People v. Lyles

• Citation: 87 Ill.Dec. 934,478 N.E.2d 291,106 Ill.2d 373
• Decision Date: 19 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 57068,57068
• Parties: , 87 Ill.Dec. 934 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Enice LYLES, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Page 291

478 N.E.2d 291

106 Ill.2d 373, 87 Ill.Dec. 934

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Enice LYLES, Jr., Appellant.

No. 57068.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 19, 1985.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 31, 1985.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Chicago, for appellee; Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., County of Cook, Michael E. Shabat, Kevin Sweeney, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel.

Charles M. Schiedel, Supervising Atty., Theodore A. Gottfried, State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellant.

RYAN, Justice:

Enice Lyles, Jr., was charged in a three-count indictment in the circuit court of Cook County with the murders of Mary (Nichols) Thigpen and her two young sons, Robert and Roderick Nichols. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a).) A jury found the defendant guilty of the murders of Robert and Roderick Nichols and guilty of voluntary manslaughter in regard to the death of Mary Thigpen. Following a separate bifurcated sentencing hearing before the same jury, the defendant was sentenced to death. The sentence was stayed (87 Ill.2d R. 609(a)), pending direct appeal to this court (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 4(b); 87 Ill.2d R. 603). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm defendant's convictions but reverse the sentence of death and remand the cause for a new sentencing hearing.

On February 25, 1978, at approximately 4 a.m., two Harvey police officers were flagged down by Warren Griffin. Griffin was upset and out of breath. He told the officers that he had just been to the home of his fiancee, Mary Thigpen, but had received no answer. He stated that he then peered through the bathroom window and observed one of Thigpen's sons lying face down in a bathtub partly filled with water. The officers drove Griffin to the Thigpen residence to investigate. They observed the body of the child in the bathtub through the bathroom window. The outer doors of the home were locked and showed no sign of forcible entry. After receiving no answer the police broke down a door and entered the residence.

Inside the police found the body of Roderick Nichols, age 5, lying face down in the hallway. The child's hands were bound behind his back and there was a cord wrapped around his neck. The body of Robert Nichols, age 4, was found in the bathtub. The child's hands and feet were bound and there was a ligature wrapped around his neck. The bathtub faucet was dripping, and the tub was three-fourths full as a towel had clogged the drain. Post-mortem examination showed the cause of death for both boys to have been ligature strangulation. The post-mortem examination also disclosed no indication of drowning in regards to Robert.

The body of the boy's mother, Mary Thigpen, was found propped up against the couch in the living room. She had stab wounds to her abdomen and arms and had a cloth ligature wrapped around her neck. The post-mortem examination showed the cause of death to have been ligature strangulation with stab wounds to the lung and abdomen. At the time of her death Mary Thigpen was six months pregnant.

After being informed that Mrs. Thigpen and the two boys were dead, Warren Griffin told the police that he thought that Enice Lyles had probably killed the family. Griffin stated that approximately two weeks before the killings he was present when Enice Lyles waved a screwdriver at Thigpen and threatened to kill her if she "kept up" whatever it was that was making him angry. Griffin further stated that Lyles had been in prison for murder and was recently released. He also told the police that Lyles lived in the basement of the house in front of the Thigpen residence and had babysat for Thigpen on several occasions.

The police proceeded to the house where Lyles lived. Lyles showed no emotion when told of the killings and stated that he had not seen Thigpen or her children for a few days. While talking with Lyles the police observed that he had three deep open lacerations on his right hand. The officers then asked Lyles if he would accompany them to the police station and he agreed.

Lyles arrived at the police station at approximately 6 a.m. and told the officers questionable and inconsistent stories about how he received the cuts on his hands and about his involvement in the killings. At approximately 10 a.m., Lyles confessed to the killings. Later that day a court reporter was summoned and Lyles gave a statement which was later transcribed and then signed by Lyles.

In the statement Lyles confessed to killing all three victims. Lyles stated that he had babysat for Mary Thigpen on Wednesday night, February 23. He stated that Thigpen became abusive when she arrived home and began threatening him with a knife. A struggle ensued, during which Lyles received the cuts on his hands. Lyles stated that he was able to force the knife away from Thigpen and began to stab her in the stomach with it. He then told of how he strangled Thigpen and her two young sons to death. He also stated that he had purchased first-aid supplies from a local drugstore on Thursday, February 24, and dropped his clothes off at a cleaners because he had blood stains on them. When later asked why he had killed the two boys, Lyles stated because he was afraid they would tell on him for killing their mother.

Lyles' confession was read to the jury. The confession was corroborated by the testimony of the drugstore clerk and the cleaning clerk, who both remembered Lyles coming in with the cuts on his hands. It was also corroborated by the fact that, at the time of the confession, no one other than the murderer knew that Robert Nichols had been strangled to death and had not drowned. After hearing all the evidence the jury found Lyles guilty of the murders of Robert and Roderick Nichols and guilty of voluntary manslaughter in regards to the death of Mary Thigpen. A bifurcated death sentencing hearing was then held.

During the first stage of the hearing the State introduced evidence that Lyles was over the age of 18 at the time he committed the murders of Robert and Roderick Nichols. The jury was also instructed that it could consider the two boys murders in determining if Lyles was eligible for the death sentence. The State also introduced evidence that Lyles had pleaded guilty when he was 14 years old to the murder of a guard at a youth camp. The jury found Lyles eligible for the death penalty.

During the second stage of the sentencing hearing the defense, as a mitigating factor, attempted to establish that Lyles was suffering from a severe mental or emotional disturbance. (See Ill.Rev.Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9--1(c)(2).) The defense introduced the testimony of psychologist Martin Scripp and psychiatrist Marvin Ziporyn in support of this argument. The State responded with the testimony of psychiatrist Gerson Kaplan. The jury found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty and sentenced the defendant to death.

The defendant first contends that his conviction should be overturned because the trial court erred by not suppressing his confession and other evidence stemming from his alleged illegal arrest. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the confession on the grounds that it was involuntary, obtained through coercion, and given without a knowing waiver of his Miranda rights. A hearing on the motion began on December 15, 1980, and the motion was subsequently denied.

On the morning the trial was to begin, May 24, 1982, the defendant filed another motion to suppress, this time alleging that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant. Jury selection was set for 9:30 a.m., and the State received the motion at 10:30 a.m. When the case was called, the State asked the court for a short continuance to study and prepare to defend against the motion, noting the untimeliness of the motion and the fact that the case was 4 1/2 years old. The matter was continued until later in the day. When the matter was recalled the State informed the court that it was ready to proceed to a hearing on the motion. Defense counsel stated, however, that he wished to stand on the testimony which was given at the voluntariness hearing held a year and a half before the trial date. The State did not stipulate to the use of the testimony given at the voluntariness hearing. Defense counsel himself had previously stated that the theory at the voluntariness suppression hearing was "simply and solely Miranda voluntariness and that's all. Never any contention made that the suppression should follow on the violation of the illegality of the arrest."

The trial judge noted the lateness of the filing of the motion and the fact that it had been a year and a half since the voluntariness suppression hearing and that "nothing new in the way of grounds" had been discovered since that time. The judge stated that if the motion were going to be heard "at all it would be heard with the trial." He then stated that the motion was "stricken" and "denied at this time."

During the trial the defense renewed its objection to testimony concerning any post-arrest admissions made by the defendant on the grounds that the arrest had been made without probable cause. A conference was then held outside the presence of the jury. The State again informed the court that it was prepared to proceed to a hearing, outside the presence of the jury, on the probable-cause motion. The judge indicated that he would be inclined to hold such a hearing after the jury was excused for the day. The defense, however, stated that it was not asking for a hearing and questioned whether the purpose in holding such a hearing would be "to give them [the State] a chance to correct the defects in their case?" At the end of the day the State, "in the spirit of making the record clear," invited defense counsel to go to hearing on his motion and stated that the prosecution had the arresting officer present to testify. Def...