People v. Lockhart

Decision Date27 July 1990
Docket NumberNo. 1-87-1999,1-87-1999
Citation201 Ill.App.3d 700,146 Ill.Dec. 1011,558 N.E.2d 1345
Parties, 146 Ill.Dec. 1011 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bernard LOCKHART, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (Michael Halloran, James H. Reddy, Asst. Public Defenders, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Justice GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Bernard Lockhart, was tried by a jury and found guilty of murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1-(a)(1), (2)), but found not guilty of armed robbery (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 18-2(a)). He was sentenced to a term of 30 years' imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred: (1) in failing to conduct a Batson hearing; and (2) in refusing to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we remand with directions.

THE VOIR DIRE

On May 8, 1986, the trial court conducted a voir dire examination of prospective jurors. The venire consisted of 60 individuals, but the 12 jurors and two alternates were selected from the first 32. During the voir dire, defendant, who is black, exercised his peremptory challenges to excuse seven prospective jurors, each of whom was white. The State, likewise, peremptorily challenged eight prospective jurors. Of those eight, five were black and three were white. Of the selected jurors, one was black while the remaining 11 jurors and two alternates were non-black. The court discharged two black veniremen for cause. The record does not disclose the racial composition of the remaining 28 venire members.

The black prospective jurors challenged by the State were:

(1) Van Merideth, a male, who was single and was a student at a two year city college. He had no prior jury service, knew no one who worked in law enforcement or in any law related field, and had no reservations about the death penalty. He and his friend were "jumped on a 'L' " platform by some gang members. Two gang members were subsequently charged with attempted robbery.

(2) Betty Daniels, a female, who was single and was an employee of Peoples Gas, had never served on a jury. She knew no one who worked in law enforcement, and had no reservations about the death penalty. She and members of her immediate family had never been victims of crime.

(3) Gordon Ulishious, a male, who was single and had just completed a "course of study" as a student, had likewise, never served as a juror. He had a cousin who was a police officer and his only personal exposure to crime occurred about two years ago when a radio was stolen from his automobile. His sister's apartment was broken into approximately 11 years ago. He had reservations about the death penalty, but stated that he would consider all the possible penalties including the death penalty, if the defendant was found guilty.

(4) Harold Williams, a male, who was single and was an employee of U.S. Steel. He had never served as a juror and knew no one who worked in law enforcement. He was involved in a civil law suit 15 years ago. He was a victim of crime 15 years ago, when he was robbed at gunpoint. His niece was also robbed on a "L" platform approximately five years ago. He had no reservations about the death penalty.

(5) Charlene Chandlers, a female, who was unemployed, had never served as a juror, and knew no one who worked in law enforcement. She had never been a victim of crime, but one of her brothers was once beaten by some assailants.

The white prospective jurors challenged by the State were:

(1) Michelle McCormick, a female, who worked as an interior designer, had not served on a jury before. She knew no one who worked in law enforcement or in law related fields. Her friend's car was broken into and she had not formed an opinion on the death penalty.

(2) Deborah Dolinsky, a female, served as a juror in a criminal case in Cleveland, Ohio. A member of her family had once been a party to a civil law suit. Her brother-in-law was a lawyer and her stepbrother was a judge in Sonoma, California. She had once been "robbed" and had also been involved in a "hit and run" with a drunken driver in Cleveland. She stated that the police officers investigating the hit and run incident never followed up on their investigation. She had "some trouble" with the death penalty, but stated that she would consider all the possible penalties including the death penalty, if the defendant was found guilty.

(3) Phyllis Hager, a female, had never served as a juror, nor did she know anyone in law enforcement. Her only exposure to crime occurred approximately eight years ago when her purse was stolen. She had "strong feelings" against the death penalty, but stated that she would consider all the possible penalties including the death penalty, if the defendant was found guilty.

On that same day, three panels, each consisting of four jurors, were separately selected and sworn without objection from the defense, as were two alternate jurors. Four of the selected 11 non-black jurors had themselves either been victims of crime, or had immediate family members who were victims of crime. They were:

(1) Karen Pedtke, a female, who was an office manager, stated that she had been burglarized two and one half years ago.

(2) Carolyn Mir, a female, who was a teacher, also stated that she had been burglarized and that the "grill" on her automobile was stolen. No one was ever apprehended for either of those crimes. When she was asked if those experiences would affect her ability to sit as a juror, she responded by saying, "possibly."

(3) Mr. Yu stated that his car was stolen and that he had a friend who was robbed. He also stated that he had once encountered abusive police officers.

(4) Cheryl Wade, a female, who worked in a refinery, stated that her parent's car was stolen, but that it was subsequently recovered.

Moreover, three of those 11 selected non-black jurors, which included one who was also counted as a crime victim, had some degree of reservation about the death penalty. They were:

(1) Karen Pedtke stated that she had "strong feeling" against the death penalty.

(2) Mary Dugan, who was married, stated that she had reservations about the death penalty.

(3) Judith Everhart, who was married, stated that she had mixed emotions about the death penalty.

On the following day, May 9, before the jury was to be sworn in as a whole, but after three panels and two alternates were separately sworn, defendant first moved for a mistrial on the ground that the State had exercised its peremptory challenges to systematically exclude blacks from the jury. In response, the State argued that defendant had not established a prima facie case of discrimination and therefore, the burden had not shifted to the State to come forward with race neutral reasons for its peremptory challenges of black prospective jurors. The State pointed out that of the eight prospective jurors peremptorily challenged, three were white and also, that a black juror had been selected.

In concluding that a prima facie case of discrimination had not been established, the trial court stated:

"Well, I think Batson says its [sic] a systematic exclusion here. They stated there were five blacks and three whites excluded, and that's five-eights and three-eights. The defendant excused seven white jurors, and I don't think you have made out a prima facie case, however, of exclusion. I think that means 100 percent exclusion."

THE TRIAL

During the trial, several witnesses testified on behalf of the State. Jeanine Dilworth, who lived with the defendant, testified that on September 23, 1984, she saw the victim, Darrette Maxie, who is a black, standing outside waiting for the defendant. She then invited him into the apartment which she shared with the defendant. Jeanine testified that the victim was a friend of the defendant whom she had previously met through the defendant. They were together in the apartment for approximately 15 minutes when defendant arrived. Defendant and the victim went into the kitchen to drink and talk. Melvin, another friend of the defendant, came by and then the three men left the apartment together.

The victim returned to the apartment alone 15 minutes later and expressed his concerns to Jeanine about defendant's use of narcotics. Defendant returned 45 minutes thereafter. She testified that upon defendant's return he and the victim talked in the kitchen and then in the bathroom for about ten minutes outside of her hearing. When they reappeared in the kitchen, she heard the victim trying to talk to defendant while defendant pointed to a gold chain around the victim's neck. She heard the victim offer to give defendant the chain if he agreed to talk to him. She then saw the victim give defendant the chain, who placed it in a glass jar.

The victim asked to take defendant for a ride in order to talk to him. Defendant agreed. But as the victim stepped outside, defendant attempted to shut the door behind him, while he remained inside. The victim kept thwarting defendant's attempts to shut him out of the apartment by putting his foot in the door and asking to be let back inside. Defendant acquiesced and, when the victim was allowed back in, they talked about the gold chain. The victim then took his chain back from defendant. At this point, defendant asked the victim to leave and as he got to the door, defendant pulled on the victim's jacket, and in response, the victim held the defendant by his arms. The victim then left the apartment saying he would not come back unless defendant called him, but defendant responded by again asking him to leave. After the victim left, defendant went to his closet,...

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