People v. Logie

• Decision Date: 18 May 1948
• Docket Number: Jan. Term.,83,Nos. 82,s. 82
• Parties: PEOPLE v. LOGIE et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

321 Mich. 303

32 N.W.2d 458

PEOPLE

v.LOGIE et al.

Nos. 82, 83, Jan. Term.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

May 18, 1948.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Ingham County; John Simpson, judge.

Jerry T. Logie and Charles C. Diggs were convicted of conspiring to corruptly affect and influence the action of the Legislature with respect to House Bill No. 22, and they appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

Befoer the Entire Bench, except CARR and DETHMERS, JJ.

Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Lansing, H. H. Warner, Victor C. Anderson and Daniel J. O'Hara, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Richard B. Foster, Sp. Asst. Pros. Atty., of Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee.

Albert W. Black, of Bay City, for respondent-appellant Jerry T. Logie.

Oscar W. Baker, of Bay City, for respondent-appellant Charles C. Diggs.

BUSHNELL, Chief Justice.

Defendants Jerry T. Logie and Charles C. Diggs were tried jointly and convicted on the charge of conspiring corruptly to affect and influence the action of the legislature of the State of Michigan with respect to Pub.Acts 1947, No. 107. This bill, which had to do with the amendment of the act regulating and licensing the conduct of racing meets, Pub.Acts 1933, No. 199, after passing the House, was transmitted to the Senate, where is was referred to the committee on State affairs. At the time, defendants Logie and Diggs were State senators and members of this committee, its vice-chairman being Senator Chester M. Howell. On Howell's motion, all membersof the State affairs committee voted to indefinitely postpone action on this bill.

At the trial, Howell, who was the chief witness for the people, under a grant of immunity, testified that he had been given $3,000 by one Constantine Daniels for the purpose of influencing votes on this bill. He said that Daniels told him that he wanted $1,000 of this amount to go to Logie and $250 to Diggs. Howell claimed that he informed both defendants of the plan to defeat the bill, to which both agreed, and that he paid Logie $500 on one occasion and $300 on another, and gave Diggs $150, telling them there would be more later. He admitted that he deliberately cheated both of them out of the balance of the money.

The questions raised in the separate briefs of appellants have to do with claimed prejudicial conduct of the special prosecutor, errors in the admission of certain testimony, failure of the trial judge to charge the jury as requested, errors in the charge given, undue discussion and emphasis in the charge of the prosecutor's side of the case; that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the great weight of the evidence, and that defendants were denied a fair and impartial trial.

In the respective briefs and in the arguments on appeal, much emphasis was placed upon claimed improper and inflammatory remarks by the special prosecutor, said to be deliberately calculated to convey to the jury the impression the defendants' counsel and their character witnesses were attempting to conceal the true facts. It is argued that these remarks were made with the deliberate purpose of belittling defendants' respective counsel and in order to prejudice the jury in weighing the testimony. The State sought to point out that defende counsel made few, if any, objections to the remarks of the special prosecutor, and when objections were made, curative rulings followed, and that, in any event, the remarks were harmless when considered in the light of their context and the circumstances of the trial.

It was hardly necessary for one counsel to repeat the objections made by the other when sufficient objections were interposed to direct the trial judge's attention to this situation. The claimed objectionable remarks of the prosecutor are too numerous to quote here. The controlling questions are: (1) Did the trial judge abuse his discretion by permitting the special prosecutor to heckle and harass defendants' counsel? (2) Were they unnecessarily ‘hurried’ in presenting their case? (3) Did the treatment thus accorded defendants by the special prosecutor and the court deprive them of their constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial?

These same claims were recently presented in People v. DeLano, 318 Mich. 557, 28 N.W.2d 909, 914. DeLano, also a State senator, was charged with the same crime with respect to another pending bill, tried before the same judge, prosecuted by the same special prosecutor, with Howell as the chief witness against him. Counsel for DeLano listed ‘112 assignments of error relating to prejudicial and derogatory remarks of the special prosecuting attorney.’ In the review of that conviction, as in the instant case, althought the contest was a heated one, we were not convinced that the prosecutor's remarks ‘influenced the jury adversely to the rights of the defendants.’ See also the rule laid down in People v. Burnstein, 261 Mich. 534, 538, 246 N.W. 217, 218, quoted in the DeLano case. As said in the Burnstein case: ‘It is not to be presumed that jurors in direct violation of their well-known duty indulge in unjustifiable inferences' from remarks made in the heat of trial and under provocation. Nor do we find in the instant record that defendants' own counsel were entirely blameless. In making this observation we do not suggest that trial judges be relieved of their responsibility. However, we find no room for criticism of the trial judge's conduct in the instant case. His task was difficult and the problem serious, and yet every consideration was given to the rights of the defendants. On review, we find no abuse of judicial discretion.

The general rule is that the prosecutor is not justified in cross-examining a character witness as to opinions formed after learning about the accusation or as to its effect on his opinion of defendant's reputation. People v. Snyder, 173 Mich. 616, 139 N.W. 1036;People v. Huff, 173 Mich. 620, 139 N.W. 1033; and People v. Hill, 258 Mich. 79,241 N.W. 843. Character witnesses, however, may be crossexamined for the purpose of testing their memory, knowledge and candor, and to determine their freedom from bias, prejudice or interest. Gillespie on Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure, Vol. 1, § 339, and authorities there cited.

The rulings of the trial judge with respect to such examination should not be set aside in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion. Opinions may differ as to the propriety of certain types of examination, but courts should not unduly hamper prosecutors and trial judges, nor presume that jurors are unmindful of their duties. See Peters v. Wurzburg, 267 Mich. 45, 49, 255 N.W. 316.

Examination of the record does not disclose that counsel were unduly hurried in their presentation of the case. It is true that the trial judge was required to admonish counsel that considerable time was being wasted, but in no instance were his remarks for any other purpose than to expedite the hearing.

Counsel for defendants claim prejudicial error in the admission of immaterial testimony with respect to an inquiry regarding the members of the State affairs committee of the senate, particularly Senator Hooper. This matter first arose when Norman E. Philleo, assistant clerk of the House of Representatives, was being examined. He testified as to the names and home addresses of the members of this committee and identified one of them as the late Warren G. Hooper. An objection was made as to the characterization of the ‘late’ Senator Hooper, which was overruled. No mention was made in connection with Hooper in...