People v. Luedemann

• Decision Date: 04 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2-03-1303, No. 2-04-0184.
• Citation: 357 Ill. App.3d 411,293 Ill.Dec. 385,828 N.E.2d 355
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Derek M. LUEDEMANN, Defendant-Appellee (Two Cases).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

828 N.E.2d 355

357 Ill. App.3d 411

293 Ill.Dec. 385

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Derek M. LUEDEMANN, Defendant-Appellee (Two Cases).

Nos. 2-03-1303, 2-04-0184.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

May 4, 2005.

Rehearing Denied June 1, 2005.

John A. Barsanti, Kane County State's Attorney, St. Charles, Martin P. Moltz, Deputy Director, Gregory L. Slovacek, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People No. 2-03-1303.

Lisa F. Napier, McNamee, Mahoney & Leach, Ltd., Dundee, for Derek M.Luedemann.

Mary Katherine Moran, Special Kane County State's Attorney, St. Charles, Martin P. Moltz, Deputy Director, Gregory L. Slovacek, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People in No. 2-04-0184. Justice GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Early on a Saturday morning in August 2002, defendant, Derek M. Luedemann, was sitting in his car in front of his girlfriend's house, waiting for her to return home. Officer Eric Pate drove by, noticing that defendant's car was running and he was smoking in the car. Officer Pate drove past defendant, parked in the middle of the street, approached defendant, and observed that defendant was intoxicated. Defendant was subsequently arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2002)), in case No. 02-DT-1233 (the DUI case). Following this arrest, defendant's car was searched. A substance containing a methylenedioxy amphetamine derivative was found in the car, leading to defendant's indictment for unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2002)), in case No. 02-CF-1904 (the controlled substances case). In both cases, defendant moved to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence seized (725 ILCS 5/114-12 (West 2002)), arguing that Officer Pate lacked a reasonable belief that defendant was involved in criminal activity. The trial court in the DUI case granted the motion. Based on this ruling, defendant moved to collaterally estop the State from contesting the motion to suppress in the controlled substances case. The trial court granted that motion. The State filed a certificate of impairment and timely appealed (see 188 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1)), contending that the trial court erred when it (1) granted the motion to suppress in the DUI case (appeal No. 2-03-1303) and (2) collaterally estopped the State from contesting the motion to suppress in the controlled substances case (appeal No. 2-04-0184). We disagree with the State's first contention and affirm the trial court's judgment in appeal No. 2-03-1303. However, we agree with the State's second contention and vacate the trial court's judgment in appeal No. 2-04-0184.

I. FACTS

As an initial matter, we note that defendant's driving privileges were summarily suspended when he was arrested for DUI, and he petitioned to rescind that suspension (625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b) (West 2002)). The evidence presented at the rescission hearing was stipulated to at the DUI suppression hearing and comprised the only evidence presented at that hearing. That evidence consisted of Officer Pate's testimony and a videotape revealing what transpired during three field sobriety tests that defendant failed.

At the rescission hearing, Officer Pate testified that he was on patrol in his marked squad car on August 17, 2002, when he saw defendant sitting in a car on a residential street in Hampshire at approximately 2:40 a.m. Defendant was smoking a cigarette in the driver's seat of his car, which was legally parked. Although many other cars were parked along that street, those cars were not occupied. As Officer Pate drove closer to defendant's car, he saw defendant reach towards the floorboard of the front passenger seat. Officer Pate was approximately 20 to 30 feet away from defendant's car when he made this observation, and he stated that he could not see specifically what defendant was doing. As Officer Pate continued to drive closer to defendant's car, defendant returned to a seated position but "slumped or slouched down a little bit * * *, bending [his] knees and sitting down lower in the seat." Officer Pate then drove past defendant's car and parked his squad car in the middle of the street. At that time, Officer Pate lacked any information about defendant committing a crime or about any criminal activity in the area that night. As Officer Pate, who was in uniform, approached defendant, he shined his flashlight on defendant's car and the area around it. Defendant's car was running, the driver's-side window was down, and the radio was on. As Officer Pate neared defendant's car, he observed defendant turn the engine off. Officer Pate testified that he believed that defendant turned the engine off in order to turn down the radio, and he clarified that he never asked defendant to turn the engine off. When Officer Pate was standing by the rear quarter panel of the driver's side of defendant's car, he saw the neck of a brown glass bottle standing upright on the floorboard by the front passenger seat. Although Officer Pate could not see a label on the bottle and did not know what the bottle contained, he did notice that the bottle was uncapped.

While standing next to the driver's side of defendant's car, Officer Pate asked defendant for his identification, which defendant produced. The officer also asked defendant why he was sitting in his car on that street. Defendant said that he was waiting for his girlfriend to return to her home. Although defendant could not give Officer Pate his girlfriend's address, he did point to her house, which he was parked in front of. Officer Pate testified that he continued to question defendant about what he was doing on that street, because three homes were burglarized at the end of that street within the last week. Although Officer Pate knew that the burglaries were committed between 5 p.m. and 8 a.m., he did not have a description of the burglar or of the vehicle the burglar might have driven. In addition to homes, Officer Pate knew, some cars were burglarized in the area. During his conversation with defendant, Officer Pate noticed that defendant's eyes were bloodshot and glassy, he smelled of alcohol, and he slurred his speech. These observations led Officer Pate to request assistance from Officer Harris.

While waiting for Officer Harris to arrive, Officer Pate parked his squad car behind defendant's car and started the videotape recording system in his squad car. Officer Pate explained that he started videotaping his encounter with defendant because police department procedures require officers to record field sobriety tests, which Officer Pate planned to administer.

When Officer Harris arrived, he and Officer Pate approached defendant. Officer Harris, who approached on the passenger side, saw an open Miller Lite bottle on the floorboard near the front passenger seat, which is where Officer Pate saw the brown glass bottle. Officer Harris advised Officer Pate about his discovery, noting that the bottle was one-third full and cold. Defendant was asked to step out of his car, and Officer Pate administered three field sobriety tests. Although defendant did not stumble getting out of the car or walking to the rear of his car, he failed all three tests and was placed under arrest for DUI. During a subsequent search of defendant's vehicle, the officers found a substance containing a methylenedioxy amphetamine derivative.

Based on this testimony and the videotape, the trial court granted defendant's petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court found that, when Officer Pate stopped defendant, the officer did not possess any evidence that defendant was involved in any type of criminal activity. Rather, the trial court noted that Officer Pate merely had a hunch that defendant had committed a crime.

Relying on this same reasoning, the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress in the DUI case. The State timely moved to reconsider and for more detailed findings. In addressing the motion for more detailed findings, the trial court stressed that Officer Pate's basis to stop defendant was a "hunch [that] turned out to be something that all policemen hope that their hunches turn out to be, but it was nothing more than a hunch." The trial court then denied the motion to reconsider, noting that, although Officer Pate's testimony concerning the burglaries in the area was credible, such testimony was not sufficient to establish that the area was a "high crime area." The trial court emphasized that Officer Pate "essentially saw a young man sitting in a car smoking a cigarette," and "[t]his conduct [was] not sufficient to warrant the approach and questioning that took place." The State filed its notice of appeal and certificate of impairment in the DUI case on November 24, 2003.

Based on the DUI ruling, defendant moved to collaterally estop the State from contesting the motion to suppress in the controlled substances case. The trial judge in the controlled substances case, who was not the same judge who presided over the DUI case, granted the motion on January 28, 2004, finding that the parties were barred from relitigating the basis for defendant's stop and arrest because the parties and the issues were the same in both proceedings and a final judgment was entered in the DUI case. The State timely appealed, and we consolidated the appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Encounter Between Officer Pate and Defendant

Interaction between the citizenry and the police can be divided into nonconsensual and consensual encounters. See People v. Murray, 137 Ill.2d 382, 387, 148 Ill.Dec. 7, 560 N.E.2d 309 (1990). The former consist of arrests and Terry stops. See Murray, 137 Ill.2d at 387, 148 Ill.Dec. 7, 560 N.E.2d 309. The latter do not infringe upon any interest protected by the fourth amendment and therefore require...