People v. Lynn

Decision Date28 August 1984
Docket NumberCr. 15346
Citation206 Cal.Rptr. 181,159 Cal.App.3d 715
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Martin Charles LYNN, Defendant and Appellant. D000164,

John Van de Kamp, State Atty. Gen., Keith I. Motley and Jay M. Bloom, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Appellate Defenders, Inc. and Lynda A. Romero, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

DUFFY, Associate Justice. *

A jury found Martin Charles Lynn guilty of first degree murder (PEN.CODE, §§ 1871, 189) and acquitted him of robbery ( § 211). Lynn admitted he had a prior violent felony conviction for robbery ( § 667.5, subd. (b)). He appeals after the trial court sentenced him to prison for the term prescribed by law, 26 years to life.

On January 16, 1982, Lynn killed Gary Williams by strangling him with his hands, a tightly knotted garrote and by stomping on Williams' neck. In the morning before his death, Williams went to the Vista residence of Ingrid Gambrell and Janice Campbell and said he wanted to buy some cocaine. Williams was intoxicated from drugs or alcohol and Janice Campbell had him leave. Lynn arrived at the residence about one hour later with Robert Morgan and was informed of Williams' desire to buy some form of narcotics. Both Lynn and Morgan appeared to be sober although they both had used heroin and alcohol that morning. Campbell, concerned about narcotics trafficking at the house, told Lynn and Morgan she did not want them there. Lynn was angry. He went outside where Williams waited and asked him why he was looking for him when he did not know him, then said he wanted to see how tough Williams was and struck Williams in the head. Williams said he wanted no trouble and walked away.

A few minutes later, Lynn and Morgan drove away from the Campbell residence and met Williams in a nearby parking lot. Lynn told Morgan to stop the car so he could apologize to Williams. Morgan stopped and Lynn told Williams to come over to the car. Lynn then apologized to Williams and asked him what he wanted. Williams said he wanted a $50 bag of heroin. Lynn offered Williams a ride and said he would talk about it. Williams accepted the offer for a ride. Lynn got out of the car to let Williams be seated in the middle of the seat between Morgan and himself. As they drove through Vista, Lynn and Williams discussed getting drugs for Williams. After two or three minutes, Lynn started asking Williams why he was coming there looking for him when he did not know him. Williams did not answer Lynn. On the outskirts of Vista, using his hands squeezing the front part of Williams' neck, Lynn began strangling Williams who tried to push Lynn away without success. About a mile after the strangling began, Morgan stopped the car, pulled Lynn and Williams out of the car and told Lynn to quit the strangling. Lynn stopped strangling Williams but threw him against the car. Then the three reentered the car with Williams again in the middle of the seat. Lynn said to Morgan, "Let's take this punk and drop him out wherever he wants to go."

Morgan turned the car around and headed for a gas station. On the way, Lynn seemed somewhat calmed but, at the station as Morgan was putting in gas, he saw Lynn strangling Williams again. Williams again tried unsuccessfully to push Lynn away. After this strangling had lasted two to three minutes, Morgan banged on the windshield and told Lynn to stop. Lynn stopped, but when Morgan reentered the car, he found Williams slumped over in his seat. Morgan could not find any pulse in Williams' wrist.

Lynn told Morgan to drive out to "the boonies" where they could get rid of the body. Morgan drove out East Vista Way to Highway 76. On the way, Lynn resumed strangling Williams, though he stopped three or four times to rest his hands. At one point, Lynn said "this guy don't want to die," and at another time he told Morgan not to get scared if the body started jumping all around. Williams was not resisting this strangling session which lasted 10 to 15 minutes before Morgan stopped the car. A retracing of the route from the gas station to where the car stopped took 13 and 1/2 minutes.

At their destination in a remote area near Bonsall, Lynn pulled Williams out of the car and ordered Morgan to get something out of the back of the car to tie around Williams' neck so he could make sure Williams was dead. Morgan found a cord and gave it to Lynn. Lynn wrapped the cord tightly around Williams' neck three times and told Morgan to hold the cord so he could knot it. Morgan, afraid of Lynn, complied and Lynn told him now Morgan could not say he had nothing to do with the murder. Lynn then stood on Williams' neck with both feet and bounced up and down on his throat. Lynn again explained he wanted to make sure Williams was dead. Lynn went through Williams' pockets and took $5 and his wallet. Lynn ripped off Williams' shirt and covered him with brush. Lynn and Morgan then left. On the way back to the residence of Campbell, Lynn disposed of Williams' shirt and tore up identification cards found in the wallet.

Morgan and Lynn returned to the Campbell residence around 5 p.m. Morgan was very quiet compared to his argumentative nature earlier in the day. Morgan sat on a couch and said nothing. Lynn was covering the front of his head with his shirt and said he had been in a fight. The next day, Campbell saw Lynn had abrasions on his head.

Campbell saw Morgan the next evening. Morgan was very upset and told Campbell that Lynn had involved him in something very bad and she and Gambrell should get Lynn out of the house. When Campbell asked Morgan if it was murder, he hung his head and cried, explaining he would not say because he did not want to involve Campbell.

Later at the house, Lynn asked Campbell what another person had meant by saying Lynn was implicated in a murder. When Campbell said she did not know, Lynn responded, "[l]ook, if I was ever to murder somebody, I wouldn't leave a witness."

When homicide Detective Craig Henderson examined Williams' body at about 5:30 p.m. on January 16, 2 it was not completely cold to the touch, indicating it had not been dead very long. Medical evidence could not establish the time of Williams' death, though it appeared he died within 15 to 30 minutes of the onset of his bruises on his neck and it was possible he was alive when the cord was placed around his neck. Neither was it determined whether the asphyxiation was due to strangulation by hand or by being stepped on. Each of the three methods of strangulation would cause extreme pain.

Lynn admitted the strangling and testified he felt threatened by Williams although Williams neither verbally nor physically threatened him. Lynn said he did not know why, but he hated Williams and wanted him to die. He intended to inflict pain on Williams although he thought he was dead. He put the rope around Williams' neck "just to choke him." On the other hand, he did not believe Williams deserved to die, he just wanted finality. When he had covered Williams' body, he knew what had happened, he had killed Williams.

Lynn said he had drunk a half pint of vodka and a quart of vodka within six hours of the killing, but he had not taken heroin on that day. He was attending a methedone center for alcohol abuse.

A defense expert opined Williams was dead when Lynn placed the cord around his neck but he acknowledged Williams could have been clinically dead and survive up to 13 and 1/2 more minutes.

In rebuttal, the prosecution presented evidence Lynn was sober on the day of the killing and Lynn would have been unconscious with a .72 blood alcohol level had he consumed the amount of alcohol he claimed to have ingested.

Lynn's surrebuttal consisted of further evidence Lynn had a diminished mental state from intoxication at the time of the crime.

I

Lynn contends there was insufficient evidence to support first degree murder on the theory either it was a premeditated and deliberated killing or it was a murder by torture. 3

Section 189 provides in pertinent part:

"All murder which is perpetrated by means of ... torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, ... is murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of murders are of the second degree.

"......................

"To prove the killing was 'deliberate and premeditated,' it shall not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his or her act."

A

On the wilful, deliberate and premeditated form of first degree murder, the California Supreme Court has set forth the appropriate view of the evidence as follows:

"The type of evidence which this court has found sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation falls into three basic categories: (1) facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing--what may be characterized as 'planning' activity; (2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a 'motive' to kill the victim, which inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support an inference that the killing was the result of 'a preexisting reflection' and 'careful thought and weighing of considerations' rather than 'mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed' (People v. Thomas, supra, 25 Cal.2d 880, at pp. 898, 900, 901 ); (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a 'preconceived design' to take his victim's life in a particular way for a 'reason' which the jury can reasonably...

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