People v. Lloyd

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: CHAMBERS, J.
• Citation: People v. Lloyd, 240 N.Y.S.3d 751 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025)
• Decision Date: 06 August 2025
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. LLOYD F. (Anonymous), appellant.

240 N.Y.S.3d 751

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.LLOYD F. (Anonymous), appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—October 22, 2024

August 6, 2025

APPEAL by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Alison M. Hamanjian, J.), rendered April 29, 2022, and entered in Richmond County, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review an order of the same court dated May 10, 2021, granting the People’s motion pursuant to CPL 722.23(1) to prevent removal of this action to the Family Court, Richmond County, and the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence. Justice Hom has been substituted for former Justice Maltese (see 22 NYCRR 1250.1[b]).

Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Steven C. Kuza of counsel), for appellant.

Michael E. McMahon, District Attorney, Staten Island, NY (Rhys Johnson and Thomas B. Litsky of counsel), for respondent.

LARA J. GENOVESI, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, CARL J. LANDICINO, PHILLIP HOM, JJ.

OPINION & ORDER

CHAMBERS, J.

The case at bar concerns a 16-year-old defendant who was charged with weapon possession offenses. The defendant contends that the Youth Part of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, abused its discretion as a matter of law when it granted the People’s motion pursuant to CPL 722.23(1) to prevent removal of this action to Family Court (see id. § 722.23[l][d]). In reviewing the defendant’s contention, this Court is called upon to interpret the meaning of “extraordinary circumstances” as the phrase is used in subdivision (l)(d) of CPL 722.23. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that, under any reasonable interpretation of the phrase “extraordinary circumstances,” the record does not support a determination that such circumstances exist to prevent removal of this case to Family Court.^*

I. Statutory framework of CPL 722.23

In 2017, the New York State Legislature enacted legislation known as “Raise the Age,” which, among its provisions, expressly created a specialized Youth Part in the Superior or Supreme Court of each county (see L 2017, ch 59, Part WWW, § 1-a, codified at CPL art 722 [hereinafter the Raise the Age legislation]; see also Matter of County of Nassau v. Nassau County Sheriff’s Corr. Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc., 213 A.D.3d 661, 661-662, 183 N.Y.S.3d 504). The Youth Part is authorized to determine the proper forum for prosecution of “adolescent offenders”—defendants who are charged with felonies committed when they were 16 or 17 years of age (see CPL 1.20[44]; 722.10[l]). The statute creates a presumption of removal to Family Court for adolescent offenders, subject to listed exceptions (see id. § 722.23[l][a]; [2][a], [c]; People v. K.S., 84 Misc.3d 319, 324, 212 N.Y.S.3d 521 [Sup. Ct., Richmond County]; People v. A.M., 82 Misc.3d 1249[A], 2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 50582[U], 2024 WL 2266307 [Putnam County Ct.]). The listed exceptions apply where the defendant has been charged with a class A non-drug felony or a violent felony and the district attorney has “proved by a preponderance of the evidence,” at a court appearance to be held within six days of arraignment, that “as set forth in the accusatory instrument” the defendant either (1) “caused significant physical injury” during the commission of the offense, (2) “displayed a firearm, shotgun, rifle or deadly weapon” in “furtherance of’ the offense, or (3) committed a sex offense (CPL 722.23; see People v. Guerrero, 235 A.D.3d 1276, 1277, 227 N.Y.S.3d 497; Clark v. Boyle, 210 A.D.3d 463, 464, 178 N.Y.S.3d 497). Unless the Youth Part determines in writing that the district attorney has made such a showing, the Youth Part “shall order the action to proceed” in accordance with the procedures set forth in CPL 722.23(1)(a) for removal to Family Court (id. § 722.23[2][c]).

CPL 722.23(1)(a) provides that, when an action is eligible for removal to Family Court, the Youth Part “shall” order the action removed “unless” the People make a timely motion to prevent removal. The statute further provides that the motion “shall” be denied, unless the Youth Part makes a determination that “extraordinary circumstances exist that should prevent the transfer of the action to family court” (id. § 722.23[l][d]). The Youth Part’s determination shall include “findings of fact and to the extent practicable conclusions of law” (id. § 722.23[l][e]).

The consequence of removal to Family Court is that the criminal action is terminated (see CPL 725.10), and the Family Court assumes exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3 of the Family Court Act to determine whether the adolescent is a juvenile delinquent (see Family Ct Act §§ 301.2, 302.1). This statutory framework removes certain cases from the adult criminal justice system, thereby avoiding the entry of a criminal conviction, and reflects the Legislature’s determination that such matters are more appropriately addressed in a rehabilitative forum (see Green v. Montgomery, 95 N.Y.2d 693, 698, 723 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 N.E.2d 1036; see also Family Ct Act §§ 301.1; 352.2).

II. Statutory interpretation

[1–3] The phrase “extraordinary circumstances” is not defined in the Raise the Age legislation (id. § 722.23[l][d]). “In the absence of a statutory definition,” the Court of Appeals instructs that “words of ordinary import” must be construed “with their usual and commonly understood meaning,” and that “dictionary definitions” may serve as “useful guideposts in determining the meaning of a word or phrase” (Nadkos, Inc. v. Preferred Contrs. Ins. Co. Risk Retention Group LLC, 34 N.Y.3d 1, 7, 108 N.Y.S.3d 375, 132 N.E.3d 568 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Andujar, 30 N.Y.3d 160, 163, 66 N.Y.S.3d 151, 88 N.E.3d 309). “‘[T]he legislative history of an enactment may also be relevant and is not to be ignored, even if words be clear’ ” (People v. Badji, 36 N.Y.3d 393, 399, 142 N.Y.S.3d 128, 165 N.E.3d 1068, quoting Riley v. County of Broome, 95 N.Y.2d 455, 463, 719 N.Y.S.2d 623, 742 N.E.2d 98). “In a manner consistent with the text, we may look to the purpose of the enactment and the objectives of the legislature” (Lubonty v. U.S. Bank N.A., 34 N.Y.3d 250, 255, 116 N.Y.S.3d 642, 139 N.E.3d 1222; see Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kessler, 39 N.Y.3d 317, 324, 186 N.Y.S.3d 85, 206 N.E.3d 1228). Our interpretation of the statutory phrase “extraordinary circumstances” therefore is guided by its common, ordinary usage, as reflected in dictionary definitions, and by the history and context of the Raise the Age legislation (see People v. Guerrero, 235 A.D.3d 1276, 1280-1281, 227 N.Y.S.3d 497; People v. T.P., 73 Misc.3d 1215[A], 2021 N.Y. Slip Op. 51048[U], 2021 WL 5227446 [Nassau County Ct.]).

The Legislature’s intent, as reflected in the language of the Raise the Age legislation, is clear and inescapable. Merriam-Webster defines “extraordinary” as “beyond what is usual, regular, or customary” or “exceptional to a very marked extent” (Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, extraordinary [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extraordinary]). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “extraordinary” as “[b]eyond what is usual, customary, regular, or common” (Black’s Law Dictionary [12th ed 2024], extraordinary).

[4] Further, the impetus for the passage of the Raise the Age legislation bolsters our conclusion that extraordinary circumstances should only be found in the most exceptional cases. For at least the past two decades, the United States Supreme Court has recognized “[t]hree general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults” that are relevant to the manner in which the criminal justice system treats juvenile defendants (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1). First, the Court has recognized that “ ‘a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility … often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions’ ” (id. [alteration omitted], quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290). Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,” a vulnerability explained in part “by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over their own environment” (id.), often “lack[ing] the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting” (id., quoting Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am Psych 1009, 1014 [2003]). Third, “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult,” and the “personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed” (id. at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183). As a result of these fundamental differences, the Court concluded that “[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed” (id.).

Since Roper, the United States Supreme Court has continued to acknowledge that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds” (Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825). “For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence” (id., citing brief for American Medical Association et al., available at 2009 WL 2247127, *16-24, and brief for American Psychological Association et al., available at 2009 WL 2236778, *22-27).

In line with this evolving understanding, New York took steps to reform its approach to youth in the justice system. In April 2014, then-Governor Andrew Cuomo issued Executive Order 131, establishing the Commission on Youth,...