People v. Logue

• Decision Date: 24 March 1970
• Docket Number: No. 41252,41252
• Citation: People v. Logue, 258 N.E.2d 323, 45 Ill.2d 170 (Ill. 1970)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Roger LOGUE, alias John Doe, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 323

258 N.E.2d 323

45 Ill.2d 170

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Roger LOGUE, alias John Doe, Appellant.

No. 41252.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 24, 1970.

Rehearing Denied May 26, 1970.

Roland N. Litterst, Peoria, appointed by the court, for appellant.

Robert S. Calkins, State's Atty., Peoria (Ronald I. Hamm, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), for the People.

WARD, Justice.

This appeal is from a judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County, which, after an evidentiary hearing, dismissed the defendant's amended petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 122--1 Et seq.

The defendant was taken into custody on July 21, 1965, for investigation in connection with the death of Billie Daniel. Three days later, an indictment charged him and Robert L. Seitz with the murder of Daniel. On July 28, the Public Defender for Peoria County was appointed by the trial court to represent both of the accused. After conferring with Seitz alone, the Public Defender on August 3 filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the defendant. The motion was allowed and an assistant Public Defender was designated to represent the defendant. A motion to quash the indictment and a motion to produce documents were subsequently filed and argued by the assistant Public Defender. A plea of not guilty was entered by the defendant on October 1 and the court denied his motions to quash and to produce. The defendant then filed a motion to have the assistant Public Defender withdrawn as his counsel and this motion was denied on October 7 after a hearing. On October 8, the assistant Public Defender filed a motion to inspect physical evidence and was permitted to examine proposed evidence in the hands of the State's Attorney. On October 11, 1965, the date previously set for trial, the defendant changed his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty, after being properly advised by the court of the consequences of such a plea and after declaring his satisfaction with the services of his counsel. The court sentenced the defendant to a term of 20 to 40 years in the penitentiary.

The principal contention of the defendant in his postconviction petition was that his plea of guilty was coerced, because of the incompetency of his counsel. In order to establish a constitutional inadequacy of representation by appointed counsel, a defendant must clearly demonstrate: '(1) actual incompetency of counsel, as reflected by the manner of carrying out his duties as a trial attorney; and (2) substantial prejudice resulting therefrom, without which the outcome would probably have been different.' (People v. Georgev, 38 Ill.2d 165, 169, 230 N.E.2d 851, 854, cert. den., 390 U.S. 998, 88 S.Ct. 1202, 20 L.Ed.2d 97; People v. Morris, 3 Ill.2d 437, 449, 121 N.E.2d 810.) The defendant must bear the burden of proof in regard to these elements. People v. Caise, 38 Ill.2d 486, 231 N.E.2d 596; People v. Georgev, 38 Ill.2d 165, 230 N.E.2d 851.

To support the charge of incompetency, the defendant, who was 25 years of age, testified that the attorney told him that he had never handled a murder case and was afraid to try it. As the defendant was an ex-convict, the attorney said, he would not be believed at a trial. 'He tried to pressure me to plead by getting my father and mother upset and said he wouldn't be able to sleep if I got the electric chair,' Logue testified. The lawyer told him, if the court inquired, to say that he was satisfied with his services. The defendant declared that he had asked the attorney to talk with his neighbors and co-workers but the attorney did not do so. He said he had wanted to plead self defense. He requested the attorney to talk with Seitz, the co-defendant, according to the defendant. He asked his counsel to seek out and interview two men who, in a way not made clear, could supply information, he said, which presumably would assist the defense. The defendant did not know the names of the men but he told his attorney they had records, described them and named taverns they frequented. The defendant on cross-examination testified that the two men had not seen the shooting and what information they could have furnished was not revealed.

The attorney testified, when called by the People, that he began the practice of law, in October 1962 as an assistant State's Attorney and that he served as a prosecutor from October 1962 to June of 1964, when he became an assistant Public Defender. He had never tried a murder case and had handled other felony cases only at the preliminary hearing stage. He denied the defendant had ever requested him to interview anyone and said the defendant never furnished names of any possible witnesses. The attorney testified the first time he hard to a defense of self-defense was when the defendant testified about it at the hearing. He had advised the defendant of possible penalties but denied he had told him that if convicted at a trial he would get the electric chair. He had filed motions to quash the indictment, produce documents and inspect physical evidence. He discussed the case with the defendant four, five or six times and investigated possible defenses. He did not interview the...