People v. Little
| Decision Date | 18 March 1977 |
| Parties | . Chadwick B. LITTLE, Defendant. Yates County Court |
| Court | New York County Court |
John M. Sheridan, pro se and for respondent Irene S. Jones, Yates County Treasurer.
The State Comptroller has twice rendered his opinion that the Yates County Court stenographer is entitled to payment of the fees prescribed by law for preparation of transcripts in the above matter and in addition to her salary fixed by the County Legislature. (Comptroller's Opinion No. 76--838 and No. 76--838--A.)
The respondent County Attorney has advised the respondent County Treasurer that payment was not required (ex. 5). The Yates County Legislature by Resolution No. 254--76 has directed the Treasurer not to pay the transcript charges until payment is required by 'final order of a Court of competent jurisdiction'.
The Criminal Procedure Law mandates that when an appeal is taken by a defendant, the criminal court in which the sentence being appealed was imposed must direct the stenographer to make and file with the Court two transcripts of the stenographic minutes of the proceedings constituting the record on appeal. ( § 460.70 Criminal Procedure Law; People v. Shenandoah, 81 Misc.2d 316, 365 N.Y.S.2d 969.)
The statute expressly provides the transcript expense is a county charge payable to the stenographer out of the court fund, or out of the juror's fund or out of any other available fund, upon the certificate of the criminal court judge. ( § 460.70 Criminal Procedure Law).
The transcript charges are set by law at sixty cents a page. There are two folios per page (22 NYCRR part 1027.3(c)) and the charge is thirty cents per folio ( § 8002 Civil Practice Law and Rules).
After the defendant's conviction for manslaughter in the second degree, he was sentenced on August 5, 1975. The County Clerk advised the court stenographer of the timely filing of the Notice of Appeal and requested her to make two transcripts of the stenographic minutes of the trial conducted by the court from June 10, 1975 to July 2, 1975, involving some thirty-two witnesses. A single transcript totaled 1141 single-spaced pages. The two types transcripts were completed June 9, 1976, and filed with the County Clerk on June 18, 1976.
On June 16, 1976, the court certified its approval on the voucher of Debra C. Miller, the court stenographer, and it was forwarded to the County Treasurer. That voucher for $1,369.20 has not been paid although there has been extensive correspondence as to legal basis for the charge and its calculation and opportunity for two inquiries to the Comptroller.
The County Law provides that each court stenographer shall be entitled to retain to his use, in addition to the amount fixed by the County Legislature for regular services, the fees and other compensation prescribed by law or certified by a presiding judge pursuant to law, for transcribing and furnishing a copy of the minutes, testimony or exhibits taken or produced in any civil or criminal action or proceeding. ( § 205 County Law; see also § 302 Judiciary Law and 703--a County Law.)
The State Comptroller cited § 205 County Law in each of his opinions to the county. The county's argument then and now is that the court stenographer is a county employee whose position is covered under the Civil Service Employees' Association contract which provides for her rate of pay and hours of work.
The transcripts here were typed during her regular working hours and with materials, ofefice space and equipment provided by the county.
The county urges that if the work of the stenographer in preparing these transcripts is a charge against the county, it has paid the charge under the Civil Service Employees' Association agreement; that the county is required under the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Article 14, Civil Service Law) to enter this agreement with its employees, including this stenographer, and that payment to her of these transcript charges under § 205 County Law would be a violation of that agreement. It speculates that giving additional compensation to one employee might result in additional compensation having to be given to other employees covered by that agreement.
Counsel allows that the language of § 205 County Law, 'shall be entitled to retain to his own use, in addition to the amount fixed . . . for regular services,' might be the basis to pay compensation for services performed in addition to or outside the court stenographer's regular services, but notes that the employment agreement provides for overtime compensation.
The county's position is patently incorrect. To hold otherwise means the county could abrogate the statutory law of the State of New York by contract. It is clear that the State Legislature intended the court stenographer to be paid transcript charges 'in addition' to her salary or wages.
As noted by the Comptroller, this payment for the transcripts is not an increase in the court stenographer's compensation under the employment agreement because the transcript payments are required by statute and 'in addition' to such compensation. (Comptroller's Opinion No. 76--838--A.)
It is held that § 205 County Law mandates the county's payment of the thirty cent folio charge to the court stenographer in addition to the salary or wage paid for regular services under the Employment Agreement.
Further, the voucher here is a charge on county funds to be paid by the Treasurer without further approvcal or audit. (People ex rel. Rea v. Prendergast, 221 N.Y. 582, 116 N.E. 1068).
The statute specifies the expense of such transcripts is a county charge payable to the stenographer out of the court fund, or out of the juror's fund or out of any other available fund, upon the certificate of the criminal court. ( § 460.70 Criminal Procedure Law).
The County Court thus has the power to certify the amount to be paid for the transcripts and the court's certificate of approval takes the place of an audit or other approval which might otherwise fall upon another official. (People ex rel. Cantor v. Craig, 202 App.Div. 840, 195 N.Y.S. 100.) The Treasurer's duties here are purely ministerial and are limited to paying the voucher as presented.
These proceedings are brought on by the Court's Order to Show Cause based upon a copy of the voucher and the Comptroller's letter of August 27, 1976, with appropriate recitals, personally served upon the respondent County Treasurer and the respondent County Attorney, why an Order of this Court should not be given that the Treasurer pay the voucher of the court stenographer in the above matter in the amount of $1,369.20 as approved by the court on June 16, 1976,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Billis v. State, s. 88-311
...judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective. People v. Little, 89 Misc.2d 742, 392 N.Y.S.2d 831, 835 (1977). Judicial power comprehends all authority necessary to preserve and improve the fundamental judicial function of d......
-
LTown Ltd. Partnership v. Sire Plan, Inc.
...772, affd. 181 N.Y. 531, 73 N.E. 1131; Karutz v. Chicago Tit. Ins. Co., 112 Misc.2d 815, 451 N.Y.S.2d 1001; Matter of People v. Little, 89 Misc.2d 742, 745, 392 N.Y.S.2d 831, affd. 60 A.D.2d 797, 400 N.Y.S.2d 615; Kimple v. Auble, 87 Misc.2d 997, 386 N.Y.S.2d 967; cf. Eash v. Riggins Trucki......
-
Gabrelian v. Gabrelian
...of things. (Carrigan, Inherent Powers of the Courts, National College of the State Judiciary, Reno, Nevada (Matter of People v. Little, 89 Misc.2d 742, 745, 392 N.Y.S.2d 831, affd. 60 A.D.2d 797, 400 N.Y.S.2d A court's inherent powers are derived from the very fact that the court has been c......
-
Jennifer G., In re
...... See State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 580 (Me.1979); People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518, 522, 350 N.E.2d 906 (1976); Baker v. Smith, 477 S.W.2d 149, 150-151 (Ky.App.1971). In ... (Carrigan, Inherent Powers of the Courts, National College of the State Judiciary, Reno, Nevada [1973].)" (Matter of People v. Little, 89 Misc.2d 742, 745 [392 N.Y.S.2d 831], aff'd 60 A.D.2d 797 [400 N.Y.S.2d 615].) A court's inherent powers are derived from the very fact that the ......