People v. Lyons

• Decision Date: 11 March 1975
• Docket Number: Nos. 72--272 and 72--319,s. 72--272 and 72--319
• Citation: People v. Lyons, 324 N.E.2d 677, 26 Ill.App.3d 193 (Ill. App. 1975)
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Donald LYONS, Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Claude GRIFFITH, Appellant.
• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 677

324 N.E.2d 677

26 Ill.App.3d 193

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Donald LYONS, Appellant.

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Claude GRIFFITH, Appellant.

Nos. 72--272 and 72--319.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

March 11, 1975.

Robert E. Farrell, Deputy Defender, Fifth Judicial District, Michael J. Rosborough, Asst. Defender, Mt. Vernon, for Donald Lyons--72--272.

Callis & Filcoff, Granite City, for Claude Griffith--72--319.

Nicholas G. Byron, State's Atty., Madison County, Edwardsville, for Lyons; Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., of counsel.

Nicholas G. Byron, State's Atty., Madison County, Edwardsville, for Griffith; James W. Jerz, Principal Atty., Martin P. Moltz, Staff Atty., Illinois State's Attorneys Association, Elgin, of counsel.

CREBS, Justice:

Amended opinion filed upon denial of petition for rehearing by defendant, Claude Griffith.

The defendants, Claude Griffith and Donald Lyons, were indicted and tried together for the crime of murder in the Circuit Court of Madison County. A jury returned a verdict of attempted murder against Griffith and aggravated battery against Lyons, and they were sentenced to the penitentiary respectively for terms of 15 to 20 years and 8 to 10 years. Separate appeals have been filed by each defendant and we have consolidated them for purposes of review.

The main thrust of each appeal is that defendants were not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that the court erred in instructing the jury on any crime other than murder.

The indictment charged that said defendants and a third man, Tolman Conway, committed the offense of murder on January 30, 1971, when intending 'to kill or do great bodily harm to Leroy Johnson,' they struck and hit him over the head causing his death. The defendants here involved were tried and convicted chiefly on the eyewitness testimony of Leroy Johnson's grandfather, Ernest Pike. Mr. Pike's daughter, Kay Trebing Lyons, was also present but she did not testify. She had known defendant Lyons for some time prior to the incident, and then subsequent thereto and prior to trial she married him. Neither defendant chose to testify or offer any evidence in his own defense.

Mr. Pike was 75 years of age, with a heart condition and he was hard of hearing. These facts were brought to the attention of the court prior to his testimony and it was agreed by all parties that his condition would be taken into consideration insofar as the length of any questioning period would be concerned. Mr. Pike testified that at the time in question his daughter, Kay, and her children were living with him and his wife, and that his grandson, Johnson, had been staying with him for about a week. The children were not present as they were visiting a neighbor's home for the night. He was awakened about 3:00 A.M. when Kay entered his bedroom. He got up and walked into the kitchen to find three men sitting there whom he identified as Lyons, Griffith and Conway. Shortly thereafter Johnson walked in, and though there may have been some conversation Mr. Pike could not hear it. He did see that Lyons was holding a derringer pistol on Johnson and that Griffith had a 12 gauge shot gun, and a derringer in his pocket, and that Conway had a .22 or .32 caliber pistol. Almost immediately Griffith began hitting Johnson over the head with the stock of the shot gun. After seven or eight blows the stock broke from the barrel and Johnson fell to the floor with his head split open and one eyeball pushed out. Lyons then stomped him on the chest and kicked him first on one side and then the other. Finally Johnson jumped up and dived for the basement with Lyons and Griffith right behind him. About five minutes later Mr. Pike heard a gun shot from the basement. He stated that he personally was unable to do anything because he was scared, and that Conway at all times had stayed upstairs with his gun in his hand. Kay had stayed in the bathroom until defendant Lyons hollered to her to throw Johnson's clothes down, which she did.

Eventually Mr. Pike went back to his bedroom and just before daybreak he saw one car leave, and then shortly after daybreak he saw Lyons and Griffith leave, one in Johnson's car and the other in another car. He stated further that there was blood all over the kitchen floor, and on the sink and ice box; that he later watched as his daughter, Kay, cleaned it up with water and a cloth, and that he also saw her make two or three trips to the basement with buckets of water which she brought back up and dumped in the sink. Not until about noon did he go to the basement, at which time he noticed a hole broken in the plaster board on the landing going to the basement, that the basement sink was torn apart, and that there were blood spots on the steps and the basement floor.

Several other witnesses testified to what they saw prior and subsequent to the incident. Two girls stated that they and another man had met Johnson at a tavern about 1:00 A.M. and in two cars had driven to the Pike residence about 3:00 A.M. One of the girls testified that while they were still seated in the car a man approached the driver's side, argued with Johnson, and threatened both of them with a gun. She then jumped in the other car and left. Another witness testified that on the night of January 29th, Kay and the two defendants were in his tavern together and that Kay had left at about 8:00 P.M., and the defendants left about one hour later. Mrs. Pike testified that after having worked all night, she returned home about 8:00 A.M. She noticed the broken plaster board and mentioned seeing the stains on the basement floor and steps. Johnson's family and a number of witnesses testified that they had not seen Johnson in the one and one-half years that had elapsed since January 29th, that his personal possessions were still at his parents' house, as was his car, which had been found by the police abandoned in East St. Louis a few days after the incident. Also the testimony of various police officers and technicians was offered concerning items of physical evidence.

In the trial court, and here, defendants seem to be of the opinion that having been charged with murder, and the State having failed to produce a body or other satisfactory evidence of death, they were therefore immune from conviction of any other offense. They declined even to cross examine the only eyewitness to testify; they offered no evidence whatsoever in rebuttal or explanation; and they objected to the trial court giving the jury instructions and forms of verdict on attempt to commit murder, aggravated battery and battery. Lyons contends specifically that aggravated battery is not a lesser included offense to murder, and Griffith contends, not that attempt murder is not an included offense, but that the giving of the battery instructions constituted error because it caused him to be surprised and misled in making his defense.

These arguments are contrary to both case and statutory law. It is a general rule that when an indictment for a higher crime embraces all of the elements of an offense of an inferior degree the jury may discharge the accused of the higher crime and convict him of the lower, if the evidence justifies it. (People v. Dugas, 310 Ill. 291, 141 N.E. 769). By statute a person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if, in performing the acts which cause death he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual. (Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, par. 9--1(a)(1)). A person commits aggravated battery when, in committing battery, he intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm. (Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, par. 12--4(a)). An included offense means one which is established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts or a less culpable mental state (or both), than that which is required to establish the commission of the offense charged. (Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, par. 2--9(a)). Applying these rules and definitions it has been specifically held that aggravated battery is a lesser included offense to the charge of murder because the elements of each offense are substantially the same with the exception that in one the victim is injured seriously and in the other he dies as a result of his injuries. (People v. Welch, 131 Ill.App.2d 98, 268 N.E.2d 242). In People v. Dugas, 310 Ill. 291, 141 N.E. 769, cases are cited with approval holding that if an indictment for murder contains averments sufficient to charge the offense an accused may be convicted of shooting at another, assault with intent to murder wilfully and maliciously shooting and wounding, an aggravated assault, or assault and battery.

Justice could hardly be served if the rules were as contended by defendants, and no more vivid example of injustice could be cited than to apply their contentions to the facts of this case. To be able to viciously beat a man and then be exonerated forever from any accountability because of the State's inability to produce satisfactory evidence of a resulting death would be a travesty. A trial is not a game to be played for a prize based on the dexterity and nimbleness of the players. It is a serious attempt to seek justice both for the accused and society. Defendant Griffith would have us believe that he was surprised and misled by the State's request for, and the court's giving of instructions on lesser, included offenses. This we cannot accept, for certainly he knew or should have known that aggravated battery and battery are lesser included offenses contained in a charge of murder by beating. Illustrative of the inadequacy of this contention is the case of People v. Helms, 133 Ill.App.2d 727, 272 N.E.2d 228. There the trial court directed a verdict for defendant on a one-count murder indictment, but nonetheless the trial proceeded on the lesser, included offense of involuntary...