People v. Lonzo
| Decision Date | 18 November 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 46490,46490 |
| Citation | 319 N.E.2d 481,59 Ill.2d 115 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Barney LONZO, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., and Barry Rand Elden, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel, and John J. Verscaj, Junior Law Student, assisted in the research), for the People.
James J. Doherty, Public Defender, Chicago (Donald S. Honchell and John Thomas Moran, Asst. Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellee.
After a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant, Barney Lonzo, was found guilty of the offense of attempted theft, and was sentenced to a term of 60 days in the House of Correction. The complaint charged that on August 29, 1972, 'at 55 West Chestnut Street, Chicago, Illinois' the defendant 'committed the offense of Attempt in that he with intent to commit the offense of theft, attempted to exert unauthorized control over bicycles in a bicycle storage cage, and permanently deprive the owners of those bicycles of their use and benefit.'
The defendant did not move to dismiss the complaint, nor did he request a bill of particulars. After the prosecution had presented its case, however, he moved for a directed finding on the ground that the complaint failed to allege that the defendant took a substantial step toward the offense of theft. The trial court overruled the objection.
In a Per curiam opinion the appellate court reversed the judgment on the ground that the complaint was 'insufficient in that it does not properly allege ownership of the property involved.' (16 Ill.App.3d 503, 306 N.E.2d 614.) We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal.
In reaching its conclusion the appellate (1968), 41 Ill.2d 7, 241 N.E.2d 419, and (1968), 41 Ill.2d 241 N.E.2d 419, and People v. Baskin (1969), 119 Ill.App.2d 18, 255 N.E.2d 42. Neither of these cases, however, involved a charge of attempted theft; each involved a completed offense. Obviously, the elements of an inchoate offense cannot be charged with the particularity that is possible after the offense has been completed. In the present case, for example, it seems unlikely that either the defendant or his two co-defendants, who were apprehended with him inside the bicycle cage in the basement of the building, had determined which bicycles they intended to steal.
The difference between the particularity required in charging an attempt and a completed offense has been frequently pointed out. In People v. Williams (1972), 52 Ill.2d 455, 460--461, 288 N.E.2d 406, 409, for example, we stated:
'* * * As an indictment for conspiracy need not allege all the elements of the substantive offense which is the object of the conspiracy (Stein v. United States (9th Cir.), 313 F.2d 518), in an indictment for attempt, the crime intended need not be set out as fully and specifically as would be required in an indictment for the actual commission of the crime. (Baker v. State, 6...
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... ... We note that "an indictment for conspiracy need not allege all the elements of the substantive offense which is the object of the [58 Ill.App.3d 478] conspiracy * * *." (People v. Williams (1972), 52 Ill.2d 455, 460, 288 N.E.2d 406; see also People v. Lonzo" (1974), 59 Ill.2d 115, 116, 319 N.E.2d 481.) The indictment fully apprised defendant of the critical elements of the conspiracy charge; namely, the agreement between defendant and Hayes leading to her submission of fraudulent representations for defendant's ultimate receipt of unlawful funds ... \xC2" ... ...
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...in an indictment for the actual commission of the crime.' 52 Ill.2d 455, 460--461, 288 N.E.2d 406, 409. Likewise, in People v. Lonzo, 59 Ill.2d 115, 116, 319 N.E.2d 481, 482, involving an attempted theft, the court said in answer to the contention that the indictment was defective in not al......
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