People v. Lucas
| Decision Date | 21 December 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 65579,65579 |
| Parties | , 139 Ill.Dec. 447 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. John W. LUCAS, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Allen H. Andrews, Asst. Defender, Officer of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellant.
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield , for People.
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Vermilion County, the defendant, John Lucas, was convicted of four counts of murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1) and of concealment of a homicidal death (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-3.1). The State requested a hearing to consider whether the death penalty should be imposed. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(d).) The trial court, at a separate sentencing hearing, found the defendant to be eligible for the death penalty and found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of a sentence of death. The circuit court sentenced the defendant to death and to a five-year term of imprisonment for the concealment of a homicidal death. The death sentence was stayed (107 Ill.2d R. 609(a)) pending direct appeal to this court (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(b); 107 Ill.2d R. 603).
Defendant raises 19 issues on appeal which, for ease of review, are grouped to reflect whether the issues relate to pretrial, trial or sentencing matters, or whether they concern constitutional questions. The issues which relate to the pretrial stage question whether the trial court erred in While the record is extensive, we will summarize the portions relevant to our disposition of this matter. The following evidence was adduced at trial. At the time of the incident, the defendant was living with Shelly Carrigan and their seven-month-old son, Danny. On the evening of January 28, 1986, the defendant and Shelly Carrigan took Danny with them to a party. At the party, the defendant consumed beer, corn liquor, marijuana and amphetamines. The defendant, Shelly Carrigan and Danny left the party between 1:30 and 2 a.m. on January 29, 1986.
[139 Ill.Dec. 450] denying the defendant's motion to suppress when: (1) the defendant did not receive adequate Miranda warnings; and (2) the police failed to scrupulously honor the defendant's request to confer with counsel. Defendant raises nine issues concerning the conduct of the trial itself. Specifically, he questions: (1) whether he was denied a fair trial by an impartial jury when the trial court denied his motion for a change of venue; (2) whether the trial court improperly dismissed two venire members for cause; (3) whether evidence of his prior conduct towards the victim was improperly admitted; (4) whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his DUI conviction and of prior injuries suffered by the victim; (5) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial; (6) whether the State presented improper testimony during its case in rebuttal; (7) whether he was denied a fair trial as a result of remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument; (8) whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the jury to view autopsy photographs; and (9) whether the murder and involuntary manslaughter instructions [132 Ill.2d 410] given by the court denied the defendant a fair trial. Defendant's allegations of error at the sentencing phase concern: (1) whether the language of section 9-1(b)(7) of the Criminal Code of 1961 permits the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty; (2) whether the sentencing authority is required to make written findings of fact when imposing the death penalty pursuant to section 9-1(b)(7); (3) whether the trial court's finding that the defendant was eligible for the death penalty was supported by the evidence; (4) whether mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty were present; and (5) whether the trial court erred in considering evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct during the sentencing hearing. The defendant also presents various constitutional challenges to the Illinois death penalty statute, which, as we discuss below, we need not address.
Shelly Carrigan testified that the defendant had been "pretty well drunk" and that when they arrived home, he was so intoxicated that she had to put him to bed.
The defendant testified that he could not remember leaving the party. However, he remembered going into Danny's room sometime that night and shaking Danny in his crib. In the process, he banged Danny against the side of the crib. The defendant indicated that at the time he was aware that he was shaking Danny.
After shaking Danny, the defendant noticed that Danny had stopped breathing. In an effort to revive him, he splashed water on him and then placed him on the floor and performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on him.
The defendant then went back to bed. The next morning, unsure whether the events of the preceding night had actually occurred, he checked on Danny and discovered that he was dead. The defendant decided to hide Danny's body in the vicinity of Grape Creek, a wooded area not far from his residence. As he was leaving, he told Shelly Carrigan, who was still in bed, that he was going to get groceries. The defendant then dressed Danny's body, drove it to Grape Creek, and hid it under a pile of wood and debris.
After leaving Grape Creek, the defendant drove to an Eisner's grocery store, and went in briefly. He then drove home and told Shelly Carrigan that Danny had been kidnapped from his car at the Eisner's. The two drove back to Eisner's and called the police.
The police arrived at the Eisner's at approximately 10:15 a.m. The defendant and Subsequently, the defendant's mother and brother came to the police station. The police informed them that they believed that the defendant was lying about the kidnapping and allowed them to speak to the defendant. The defendant's brother testified at trial that he and his mother were asked by the police to find out the truth regarding the child's disappearance. After talking to his mother and brother, the defendant decided that he did not need an attorney, that he would take a polygraph test, and that he would talk to the police.
[139 Ill.Dec. 451] Shelly Carrigan were taken to the Public Safety Building, where they were questioned about the alleged kidnapping while the defendant's car was checked for evidence of the kidnapping. The defendant was initially questioned about the kidnapping by Investigators Miller and Hartshorn at 11 a.m. Based on certain inconsistencies in the defendant's story, they began to suspect his involvement in the incident; however, they did not place him under arrest. At 1:15 p.m., the police officers advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and again proceeded to question him about the alleged kidnapping. When the defendant indicated[132 Ill.2d 412] that he would like to speak to an attorney, the officers ceased questioning and left the room.
While the defendant was at the Public Safety Building, the police obtained Shelly Carrigan's permission to search the house and car. The police obtained bloodstained bedding from Danny's room and took numerous photographs of the room.
The defendant was again interviewed at 7:43 p.m. on January 29, 1986, after he had submitted to a polygraph examination. After again being advised of his Miranda rights, he stated that he thought he had been involved in Danny's death and agreed to show the police where Danny's body was hidden. The defendant repeated his statements on tape at 7:53 p.m.
On January 30, 1986, at 10:23 a.m., the defendant told the police that on the evening of January 28, 1986, he had gone into Danny's room and had thrashed and banged Danny around in the crib. Once he realized that Danny was not breathing, he had attempted to revive him by performing CPR on him. He also stated that he had hidden the body at Grape Creek and later claimed that Danny had been kidnapped.
Dr. Maratos, the medical pathologist who performed an autopsy on Danny, testified that the cause of death was suffocation. He stated that Danny also suffered other injuries, the most significant of which were a fractured left arm and a ruptured liver, and that the ruptured liver would have proved fatal had Danny not been suffocated. Dr. Maratos also testified that all of the injuries had occurred prior to Danny's death and that they could have been caused by someone holding Danny by his left arm and striking him against a solid object. Dr. Maratos described numerous autopsy photographs showing various aspects of the autopsy, several of which were submitted to the jurors during deliberations.
Thomas Miller and Richard Magers, friends of the defendant, testified at trial that they had been at the party with the defendant on January 28, 1986, and had seen the defendant drink beer and moonshine. Four or five marijuana cigarettes were passed around during the evening and were shared by most of the people at the party. At one point during the evening, Shelly Carrigan left the party for approximately half an hour. During her absence, Thomas Miller cared for Danny when he cried while the defendant continued to spend most of the evening drinking and playing cards.
The State also introduced evidence regarding a September 10, 1985, incident in which Danny sustained a broken arm while in the defendant's care. The defendant contended that Danny's arm had been broken when the defendant tripped and accidentally dropped Danny. Gordon Terry, an investigator from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), testified that when he accused the defendant of breaking Danny's arm, the defendant laughed and stated that he could not prove it.
Shelly Carrigan...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. King
... ... People v. Spears, 112 Ill.2d 396, 403-404, 98 Ill.Dec. 9, 493 N.E.2d 1030 (1986); People v. O'Neil, 194 Ill.App.3d 79, 141 Ill.Dec. 44, 52, 550 N.E.2d ... Id.; People v. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d 399, 139 Ill.Dec. 447, 465, 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1021 (1989); People v. Gallagher, 69 N.Y.2d 525, 529, 508 N.E.2d 909, 516 N.Y.S.2d 174 ... ...
-
State v. Johnson
...be a part of the "wanton cruelty" calculus. See People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 356, 368, 609 N.E.2d 294 (1993); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 446, 548 N.E.2d 1003 (1989). 61. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703 (F) (10) (1989) ("[t]he murdered individual was an on duty peace officer who was k......
-
People v. Fair
... ... (Odle, 128 Ill.2d at 141, 131 Ill.Dec. 53, 538 N.E.2d 428.) Subsequent challenges to this statute in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Maynard v. Cartwright (1988), 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372, have also been upheld. See People v. Lucas (1989), 132 Ill.2d 399, 444, 139 Ill.Dec. 447, 548 N.E.2d 1003; People v. Kidd (1989), 129 Ill.2d 432, 455-56, 136 Ill.Dec. 18, 544 N.E.2d 704 ... Defendant submits that the medical testimony established that Gregory's death was caused by three severe blunt trauma injuries to ... ...
-
People v. Brown
... ... People v. Kitchen, 159 Ill.2d 1, 34, 201 Ill.Dec. 1, 636 N.E.2d 433 (1994); People v. Henderson, 142 Ill.2d 258, 319, 154 Ill.Dec. 785, 568 N.E.2d 1234 (1990); People v. Scott, 148 Ill.2d 479, 546, 171 Ill.Dec. 365, 594 N.E.2d 217 (1992); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d 399, 439, 139 Ill.Dec. 447, 548 N.E.2d 1003 (1989). Among the valid reasons for admitting photographs of a decedent is to prove the nature and extent of injuries and the force needed to inflict them, the position, condition, and location of the body, and the manner and cause of death, ... ...
-
Capital punishment in Illinois in the aftermath of the Ryan commutations: reforms, economic realities, and a new saliency for issues of cost.
...almost immediately after injuries that could have been inflicted by a single blow does not satisfy this requirement. People v. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d 399, 548 N.E. 2d 1003 (1989). Deliberate starvation and exposure satisfies this requirement. People v. Banks, 161 Ill.2d 119, 641 N.E. 2d 331 Gene......