History
¶5 Over the course of thirteen months, Lindsey persuaded six investors to advance roughly $3 million toward a new technology that he claimed would harness the energy of bioluminescent algae to light signs and panels. In soliciting these funds, Lindsey told his investors that he had already secured contracts to sell his lighting products to several large clients, including the U.S. Department of Defense, U-Haul, PetSmart, and the 2012 Super Bowl. As it turned out, neither the technology nor the contracts existed. Instead, Lindsey diverted the funds he collected to his own personal use. But Lindsey's investment scheme caught up with him on June 7, 2012, when a Colorado grand jury indicted him for securities fraud and theft.
¶6 Lindsey, however, would not stand trial for almost three years. In the intervening time, the criminal case against Lindsey lingered in the Jefferson County district court as it was besieged by significant procedural interruptions, including numerous continuances of court appearances, at least seven trial settings, and three changes in defense counsel. Lindsey's handiwork was responsible for the bulk of these delays. The last attorney to enter an appearance on Lindsey's behalf was Tyler. But, like most of his colleagues before him, Tyler eventually wanted off the case. Less than a month before trial, he filed a combined notice of discharge and motion to withdraw ("motion to withdraw"). Tyler informed the court that he and Lindsey had "[i]rreconcilable differences" and that Lindsey had discharged him as counsel of record. In a letter to the court, Lindsey denied discharging Tyler and objected to Tyler's withdrawal from the case.
¶7 Tyler's motion to withdraw was referred to another judge, Judge Christopher Munch, for a hearing outside the presence of the prosecutor.1 At the hearing, Tyler argued that Lindsey had failed to be completely forthright with him, to keep promises to furnish information and funds for an effective defense, and to diligently work and communicate with him.2 Judge Munch found no irreconcilable conflict and predicted, based on the number of postponements and the age of the case, that Judge Vriesman was unlikely to continue the trial yet again. On Judge Munch's recommendation, Judge Vriesman denied Tyler's motion to withdraw.
¶8 Ten days later-less than forty-eight business hours before trial was set to start-Tyler filed a new motion, this one asking the court to make a determination as to Lindsey's competency pursuant to section 16-8.5-102.[3] In the motion, Tyler certified that he had "good faith doubts" that Lindsey was competent to proceed. Tyler opined that Lindsey could neither "appreciate the nature and consequences of the trial which he [was] facing" nor "assist in the preparation and assistance of [c]ounsel in his [d]efense." But the specific facts on which Tyler relied mirrored the factual allegations advanced in support of his motion to withdraw: Lindsey had not been completely forthright with him, had not kept promises to furnish information and funds for an effective defense, and had failed to diligently work and communicate with him.
¶9 At the hearing on the competency motion, which was held on the morning of the first day of trial, Lindsey informed the court that he had read Tyler's competency motion and that it was "driving [him] nuts" because he had given Tyler "a lot" of the information and documents that the motion claimed he hadn't provided. He added that he wished he had a lawyer who would "at least look[] at [his] technology and . . . at all the documents that [he had] provided" Tyler. Lindsey further indicated that he had never been diagnosed with a reading disability or any other type of mental or developmental disability. After being advised of the consequences that would accompany a court-ordered competency evaluation, including that he would be committed to the Jefferson County jail or the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo for as little as several weeks or as long as a few months, Lindsey told the court that he did not wish to join Tyler's motion. In fact, according to Lindsey, he "didn't even know the motion was being filed" by Tyler.
¶10 For her part, the prosecutor asked the court to allow Lindsey's probation officer in a criminal case out of Arapahoe County to testify by telephone. She represented, by way of an offer of proof, that Lindsey's probation officer, who knew Lindsey better than Tyler, the judge, and the prosecutor, would testify that she (the probation officer) had been meeting regularly with Lindsey for two years and that Lindsey was competent.
¶11 At that point, Tyler requested and received a short recess so that he could discuss the competency motion with Lindsey. At the end of the recess, Tyler informed the court that Lindsey had experienced a change of heart and was now willing to join in the competency motion. Lindsey confirmed that, based on his discussion with Tyler, he was on board with the competency motion.
¶12 In resolving the competency motion, Judge Vriesman looked to the definition of "[i]ncompetent to proceed" in section 16-8.5-101(12), C.R.S. (2019). Under that definition, a defendant is incompetent to proceed if he suffers from "a mental disability or developmental disability" that causes him to lack either "sufficient present ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding in order to assist in the defense" or "a rational and factual understanding" of the proceedings.[4] Guided by this definition, Judge Vriesman considered all of the pertinent circumstances: • the timing of the competency motion-"less than 48 [business] hours prior to" trial;
• the history of the case, including at least seven trial settings;
• the fact that he and his predecessor had warned Tyler and Lindsey on at least three occasions during the previous twelve months that there would be "[n]o...
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