People v. Lynch

Decision Date16 March 1998
Citation176 Misc.2d 430,674 N.Y.S.2d 894
CourtNew York County Court
Parties, 127 Ed. Law Rep. 975, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 98,210 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Kevin LYNCH, Defendant.

Michael E. Bongiorno, District Attorney of Rockland County, for plaintiff.

Harold A. Seidenberg, Nyack, for defendant.

WILLIAM A. KELLY, Judge.

The Defendant has moved by omnibus motion, dated December 16, 1997, for various forms of pretrial relief. The motion is decided as follows:

A. Constitutionality of the Statute

The defendant alleges that the statute under which he is charged is void for vagueness because there is no standard articulated from which it can be determined what conduct is "clearly inherent in the nature of an office" and, therefore, his due process rights have been violated. The People controvert the defendant's allegations by relying on People v. Goldswer, 48 A.D.2d 748, 368 N.Y.S.2d 323. The People assert that the defendant has failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to legislative enactments, such as the creation of Penal Law section 195.00(2), and contend that, in any event, the language of the statute "clearly apprises a reasonable man of the nature of the acts prohibited and of what conduct is required of him."

In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495, the United States Supreme Court construed the breadth of a statute that was alleged to have no standard articulated by which to judge whether conduct is condemned or prohibited. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that it favored that interpretation of legislation which supports its constitutionality, stating, "[o]nly if no construction can save the Act from this claim of unconstitutionality are we willing to reach that result." Id. at 100, 65 S.Ct. at 1035.

In Lighthouse Shores, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 41 N.Y.2d 7, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 359

N.E.2d 337, the New York Court of Appeals stated that, in order to defeat the "exceedingly strong" presumption of constitutionality, "unconstitutionality must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt ." Id. at 11, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 359 N.E.2d 337. The Court of Appeals explained that, as for the challenged law or ordinance:

"[i]t is [ ] presumed that the legislative body has investigated and found the existence of a situation showing or indicating the need for or desirability of the ordinance, and, if any state of facts known or to be assumed, justifies the disputed measure, this court's power of inquiry ends. Thus, ... [the] plaintiffs in order to succeed have the burden of showing that 'no reasonable basis at all' existed for the challenged portions of the ordinance." Id. at 11-12, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 359 N.E.2d 337.

In this case, the defendant has failed to overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality. His conclusory statement that the statute sets forth "no statement whatsoever ... from which it can be determined what would be clearly inherent in the nature of an office" is insufficient to carry his burden of proof.

In any event, the defendant is charged with having committed the crime of Official Misconduct in violation of section 195.00 of the Penal Law. This section of "the present, revised Penal Law condensed more than 30 separate provisions in the former Penal Law dealing with offenses of malfeasance and nonfeasance by public servants, most of which were very narrow ones involving violations of specific duties by specified public officers." People v. LaCarrubba, 46 N.Y.2d 658, 416 N.Y.S.2d 203, 389 N.E.2d 799. Subdivision two of section 195.00 currently provides, in pertinent part, as follows, "A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or deprive another person of a benefit he knowingly refrains from performing a duty which is imposed upon him be law or is clearly inherent in the nature of his office."

The Court points out that the essential characteristic of official misconduct is that public servants are "under an inescapable obligation to serve the public with the highest fidelity ." That "they are required to display such intelligence and skill as they are capable of, to be diligent and conscientious, to exercise their discretion not arbitrarily but reasonably, and above all to display good faith, honesty and integrity" to ensure the "soundness and efficiency of our government, which exists for the benefit of the people who are its sovereign." Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 474-75, 86 A.2d 201, 221-22, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, 73 S.Ct. 25, 97 L.Ed. 652 (1952) (citation omitted). To define all of the duties of public offices in statutes is "probably impossible and certainly impracticable" (see State v. Green, 376 A.2d 424). The official misconduct statute speaks in broad, general terms. It recognizes that some duties may be "imposed by law" and that some are "inherent in the nature of the office" (see 67 C.J.S. Officers § 110).

Significantly, the defendant does not contest the constitutional vagueness of the having breached a duty "imposed by law" provision of the statute. His protest is limited to the contention that there is no standard articulated to define what conduct is violative of a "duty clearly inherent in the nature of his office." He asserts that, by virtue of the use of said language, the statute fails to provide a clear and unmistakable warning as to the acts which will subject one to criminal punishment.

The Penal Law is designed to "give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed and to define the act or omission which constitutes each offense." P.L. §§ 1.05(2) and (3). The penal statute need only inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.

A duty which is "clearly inherent in the nature of the office" encompasses those unspecified duties that are so essential to the accomplishment of the purposes for which the office was created that they are clearly inherent in the nature of the office (see State v.. Green, 376 A.2d 424). The criminal statute does not proscribe each and every failure to perform an "essential" and "unspecified" duty. What it does proscribe is the failure to perform an "essential" and "unspecified" duty by a public servant at a time when the public servant possesses a criminally culpable state of mind. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103-104, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1036-1037, 89 L.Ed. 1495. The inclusion of the criminally culpable state of mind makes the statute less severe "by making it applicable only where the requisite bad purpose was present." Id. at 103, 65 S.Ct. at 1036.

Thus, the District Attorney is required to prove that the defendant knew that he was refraining from performing a duty which is clearly inherent in the nature of his office and that the defendant intended to obtain a personal benefit or to cause harm to another person. See P.L. § 195.00(2). Consequently, if the defendant refrains from performing such a duty with the specific requisite intent and is aware that what he does is precisely that which the statute forbids, he cannot complain on the grounds of vagueness of the language employed as it comports with common understanding. Screws, supra at 104, 65 S.Ct. at 1036-1037; State v. Green, 376 A.2d 424, 427 (upholding the constitutionality of a statute modeled on New York State's Official Misconduct statute). Accordingly, the Court finds that the official misconduct statute, whereby the defendant is accused of failing to perform a duty clearly inherent in the nature of his office sufficiently apprises a reasonable man of the nature of the acts prohibited and of what conduct is required of him to comply with due process protections.

B. Facial Insufficiency

The defendant has moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that, on its face, the indictment sets forth no facts whatsoever spelling out the commission of any crime. The People, however, rest on the fact that the indictment tracks the language of Section 195.00(2), under which the defendant is charged.

The People are correct. "An indictment that states no more than the bare elements of the crime charged, and, in effect, parrots the Penal Law is legally sufficient." People v. Price, 234 A.D.2d 978, 652 N.Y.S.2d 453; see also C.P.L. § 200.70. The primary purpose of the indictment is to give the defendant "fair notice of the nature of the charges, and of the manner, time and place of the conduct underlying the accusations, so as to enable the defendant to prepare or conduct an adequate defense." People v. Nichols, 193 A.D.2d 764, 597 N.Y.S.2d 719; People v. Rider, 115 A.D.2d 123, 125, 494 N.Y.S.2d 925. This was accomplished by providing in each count the name and the section of the particular statute violated. People v. Rider, 115 A.D.2d 123, 125, 494 N.Y.S.2d 925. Accordingly, the defendant's motion is denied.

Changes in the criminal procedure law, including the liberal discovery rules, have diminished the importance of the indictment as an informational document. Where an indictment fails to specify the details of the wrongful conduct, the defendant may discover the particulars of the crime charged by requesting a bill of particulars. People v. Price, 234 A.D.2d 978, 652 N.Y.S.2d 453; People v. Rider, 115 A.D.2d 123, 125, 494 N.Y.S.2d 925. In this case, the defendant has requested and received a bill of particulars, which must be supplemented in compliance with a separate order of this Court. The bill of particulars and supplementation will provide the defendant with fair notice of the accusations against him and enable him to prepare an adequate defense. People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 347 N.E.2d 898; People v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589, 597, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110, 384 N.E.2d 656.

C. & D. Grand Jury Minutes/Dismissal of Indictment

The defendant has moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the evidence presented to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • People v. Castaldo
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • January 11, 2017
    ...of the purposes for which the office was created that they are clearly inherent in the nature of the office" (People v. Lynch, 176 Misc.2d 430, 433, 674 N.Y.S.2d 894 [Rockland County Ct.] ; see People v. Jackson, 35 Misc.3d 179, 187–188, 938 N.Y.S.2d 726 ; People v. Ridge, 25 Misc.3d 432, 4......
  • People v. Jackson
    • United States
    • New York Criminal Court
    • February 1, 2011
    ...the meaning of the phrase, “clearly inherent in the nature of the office,” as required by PL § 195.00(2). However, People v. Lynch, 176 Misc.2d 430, 433, 674 N.Y.S.2d 894 (County Ct., Rockland County 1998), provides the following: “A duty which is clearly inherent in the nature of the offic......
  • People v. Ridge, 2009 NY Slip Op 29297 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 7/13/2009)
    • United States
    • New York District Court
    • July 13, 2009
    ...is an amorphous phrase. This court has found few cases which define or discuss the precise meaning of the phrase. People v. Lynch, 176 Misc 2d 430, 433, 674 N.Y.S.2d 894, 896 (Co.Ct. Rockland Co. 1998) provides an appropriate benchmark: "A duty which is clearly inherent in the nature of the......
  • Gillen v. Town of Hempstead Town Bd.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • March 5, 2019
    ...conduct may coexist with ethical impropriety and the former does not prohibit annulment of the Resolution (See, People v. Lynch , 176 Misc. 2d 430, 437, 674 N.Y.S.2d 894 [County Court, Rockland County 1998] (the mere fact that the conduct proscribed by the statutory scheme is also prohibite......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT