People v. Lopez

• Citation: 31 Cal.4th 1051,79 P.3d 548,6 Cal.Rptr.3d 432
• Decision Date: 24 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. S106681,S106681
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Daniel Sapien LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

6 Cal.Rptr.3d 432

79 P.3d 548

31 Cal.4th 1051

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Daniel Sapien LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S106681

Supreme Court of California

November 24, 2003

Joseph Shipp, Sebastapol, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner and Robert R. Anderson, Chief

Assistant Attorneys General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick J. Whalen, Michael A. Canzoneri and Brian G. Smiley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

The crime of carjacking requires the "felonious taking" of a motor vehicle. (Pen.Code, § 215.)¹ Similarly, the crime of robbery requires the "felonious taking" of personal property. (§ 211.) California courts, following common law, have long held that the "taking" element of robbery requires that a defendant gain possession of the victim's property and asport or carry it away. (See People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165, 282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742 (Cooper); Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) § 2, pp. 343-344 (Perkins).) Does the felonious taking element of the crime of carjacking, like robbery, require asportation or movement of the motor vehicle? We conclude that it does. Because the Court of Appeal came to a contrary decision, we reverse that court's judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 1, 1999, Wa Vue Yang was seated inside his van in a parking lot when defendant approached him and offered to sell him a watch. When Yang replied that he had a watch, defendant pulled out a gun and shot at the ground. He pointed the gun at Yang and ordered him out of his van. Yang complied, but left his keys in the ignition. Defendant sat in the van and threw his backpack onto the passenger seat. As Yang began to leave, he remembered that he had left some checks inside the van. Deciding that defendant's weapon was an air gun, Yang's fear subsided. He returned to the van to retrieve his checks. Defendant pointed his gun at Yang and pulled the trigger twice, but the gun did not fire. Defendant fled from the van and left his backpack, containing identification, in the van.

Defendant committed a series of other unrelated crimes. After a court trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of multiple felony offenses, including carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)) for the criminal activity against Yang (count V). Under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds.(b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), the court imposed a lengthy term of imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the carjacking conviction. It rejected defendant's claim that, because the vehicle had not been moved or the engine started, there was insufficient evidence of a completed carjacking and he was guilty only of attempted carjacking. Determining that carjacking and robbery are not analogous crimes, the court held that actual movement of a motor vehicle is not required to complete the offense of carjacking. We granted review to settle the conflict between this case and People v. Vargas (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 456, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 867 (Vargas), which held that carjacking requires movement of the vehicle because robbery is an analogous statute and it requires movement of the property taken.

II. DISCUSSION

Carjacking is defined as "the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, or from the person or immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his or her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means of force or fear." (§ 215, subd. (a), italics added.)

Robbery is defined as "the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." (§ 211, italics added.)

Defendant relies on Vargas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 456, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 867. He argues that, because the Legislature used the same "felonious taking" phrase in defining carjacking, it intended that the phrase be given the same meaning as the analogous provision in the robbery statute. Following the common law crime of larceny, California courts have construed the taking element of robbery to include two necessary elements: caption or gaining possession of the victim's property, and asportation or carrying away the loot. (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 852, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673; Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1165, 282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742; see also People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 945-947, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 143, 987 P.2d 168; Perkins, supra, § 2, pp. 343-344.) The Attorney General responds that the Legislature created a new crime of carjacking, which, although resembling the crime of robbery in some respects, is a separate crime with meaningful differences. Although we agree with the Attorney General that "[t]he analogy between robbery and carjacking is imperfect" (People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th 853, 860, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 254, 3 P.3d 898), "[t]here is no evidence the Legislature intended to adopt a `felonious taking' requirement different from that for robbery." (Vargas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 463, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 867.)

In construing a statute, our role is to ascertain the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713.) In determining intent, we must look first to the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 230, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 570, 6 P.3d 228.) If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute governs. (Id. at pp. 230-231, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 570, 6 P.3d 228.) "If, however, the language supports more than one reasonable construction, we may consider `a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.' [Citation.] Using these extrinsic aids, we `select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.' [Citation.]" (People v. Sinohui (2002) 28 Cal.4th 205, 211-212, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 47 P.3d 629.)

Section 215, subdivision (a), requires the "taking" of a motor vehicle. Defendant claims that the plain meaning of the word "taking" requires proof of asportation. However, terms such as "asportation," "carries or drives away," or "movement" do not appear in the statute. The plain meaning of "taking" does not necessarily impute an asportation requirement. (See Carter v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 255, 272, 120 S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203 [comparing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (b), one of which required a taking while the other specified taking and carrying away].) In contrasting "taking" from "carrying away," one commentator noted that "A taking occurs when the offender secures dominion over the property, while a carrying away requires some slight movement away of the property." (3 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2003) Larceny — Taking and Carrying Away, § 19.3, p. 74, italics added.) Thus, we must look to extrinsic sources to determine legislative intent.

The Legislature created the crime of carjacking in 1993. (Stats.1993, ch. 611, § 6, p. 3508.) Prior to the enactment of section 215, the forcible taking of a motor vehicle was charged and prosecuted as a second degree robbery. (See People v. Duran (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1376, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 812; People v. Hamilton (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1141-1142, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 343; see also Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 8, 1993, p. 1.) The legislative history reveals the underlying purpose for creating the new crime of carjacking: "According to the author [of the legislative bill]: [¶] There has been considerable increase in the number of persons who have been abducted, many have been subjected to the violent taking of their automobile and some have had a gun used in the taking of the car. This relatively `new' crime appears to be as much thrill-seeking as theft of a car. If all the thief wanted was the car, it would be simpler to hot-wire the automobile without running the risk of confronting the driver. People have been killed, seriously injured, and placed in great fear, and this calls for a strong message to discourage these crimes. Additionally law enforcement is reporting this new crime is becoming the initiating rite for aspiring gang members and the incidents are drastically increasing. [¶] Under current law there is no carjacking crime per se and many carjackings cannot be charged as robbery because it is difficult to prove the intent required of a robbery offense (to permanently deprive one of the car) since many of these gang carjackings are thrill seeking thefts. There is a need to prosecute this crime." (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1993, p. 1, italics added.)

Thus, the legislative history demonstrates that carjacking was made a separate offense because of perceived difficulties with obtaining convictions under the robbery statute. (People v. Hamilton, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1141-1142, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 343.) In addition, because of the potentially violent nature of the taking and growing frequency of the crime, the Legislature made the punishment for carjacking greater than that for second degree robbery. (People v. Antoine (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 489, 495, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 530; People v. Hamilton, supra, at...