People v. Lopez

• Court: Colorado Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.
• Citation: People v. Lopez, 2024 CO 50, 553 P.3d 203 (Colo. 2024)
• Docket Number: 22SC759
• Decision Date: 19 August 2024
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Matthew Rodolfo Vansant LOPEZ, Respondent.
• topic: Constitutional Law,Civil Procedure

553 P.3d 203

2024 CO 50

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner

v.Matthew Rodolfo Vansant LOPEZ, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 22SC759

Supreme Court of Colorado.

June 24, 2024

Rehearing Denied August 19, 2024

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 19CA287,

Attorneys for Petitioner; Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Frank R. Lawson, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: McClintock Law Firm, LLC Elizabeth A. McClintock, Colorado Springs, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 We granted certiorari to consider whether a defendant who argues, for the first time on appeal, that his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel was violated by the simultaneous prosecution of defense counsel and defendant by the same prosecutor must prove that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his representation.

¶2 To answer this question, we must decide whether (1) to adopt the division’s analysis in People v. Edebohls, 944 P.2d 552, 556–57 (Colo. App. 1996), in which the division concluded that pending criminal charges against defense counsel in the same district in which counsel was representing a defendant created an actual conflict of interest that, absent a valid waiver, required reversal; or (2) to require, instead, a showing that an actual conflict of interest existed and ad- versely affected a defendant’s representation, as we have required in cases involving different forms of attorney conflicts.

¶3 We now conclude that Edebohls has been superseded by subsequent case law, which has limited the categories of errors deemed to mandate reversal without a showing of prejudice (i.e., structural errors). Accordingly, we conclude that the proper framework for analyzing a conflict like that at issue here is the framework set forth in our decision in West v. People, 2015 CO 5, ¶ 65, 341 P.3d 520, 534, Under this framework, unless a matter falls within one of the limited scenarios in which the Supreme Court has presumed prejudice, see, e,g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487–91, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658–60, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), a defendant must show both a conflict of interest and an adverse effect resulting from that conflict, West, ¶ 65, 341 P.3d at 534.

¶4 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below and remand this case for findings in accordance with the standards set forth in this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶5 Matthew Rodolfo Vansant Lopez met the victim, K.H., in Colorado Springs. Shortly after their initial encounter, K.H. and Lopez had a text exchange in which the two discussed K.H.’s going to Lopez’s home to clean his house for a fee. After K.H. told Lopez the cost, Lopez responded that he did not really need his place cleaned but that he could get K.H. some cash, "just for the pleasure of [her] company." K.H. agreed to go to Lopez’s home on the condition that there would be no "tricks."

¶6 Lopez subsequently drove K.H. to his home and after showing her his gun collection, propositioned her for sex. K.H. declined, but Lopez then said, "[Y]ou know I’m going to rape you, right?" K.H. tried unsuccessfully to escape, and Lopez sexually assaulted her for two hours. Thereafter, Lopez drove K.H. to a rescue mission, after threatening to harm her and her family if she told anyone what had happened.

¶7 After arriving at the mission, K.H., who was visibly upset and crying, approached a shelter supervisor and told the supervisor that she had been raped. The supervisor called the police, and K.H. was subsequently taken to a hospital where she underwent a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner examination. K.H. also talked to the police and identified Lopez as her assailant.

¶8 With the information that K.H. had provided, the police obtained a search warrant and executed it at Lopez’s residence, where they found, among other things, two suspected explosive devices. The police arrested Lopez, and the El Paso County District Attorney’s Office (the "DA") charged him with, as relevant here, two counts of sexual assault, one count of second degree kidnapping, one count of possession of an incendiary device, and two crime of violence counts.

¶9 Thereafter, Lopez retained Dennis Hartley, a private criminal defense attorney, as counsel, and Hartley represented Lopez from August 2017 through the end of Lopez’s trial in October 2018.

¶10 As pertinent here, at the time he entered his appearance as Lopez’s counsel, Hartley was being prosecuted by the same DA that was prosecuting Lopez. Specifically, five months before becoming Lopez’s attorney, Hartley had been charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence ("DUI"), and the DA was still prosecuting that case at the time Hartley appeared on Lopez’s behalf. Then, three months after Hartley entered his appearance for Lopez, he received another summons in El Paso County, this time for driving under restraint ("DUE"). The DA prosecuted that case, as well.

¶11 Shortly after the DUR charge was filed against Hartley, he pleaded guilty to the DUI charge and was sentenced to ten days work release followed by thirty days in-home detention and twenty-four months of supervised probation. Because of this conviction, the court also revoked a deferred judgment that Hartley had received in 2015 for another misdemeanor DUI, and it imposed a concurrent sentence, identical to the one described above. The DA thus became responsible for prosecuting any violation of the conditions of Hartley’s sentence while continuing to prosecute the DUR charge.

¶12 A few days after entering into the DUI plea agreement and with the DUR charge still pending, Hartley, acting on Lopez’s behalf, moved for a continuance of a scheduled motions hearing in Lopez’s case, and he asked to approach the bench so that he could "explain this a little bit." Because the court’s recording system was not working, however, the court noted that it had no way to record a bench conference that day. The court, then asked whether Hartley had discussed "this" with the prosecution (the court did not indicate in open court what "this" was). After Hartley said that he had, the court asked whether Hartley had discussed "this" with Lopez (again, the court did not elaborate). Hartley responded, "He understand[s]." The court then instructed Hartley to approach and indicated that they could make a record later if need be. Upon completion of this unrecorded bench conference, the court found good cause to continue the motions hearing.

¶13 Approximately six weeks later, while Lopez’s case was still in its pretrial phase, Hartley received another DUR summons, and three weeks after that, he filed a motion to continue the jury trial in Lopez’s case. In this motion, Hartley asserted, among other things, that during an incident in his home, he had sustained a serious injury that required surgery and that he was unable to walk and was still hospitalized.

¶14 The day after Hartley filed this motion, the trial court conducted a hearing at which another attorney covered for Hartley. This attorney reiterated Hartley’s request for a continuance, noting that Hartley was likely to be hospitalized for a significant period of time. The court found good cause to continue Lopez’s trial.

¶15 Several months later, Hartley resumed his representation of Lopez. At this point, the DA was still supervising Hartley’s probation and prosecuting the two pending DUR charges against him. Apparently in light of these facts, the court made the following inquiry at a motions hearing:

THE COURT: Mr. Hartley, have you gone through the advisement slash conflict waiver issues with Mr. Lopez?

MR. HARTLEY: What conflict waiver? Oh, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Lopez, you’re aware of current circumstances, and you’re perfectly fine again continuing with representation by Mr. Hartley?

MR. LOPEZ: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Excellent. Thank you, very much.

¶16 The case proceeded, and just days before Lopez’s trial was to begin, Hartley and the DA agreed to a global disposition to resolve each of the charges still pending against Hartley. Under this disposition, Hartley agreed to plead guilty to one of the outstanding DUR charges, to the revocation and re-grant of probation in his second DUI case, and to a controlling sentence of 180 days of in-home detention, with his prior supervised probation to continue.

¶17 The trial in Lopez’s case began, and on the second day of trial, one of the trial prosecutors indicated that he had a matter that he needed to address. The following bench conference then occurred, apparently outside of Lopez’s earshot:

[PROSECUTOR]: I have orders from [District Attorney] May to ask the Court to advise the defendant that Mr. Hartley’s criminal case was concluded, and that he is serving a sentence right now, and that we would be the authority prosecuting any violation of the in home detention sentence. That’s all I have.

THE COURT: Did we or did we not previously address this issue, and get some sort of waiver or conflict issue letter indicating this from Mr. Hartley?

[PROSECUTOR]: Yeah, quite a long time ago.

THE COURT: And it[’s] different you now say because the situation transitioned from possible prosecution to where the prosecution decides whether to pursue probation violation charges and of course there is no current probation violation allegation, right?

[PROSECUTOR]: Correct.

THE COURT: Now, what is [it] you think we need? Is it just a written letter, or something on the record?

[PROSECUTOR]: I think Mr. Hartley saying he advised his client. I didn’t think we needed to do anything.

THE COURT: Okay.

[PROSECUTOR]: But that is the position of the office.

THE COURT: I got you. Okay. Mr. Hartley, how do you...