People v. Lionberger

• Decision Date: 29 July 1986
• Docket Number: 2138,Cr. A,Nos. 2137,s. 2137
• Court: California Superior Court
• Parties: 185 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Deborah K. LIONBERGER et al., Defendants and Appellants. Appellate Department, Superior Court, Ventura County, California

Page 358

230 Cal.Rptr. 358

185 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Deborah K. LIONBERGER et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Cr. A. Nos. 2137, 2138.

Appellate Department, Superior Court, Ventura County, California.

July 29, 1986.

Dennis A. Fischer for defendants and appellants.

Michael D. Bradbury, Dist. Atty., and Dennis I. Floyd, Deputy Dist. Atty., for plaintiff and respondent.

STEELE, Presiding Judge.

Misdemeanor complaints were filed in the Municipal Court respectively naming as defendants, Dick Otto Weisse, case number MM68376, Sharyl Ann Weisse, case number MM68377, and Deborah K. Lionberger, case number MM68378, following the arrests of each on May 31, 1985 for violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550, subdivision (a) (illegal use of controlled substance). The defendants were arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty on June 28, 1985. On August 2, 1985, a motion was heard to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. The defendants jointly challenged the constitutional propriety under the Fourth Amendment standards of their detention and subsequent arrest by the sheriff's deputy who stopped the automobile driven by the defendant, Dick Weisse, in which the defendants, Sharyl Weisse and Deborah Lionberger, were passengers, and made observations upon which the instant prosecution is based. At the conclusion of the hearing, and following the taking of evidence and argument, the trial court granted the suppression motion as to the defendant, Dick Weisse, and denied the motions as to the defendants, Sharyl Weisse and Deborah Lionberger, principally because they lacked standing to assert a similar constitutional basis for the motion. Thereafter, upon appropriate application by these appellants, this court stayed further proceedings in the lower court pending final determination of this appeal.

The issue presented is the standing of a vehicle's passengers to seek suppression on Fourth Amendment grounds of police observations and other evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful seizure. More precisely, the question is: In light of the trial court's finding that the stopping of the vehicle driven by Dick Weisse "was not supported by probable cause," did the court erroneously deny the suppression motion of appellants Sharyl Ann Weisse and Deborah Lionberger because they "lacked standing to assert the violation of the driver's Fourth Amendment rights" under Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387?

The question must be answered in the affirmative. We conclude that the trial court erred in its application of Rakas.

At 1:15 on the morning of May 31, 1985, the arresting officer was on traffic patrol in the City of Camarillo when he observed the three defendants enter a car parked in the Paseo Camarillo Shopping Center. He did not see where the defendants had come from, but assumed that it was from Josephina's, one of two restaurants in the vicinity with bars. The automobile was then driven by Mr. Weisse to the exit of the parking lot where it stopped at a stop sign for 15 or 20 seconds and then made a left turn onto Lantana Avenue without signaling. Although the officer admitted that the stop was proper, he found the 15- to 20-second pause suspicious. Other than that, and the failure to signal before turning, he observed nothing unusual.

The officer then followed the vehicle for at least three quarters of a mile before stopping it. The basis for the stop was a combination of the vehicle's failure to signal when leaving the parking lot, the "unusually long stop," the lateness of the hour, the fact that there were two bars in the vicinity, and that the driver could "possibly" be drunk. It should be noted that during the time in which the officer followed the vehicle, it did nothing further to arouse the officer's suspicions.

Upon being stopped, the driver exited the vehicle and produced his driver's license. The officer smelled alcohol and shined the light in the driver's eyes. The driver acknowledged that he had been drinking. There is some confusion as to whether a field sobriety test was given. The officer then directed the driver to step onto the sidewalk and went to investigate the vehicle, alleging fear for his safety.

Mrs. Weisse was in the front passenger seat and Mrs. Lionberger was in the rear. The officer shined his flashlight around the car in search of weapons and alcohol and found neither. He then decided to look into the eyes of the passengers. He tried, but was unsuccessful. He was, however, determined to do so. As he stated regarding Mrs. Lionberger, "If she would have never looked, I probably would have went on and tried later. I would have looked there all night trying to look at her face." He went on to say that if they tried to walk away, he would have followed them "not to stop them, just walk up to them and look in their face." The officer finally determined that the passengers each had dilated pupils and the arrest followed.

The appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the appellants lacked standing to challenge the unlawful stop of the automobile in which they were passengers, because they had a legitimate expectation of privacy, under the Fourth Amendment, to travel free of any unreasonable government intrusion. The trial court relied on Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, for its finding that the appellants had no standing to assert the motion to suppress. We find, however, that Rakas, supra, does not stand for that. Rakas sets forth the principle that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be asserted vicariously. Justice Rehnquist noted, "For we are not at all sure that the determination of a motion to suppress is materially aided by labeling the inquiry identified in Jones as one of standing, rather than simply recognizing it as one involving the substantive question of whether or not the proponent of the motion to suppress has had his own Fourth Amendment rights infringed by the search and seizure which he seeks to challenge." (Id. at p. 133, emphasis added.) One year later, in United States v. Salvucci (1980) 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619, Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the court, in footnote 4 at page 87, 100 S.Ct. at page 2550, said, "In Rakas, this Court discarded reliance on concepts of 'standing' in determining whether a defendant is entitled to claim the protections of the...