People v. Macrander, 91SC416
| Decision Date | 06 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91SC416,91SC416 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Leo Jason MACRANDER, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy R. Twining, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for petitioner.
David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Andrew C. Heher, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for respondent.
In People v. Macrander, 817 P.2d 579 (Colo.App.1991), the court of appeals decided two questions concerning jury selection in a criminal prosecution. The court held that a prospective juror whose son was a deputy district attorney on the staff of the elected district attorney who initiated the prosecution was subject to a challenge for cause under section 16-10-103(1)(b), 8A C.R.S. (1986), as being related within the third degree "to any attorney of record." The court also held that the trial court's denial of the defendant's challenge for cause was prejudicial error requiring a new trial under circumstances where the defendant removed the suspect juror by peremptory challenge and exhausted all available peremptory challenges on other jurors. We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals, and we now affirm the judgment.
The defendant, Leo Jason Macrander, was charged in a felony complaint filed in the County Court of Jefferson County with attempted second degree murder, 1 first degree assault on a peace officer, 2 felony menacing, 3 and two counts of committing a crime of violence, 4 all of which allegedly occurred on May 28, 1988. The complaint began by stating that "Donald E. Mielke, District Attorney in and for the First Judicial District of the State of Colorado, in the name and by the authority of the People of the State of Colorado, informs the court," and then set forth five separate felony counts. The complaint was signed in the following manner:
Donald E. Mielke
District Attorney
/s James D. Anderson
Deputy District Attorney
The defendant waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and the case was bound over for trial to the District Court of the First Judicial District.
On May 16, 1989, jury selection commenced in the district court. During the trial court's general questioning of the entire jury panel, one of the prospective jurors, Catherine McNulty, stated that her son is "a deputy district attorney for this district." When Mrs. McNulty was later called into the jury box for further questioning on voir dire, the following exchange occurred between her and the prosecuting attorney, James Stanley:
Mr. Stanley: Now, Mrs. McNulty, of course you present a special situation for everyone here, being that I work with your son.
Juror McNulty: Yes.
Mr. Stanley: I don't work with him, but he's in our office. Do you know me? Have you ever seen me before?
Juror McNulty: No.
Mr. Stanley: Well, your son doesn't discuss anything about his work?
Juror McNulty: No, he doesn't.
* * * * * *
Mr. Stanley: Well, as you know, and as you recognize immediately, of course, it's a concern that your son is a district attorney, and the obvious question is, you know: How do you feel about it? Do you think you could be completely fair if you were on this jury?
Juror McNulty: I think so.
Mr. Stanley: I mean, for instance, whatever your decision is, when you go back and see him--well, of course you don't live with your son.
Juror McNulty: No. He's married.
Mr. Stanley: Do you see him much?
Juror McNulty: Yes. He's over quite a bit.
Mr. Stanley: I suppose one thought that we're all having is that you might feel pressured to lean towards the prosecution because of your son's occupation. Do you feel that way at all?
Juror McNulty: I don't think so.
Defense counsel, during his voir dire examination of the prospective jurors, challenged Mrs. McNulty for cause pursuant to section 16-10-103(1)(b), 8A C.R.S. (1986), on the ground that her son was a deputy district attorney on the staff of the district attorney's office which initiated the prosecution and that the district attorney's office was the attorney of record in the case. The prosecuting attorney objected to defense counsel's challenge for cause, and the trial court denied the challenge. The trial court ruled that because Mrs. McNulty's son was not involved in the particular case being tried, her son was not an "attorney of record" within the meaning of that term in section 16-10-103(1)(b). Defense counsel thereafter used a peremptory challenge to remove Mrs. McNulty and exhausted all five peremptory challenges authorized by section 16-10-104, 8A C.R.S. (1986). At the conclusion of the voir dire, the court swore the impaneled jurors for trial. 5 The jury ultimately returned guilty verdicts on all counts, and the court imposed concurrent sentences with a maximum term of thirty-two years.
The defendant appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The court of appeals reasoned that "each member of the staff of a district attorney, who is charged by law with prosecuting a particular case, must be considered to be an 'attorney of record' in those cases being prosecuted in the name of that district attorney, at least for purposes of the particular statute under consideration here." Macrander, 817 P.2d at 582. In addition, the court of appeals held that where, as here, the trial court erroneously denies a challenge for cause and "the defendant uses all of his peremptory challenges, including one to remove the disqualified juror," the trial court's denial of the challenge for cause must be viewed as prejudicial error because its effect is "to deprive the defendant of his guaranteed number of peremptory challenges." Id.
We granted the People's petition for certiorari to consider whether the term "attorney of record" in section 16-10-103(1)(b), 8A C.R.S. (1986), includes all deputy district attorneys on the staff of the district attorney's office responsible for the prosecution of the case then being tried, including those deputies who have had no involvement in the case, and also whether prejudicial error occurs when a trial court erroneously denies a challenge for cause and the defendant thereafter uses a peremptory challenge to remove the suspect juror not removed for cause and exhausts all available peremptory challenges.
We first address the meaning of the term "attorney of record" in section 16-10-103(1)(b). The People argue that the term refers only to those prosecuting attorneys who have had some direct involvement in the case by signing a charging document or other pleading, or by appearing in court on behalf of the People at some stage of the prosecution. Our resolution of the People's claim proceeds from a consideration of the purpose served by the challenge for cause in a criminal case and the nature and scope of the statutory authority vested in the elected district attorney and members of the district attorney's prosecuting staff.
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). Fairness requires more than the elimination of actual prejudice. It has been cogently observed that if justice "is to perform its high function in the best way," it not only must achieve the reality of fairness but "must satisfy the appearance of justice" as well. Id. To that end, the right to challenge a juror for cause has been recognized as an integral part of a fair trial. Beeman v. People, 193 Colo. 337, 339, 565 P.2d 1340, 1342 (1977).
"The bias of a prospective juror may be actual or implied; that is, it may be bias in fact or bias conclusively presumed as a matter of law." United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133, 57 S.Ct. 177, 179, 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936). Actual bias is a state of mind that prevents a juror from deciding the case impartially and without prejudice to a substantial right of one of the parties. Black's Law Dictionary 162 (6th ed. 1990). Implied bias is "a bias attributable in law to the prospective juror regardless of actual partiality." Wood, 299 U.S. at 134, 57 S.Ct. at 179. Bias may be implied, for example, when a prospective juror has a close relationship to a party or attorney in the case, or has had an important contact with the case, so as to create serious doubt about the prospective juror's impartiality, if not in fact, then at least in appearance. People in the Interest of R.A.D., 196 Colo. 430, 432, 586 P.2d 46, 47 (1978).
Section 16-10-103(1) lists eleven separate grounds for challenging a prospective juror for cause and states that the court "shall sustain a challenge for cause" predicated on any one of them. Those grounds include not only a demonstrable showing of a prospective juror's actual bias but extend to various forms of implied bias as well, including specific relationships between a prospective juror and an interested party or participant in the case and particular experiences which might impair a prospective juror's ability to maintain a genuine state of impartiality throughout the trial. 6 Included within these eleven grounds is the prospective juror's "[r]elationship within the third degree by blood, adoption, or marriage ... to an attorney of record or attorney engaged in the trial of the case." 7 Section 16-10-103(1)(b) evinces a realistic legislative judgment that a prospective juror's close familial relationship to an attorney of record could engender such subtle forms of pressure on the juror's "sense of impartiality" as to constitute a bias implied by law without regard to a demonstration of actual bias.
We have accorded a trial court considerable discretion in ruling on causal challenges predicated on actual bias primarily because such challenges require an assessment of the...
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