People v. M.A. (In re M.A.)
| Decision Date | 04 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 118049.,118049. |
| Citation | 43 N.E.3d 86 |
| Parties | In re M.A., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant and Cross–Appellee, v. M.A., Appellee and Cross–Appellant). |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Annette Collins and Mary L. Boland, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defender, and Rachel Moran, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.
Marsha Levick and Kacey Mordecai, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Shobha L. Mahadev and Scott Main, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, for amici curiae Juvenile Law Center et al.
¶ 1 Respondent, M.A., was adjudicated delinquent of several offenses. As a result of her adjudication, M.A. was ordered to register under the Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (Violent Offender Act) (730 ILCS 154/1 et seq. (West 2012)). M.A. appealed, contending that the registration provisions of the Violent Offender Act violated her right to substantive and procedural due process, as well as equal protection.
¶ 2 The Appellate Court, First District, rejected M.A.'s claim that the statute violated her right to substantive due process. 2014 IL App (1st) 132540, 382 Ill.Dec. 526, 12 N.E.3d 805. The appellate court, however, with one justice dissenting, agreed with M.A. that the registration provisions are unconstitutional because the provisions violate procedural due process and equal protection. Id. The appellate court therefore reversed the trial court's order requiring M.A. to register under the Act.
¶ 3 This appeal as of right followed. Ill. S.Ct. R. 317 (eff. July 1, 2006). We subsequently allowed the Juvenile Law Center, the Children and Family Justice Center, the Civitas ChildLaw Center, the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of the University of Chicago Law School, the James B. Moran Center for Youth Advocacy, the Juvenile Justice Initiative, and the National Juvenile Defender Center, to file a joint amicus curiae brief on behalf of M.A. Ill. S.Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
¶ 5 M.A., was charged in a juvenile petition with aggravated domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12–3.3 (West 2012) ), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12–3.05(f)(1) (West 2012)), battery (720 ILCS 5/12–3(a)(1) (West 2012)), and domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12–3.2(a)(1) (West 2012)). The incident giving rise to the charges occurred on November 24, 2012. On that date, M.A. was 13 years old. That morning, M.A. and her 14–year–old brother, Muhammad, were at their aunt's house. M.A. and Muhammad got into an argument over a missing shower cap. Muhammad said that M.A. was the last person to have the shower cap. M.A. said she was not, and swore on her grandfather that she did not have the shower cap. M.A.'s grandfather was deceased, so Muhammad became angry and said, “Don't be putting shit on my granddaddy.” When M.A. responded, “You don't tell me what to do,” Muhammad went over to the couch where M.A. was sitting, and told her, “Do it again.” M.A. told Muhammad, “Get out of my face.” Muhammad then punched M.A. in the face.
¶ 6 When the fight ended, M.A. ran to the kitchen and grabbed a knife. Muhammad went into a bedroom and shut the door. M.A. managed to enter the bedroom and cut Muhammad on his face and his arm. Muhammad received 3 stitches for the cut on his face, and 10 stitches for the cut on his arm.
¶ 7 At trial, Muhammad testified that he punched M.A. two or three times on her arm. Muhammad said the fight lasted about a minute, then he went into a back bedroom. After M.A. went into the kitchen, she tried to force her way into the bedroom. Muhammad tried to keep M.A. out because she was yelling something “like I want to kill you,” and had a large kitchen knife in her hand. M.A. forced her way into the bedroom and began swinging the knife at Muhammad, trying to stab him. M.A. cut Muhammad with the knife on his face and his arm.
¶ 8 Johanne Saintsurin, M.A.'s aunt, testified that the fight started when Muhammad pushed M.A. on the couch, got on top of her and started punching her everywhere. After Muhammad stopped punching M.A., M.A. walked to the kitchen saying “she was going to kill him, something like that.” Muhammad went into the bedroom and closed the door, and M.A. came back with a knife from the kitchen. Saintsurin told M.A. to put the knife down. When M.A. did not put the knife down, Saintsurin called M.A.'s father and went to check on the younger children. Saintsurin then saw that Muhammad was bleeding from his arm and his nose. Saintsurin called 911. M.A. was still in the living room holding the knife when the police arrived. Saintsurin noticed several items in the living room, including a medicine ball and a pillow, had been cut open.
¶ 9 M.A. testified on her own behalf that when she and Muhammad got into the argument, Muhammad came over to the couch where she was sitting and punched her multiple times. Muhammad also pulled her hair, was “hollering and cussing,” and was grabbing her. M.A. testified that she ran to the kitchen and grabbed a knife, but claimed she was trying to scare Muhammad, and was not trying to cut him. M.A. testified that she followed Muhammad into the bedroom. When Muhammad opened the door a little, she “slashed” the knife in the door to scare him. M.A. admitted that she was talking about “killing” him.
¶ 10 On May 2, 2013, M.A. was adjudicated delinquent on all counts. The circuit court of Cook County found Mohammad's account of the incident more credible, and did not believe M.A. had made just one pass of the knife through the door. The circuit court sentenced M.A. to 30 months' probation, with certain conditions. One of the conditions was that M.A. was required to register under the Violent Offender Act. M.A.'s motion to reconsider the finding of delinquency was denied.
¶ 11 M.A. then filed an appeal, arguing that the automatic application of the Violent Offender Act's registration provisions to juvenile offenders violated substantive and procedural due process. M.A. also argued that the Violent Offender Act's registration provisions, as applied to juvenile offenders, resulted in a denial of equal protection, because juvenile violent offenders were treated more harshly than juvenile sex offenders. M.A. did not appeal her adjudication or the sufficiency of the evidence to support her adjudication.
¶ 12 The appellate court first rejected M.A.'s claim that the Violent Offender Act violated her right to substantive due process. 2014 IL App (1st) 132540, ¶ 48, 382 Ill.Dec. 526, 12 N.E.3d 805. The appellate court, however, agreed with M.A. that the Act denied her right to procedural due process. The appellate court found unconstitutional the Violent Offender Act's provision mandating registration of juvenile violent offenders against youth as adults when they turned 17 years of age. Id. ¶ 65. The appellate court also held that the failure of the Violent Offender Act to provide any means by which a juvenile offender can petition to be taken off the registry was unconstitutional. Id.
¶ 13 In addition, the appellate court found that the Violent Offender Act denied juvenile offenders equal protection and was unconstitutional on that basis as well. The appellate court held that the appropriate class for purposes of its equal protection analysis was juvenile offenders who, as a result of a juvenile adjudication, are required to register with law enforcement authorities. Id. ¶ 69. Looking at the class, the appellate court concluded that juvenile sex offenders are treated differently, and more leniently, than juveniles required to register as violent offenders against youth. Id. The appellate court majority found there was no rational basis for treating juvenile sex offenders more leniently than juvenile violent offenders. Id. ¶ 73.
¶ 14 One justice dissented from the appellate court's finding that the Violent Offender Act violated procedural due process and equal protection. 2014 IL App (1st) 132540, ¶¶ 77–108, 382 Ill.Dec. 526, 12 N.E.3d 805 (Pucinski, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Pucinski would find that M.A. received all the process she was due during her delinquency adjudication, noting that it was the delinquency adjudication that triggered the Act's mandatory registration requirements. Id. ¶ 98. Justice Pucinski also disagreed that juvenile sex offenders and juvenile violent offenders were similarly situated for purposes of equal protection. Id. ¶¶ 101–04.
¶ 16 On appeal, the State argues that the appellate court majority erred in finding that the Violent Offender Act violated procedural due process and equal protection. M.A. seeks cross-relief, arguing that the appellate court erred in finding that the Act did not violate substantive due process.
¶ 17 With regard to juveniles, the Violent Offender Act states:
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