People v. Loden

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: SEIDENFELD
• Citation: People v. Loden, 327 N.E.2d 58, 27 Ill.App.3d 761 (Ill. App. 1975)
• Decision Date: 24 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 73--332,73--332
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesse Delbert LODEN, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 58

327 N.E.2d 58

27 Ill.App.3d 761

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesse Delbert LODEN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 73--332.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, First Division.

April 24, 1975.

Ralph Ruebner, State Appellate Defender Agency, Deputy Appellate Defender, Richard J. Wilson, Elgin, for defendant-appellant.

Philip G. Reinhard, State's Atty., Rockford, James W. Jerz, Martin P. Moltz, Ill. State's Atty. Assoc., Elgin, for plaintiff-appellee.

SEIDENFELD, Presiding Justice:

Defendant was convicted of the offense of burglary after a jury trial, and was sentenced to 1--3 years imprisonment. He appeals, contending that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that the court erred in giving an instruction on voluntary intoxication over his objections, and that he was denied credit for jail time served prior to judgment.

There is testimony that on March 25, 1973, at about 2:40 A.M., an upstairs tenant heard noises coming from the hardware store below. She called the police who arrived about 15 or 20 minutes later. They testified that they found that a window in the back of the hardware store had been broken. They then saw defendant crawling down one of the aisles of the store and arrested him. There was no evidence that any items from the store were either missing or moved or that any money was missing from the cash drawer which was ordinarily left open. There was testimony that defendant had not been authorized to enter the store.

Defendant testified essentially that he had come out of a bar in the neighborhood of the hardware store when he was confronted by two police officers, who asked him why he wasn't in jail (referring to defendant's arrest by the same two officers some five months previously for assaulting one of the officers). He said that one of the officers then struck him with a gun, and placed him in their parked squad car. Once in the squad car, that he was questioned about a burglary for an extended time and during the questioning the officers severely beat him. That he was then taken to the alley behind the hardware store, again beaten, and finally thrown through the bathroom window into the hardware store.

Defendant first argues that the State failed to sustain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he entered the premises with intention to commit a felony or theft, which is an essential element of the crime of burglary (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 38, par. 19--1).

The specific intent to commit a felony or theft must exist at the time of an unauthorized entry into the building of another. Ordinarily intent must be proved circumstantially by inferences drawn from conduct. In the absence of inconsistent circumstances, proof of unlawful entry into a building which contains personal property that could be the subject of larceny gives rise to an inference that will sustain a conviction of burglary. The inference is grounded in human experience which justifies the assumption that the unlawful entry was not purposeless, and, in the absence of other proof, indicates theft as the most likely purpose. People v. Johnson (1963), 28 Ill.2d 441, 443, 192 N.E.2d 864; People v. Rossi (1969), 112 Ill.App.2d 208, 212, 250 N.E.2d 528. See also, People v. Hayes (1973), 11 Ill.App.3d 359, 361, 296 N.E.2d 649.

Defendant's argument that there are sufficient inconsistent circumstances in the record to rebut the inference that theft was the purpose of the unlawful entry is not persuasive. To reach that conclusion it would be necessary to give great credence to the defendant's uncorroborated testimony which contained numerous inconsistencies and which the jury obviously did not believe.

Defendant claims that there are inconsistencies in the testimony of the State's witnesses which support the conclusion that the defendant not only did not enter the store with the intent to commit a theft or felony but that he entered the store against his will, having been thrown through the window by the police officers. Principally, this is based on the fact that nothing appeared to be disturbed in the store. Thus, the defendant argues that the noises the upstairs tenant heard were not the sounds of a theft attempt by defendant, but were, rather, the sounds of the police officers beating the defendant. In addition, defendant points to the presence of broken glass on the floor of the store, the lacerations on his hands, and his contention that the officers had sufficient motive to 'frame' him because his previous arrest had resulted in a suspended sentence, as support for his version of the incident. These factual questions, all of which involve the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, are for the jury. From our review of the entire record we do not agree that the State's case is so 'unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt' of the defendant's guilt. People v. Stringer (1972), 52 Ill.2d 564, 289 N.E.2d 631; People v. Taylor (1974), 18 Ill.App.3d 367, 370, 309 N.E.2d 642.

People v. Soznowski (1961), 22 Ill.2d 540, 177 N.E.2d 146; People v. McCombs (1968), 94 Ill.App.2d 308, 236 N.E.2d 569 and People v. Hutchinson (1964), 50 Ill.App.2d 238, 200 N.E.2d 416, cited by the...