People v. M.C.

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Citation: People v. M.C., 292 P.3d 1030 (Colo. App. 2012)
• Decision Date: 12 April 2012
• Docket Number: 11CA0941
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner–Appellee, In the Interest of M.C., Juvenile–Appellant.

292 P.3d 1030

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner–Appellee, In the Interest of M.C., Juvenile–Appellant.

No. 11CA0941.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV.

April 12, 2012.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Nicole Wiggins, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner–Appellee.

Law Offices of Robert P. Johns, Robert P. Johns, Mike Schneider, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile–Appellant.

Opinion by Judge WEBB.

¶ 1 This case addresses whether section 33–6–117(1)(a), C.R.S.2011, proscribing willful destruction of wildlife, applies to a person who did not take the wildlife. M.C., a juvenile, appeals an adjudication of delinquency entered after a bench trial finding him guilty under subsection (II) of this section, primarily on the basis that this subsection is unconstitutionally vague. We reject the juvenile's constitutional challenge and conclude that having been the initial taker of wildlife is not required to prove a violation of section 33–6–117(1)(a)(II). Because the trial court found that the juvenile acquired possession of the wildlife and participated in concealing the carcass, which the juvenile does not challenge for insufficiency of evidence, we further conclude that the prosecution proved a violation of subsection (II), as we interpret it. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶ 2 The juvenile was charged with willful destruction of wildlife for “unlawfully and intentionally abandon[ing] the carcass or body of taken wildlife,” section 33–6–117(1)(a)(II). Because the wildlife was big game, the offense constituted a class 5 felony. § 33–6–117(1)(b), C.R.S.2011.

¶ 3 The prosecution responded to the juvenile's motion for a bill of particulars as follows:

[M.C.] abandoned the wildlife when he left the original kill site with the person who killed the wildlife. He went with the person who killed the wildlife back to a [sic] juvenile's house. He then returned to the scene with the person who killed the wildlife. He helped move the carcass from the original kill spot to a different location. He and the others then abandoned the wildlife.

The juvenile then moved to dismiss under Crim. P. 12(b) on the ground that the information failed to charge an offense. He argued that the prosecution had charged him only with violating section 33–6–117(1)(a)(II), which did not operate independently of the elements of section 33–6–117(1)(a)(I), especially that the actor had taken the wildlife. Alternatively, he argued that standing alone, section 33–6–117(1)(a)(II) was unconstitutionally vague because it does not identify what right or interest the actor must have in the wildlife before being vulnerable to prosecution for abandonment.

¶ 4 The court denied the juvenile's motion on two grounds. First, based on the plain language of the statute and People v. Gordon, 160 P.3d 284, 289 (Colo.App.2007), subsections (I) and (II) described alternative ways to commit willful destruction of wildlife. Second, the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because the juvenile had failed to prove that “a person [of] ordinary intelligence must guess at the meaning of C.R.S. 33–6–117(1)(a)(II),” which was “clear on its face.” However, the court noted that while “[t]he statute does not require the juvenile to have killed the animal in question ... the Court does believe the juvenile may argue to this Court that the juvenile must have possessed the ‘taken wildlife’ in order to abandon it.” ¹

¶ 5 The trial court found that the juvenile and two companions, T.P. and C.P., had gone out to shoot clay pigeons. When they encountered a pronghorn antelope, T.P. shot and killed it. The boys went to C.P.'s home, then returned that night with flashlights. They dragged the carcass down a hill and hid it under some bushes. The juvenile helped conceal the carcass, by either dragging it or holding a flashlight. No one took body parts from the carcass.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 6 We review the interpretation of a statute de novo. People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551, 554 (Colo.2006). Because we presume statutes to be constitutional, the party challenging the facial constitutionality of a statute has the burden of showing that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Hinojos–Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo.2007).

III. Sufficiency of the Record

¶ 7 Initially, we reject the Attorney General's contention that because the juvenile did not designate the transcript of any testimony, he failed to provide a sufficient record.

¶ 8 “A judgment entered by a court of general jurisdiction is presumed to be correct. Thus, it is the duty of the party asserting error to present a record demonstrating that error.” People v. Ullery, 984 P.2d 586, 591 (Colo.1999) (internal citations omitted). Appellate rules governing composition of the record on appeal “insure that the appellate court will be given sufficient information to arrive at a just and reasoned decision.” City of Aurora v. Webb, 41 Colo.App. 11, 13, 585 P.2d 288, 290 (1978).

¶ 9 Although C.A.R. 10(a) allows a party to make the transcript part of the record, it requires only the final pleadings; the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment; and any post-trial motions and judgment. “The record need not be all-inclusive;rather, it will be deemed adequate if it contains sufficient information to enable the court to resolve the issues presented.” People v. Olson, 921 P.2d 51, 52 (Colo.App.1996).

¶ 10 Here, the juvenile designated all filings in the case and trial exhibits, as well as a transcript of closing arguments and the court's rulings. Because he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, a transcript of the testimony is unnecessary. Although we must presume omissions from the evidentiary record would support the judgment, People v. Wells, 776 P.2d 386, 390 (Colo.1989), we conclude that the juvenile has not forfeited his right to review of the trial court's statutory interpretation.

IV. Analysis

¶ 11 Section 33–6–117(1)(a) provides:

(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in articles 1 to 6 of this title or by rule of the commission, it is unlawful for a person:

(I) To hunt or take, or to solicit another person to hunt or take, wildlife and detach or remove, with the intent to abandon the carcass or body, only the head, hide, claws, teeth, antlers, horns, internal organs, or feathers or any or all of such parts;

(II) To intentionally abandon the carcass or body of taken wildlife; or

(III) To take and intentionally abandon wildlife.

The juvenile contends that a person cannot intentionally abandon the carcass of taken wildlife under subsection (II) without first having hunted or taken wildlife and removed parts, as prohibited in subsection (I). Alternately, he contends that if subsections (I) and (II) of section 33–6–117(1)(a) describe different ways of committing the same offense, subsection (II) is unconstitutionally vague. We consider and reject these contentions in turn.

A. Statutory Interpretation

¶ 12 “Our fundamental responsibility in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the General Assembly's purpose and intent in enacting the statute.” Whitaker v. People, 48 P.3d 555, 558 (Colo.2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In so doing, we look first to the statute's language, and where the language is clear and unambiguous, “our analysis is complete and there is no need to resort to other rules of statutory construction.” People v. Simon, 266 P.3d 1099, 1106 (Colo.2011). Where a statute is unclear or reasonably susceptible to different interpretations, however, we employ rules of statutory interpretation, in light of legislative history, prior law, a given construction's consequences, and the purpose of the statutory scheme. People v. Luther, 58 P.3d 1013, 1016 (Colo.2002).

¶ 13 We construe words and phrases according to the rules of grammar and common usage, unless the legislature has given them a technical meaning. People v. Williamson, 249 P.3d 801, 803 (Colo.2011); § 2–4–101, C.R.S.2011. We read the statute as a whole, “with a goal of giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts.” People v. Summers, 208 P.3d 251, 254 (Colo.2009). But we avoid construing a statute to render any of its words superfluous or to lead to an absurd result. People v. Null, 233 P.3d 670, 679 (Colo.2010).

¶ 14 The General Assembly stated its intent in enacting section 33–6–117 as follows:

The purpose and intent of this section is to protect the wildlife of this state from wanton, ruthless, or wasteful destruction or mutilation for their heads, hides, claws, teeth, antlers, horns, internal organs, or feathers, from being taken and abandoned, or any or all of the foregoing, and the provisions of this section shall be so construed.

§ 33–6–117(2), C.R.S.2011.

B. Subsections (I) and (II) Describe Independent Means of Violating Section 33–6–117

¶ 15 We first reject the Attorney General's contention that the juvenile lacks standing to argue the interplay between subsections (I) and (II) because he was not charged under subsection (I). A defendant has standing to challenge a statute's constitutionality to the extent “he himself is adversely affected.” People v. Wimer, 197 Colo. 191, 193, 591 P.2d 87, 88 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because we interpret a statute as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts, here interpretation of subsection (I) affects the interpretation of subsection (II). See also People in Interest of C.M., 630 P.2d 593, 594 (Colo.1981) (“Where ... the constitutional challenge is to those very statutory terms which constitute the basis of the underlying prosecution, requisite standing exists.”). Nonetheless, we reject the juvenile's contention for two reasons.

¶ 16 First, the plain language of subsections (I) and (II) describe different ways of committing willful destruction of wildlife. The juvenile was charged under the current version...