People v. Madden, Supreme Court Case No. 13SC496

• Citation: 364 P.3d 866
• Decision Date: 21 December 2015
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 13SC496
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Louis Alonzo MADDEN, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

364 P.3d 866

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner,

v.Louis Alonzo MADDEN, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 13SC496

Supreme Court of Colorado.

December 21, 2015

Rehearing Denied February 8, 2016

Attorneys for Petitioner: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, John J. Fuerst III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Respondent: Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender, Ned R. Jaeckle, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado.

En Banc

CHIEF JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 This case requires us to decide whether the trial court had authority to refund costs, fees, and restitution that Respondent Louis Alonzo Madden had paid following his conviction. Madden's conviction was vacated and the prosecution elected not to retry him. None of the statutes governing the costs, fees, and restitution that Madden was ordered to pay address whether the court may draw on those funds. Similarly, procedural rules for defendants seeking post-conviction relief do not address whether a court may order refunds from public funds. Madden did not pursue a refund through the procedures defined in the Exoneration Act, which provides statutory authority for a trial court to issue a refund. Therefore, the trial court did not have statutory authority to order a refund from public funds in this case.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 In 2005, Madden was convicted of attempting to patronize a prostituted child and attempted third degree sexual assault by force. See §§ 18–2–101, 18–7–406(1), C.R.S. (2015); 18–3–404, C.R.S. (1999). Madden was originally sentenced to an indeterminate sentence and was ordered to pay costs, fees, and restitution. Specifically, the trial court ordered Madden to pay the following costs and fees: (1) $125.00 to the victim compensation fund, (2) $125.00 to the victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund (referred to as the "VAST" fund in the Register of Actions and this opinion), (3) $30.00 for court costs, (4) $45.00 for a drug standardized assessment, (5) $25.00 for drug testing, (6) $1,000.00 for a special advocate surcharge, (7) $2,000.00 for a sex offender surcharge, (8) $128.00 to the sex offender identification fund, and (9) a "time payment fee" of $25.00. He was also ordered to pay $910.00 in restitution, bringing the total owed to $4,413.00.

¶ 3 On appeal, we reviewed Madden's case and reversed his conviction of attempting to patronize a prostituted child, leaving only his attempted sexual assault conviction intact. People v. Madden, 111 P.3d 452, 460 (Colo.2005). We remanded to the court of appeals, which then returned the case to the trial court with instructions to impose a determinate sentence. People v. Madden, No. 02CA0024, slip op. at 4, 2005 WL 1692643 (Colo.App. July 21, 2005). The trial court sentenced Madden to prison for three years, with credit for time served.

¶ 4 Madden then filed a pro se motion under Crim. P. 35(c), alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court appointed counsel and, after an evidentiary hearing, granted the motion and vacated Madden's conviction. The prosecution elected not to appeal the order or retry the case. Shortly thereafter, Madden requested that he no longer be required to register as a sex offender and that the court refund the costs, fees, and restitution that he had paid. Madden had paid $1,220.00 toward the costs and fees and $757.75 in restitution, for a total of $1,977.75. The trial court determined that the amount that Madden had paid toward costs and fees should be returned, so Madden received a $1,220.00 refund. The restitution money, however, had been paid to the counseling service that the victim used and could not be returned. The trial court reasoned that the counseling service could sue the victim to recover that money, and the victim should not be required to return the restitution money. Madden appealed.

¶ 5 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Madden was "entitled to a refund of the restitution that he paid in connection with his vacated conviction and that he may seek such a refund from the state in the context of this case." People v. Madden, 2013 COA 56, ¶ 1, ––– P.3d ––––. The People then petitioned this court for certiorari, asking whether the trial court may order a refund of restitution. We granted certiorari to consider whether a trial court may order refunds of costs and fees,¹ in addition to restitution.²

II. Standard of Review

¶ 6 Whether a trial court has authority to order a refund of costs, fees, and restitution presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See People v. Porter, 2015 CO 34, ¶ 8, 348 P.3d 922, 924. This case involves issues of statutory construction, which we also review de novo. Mishkin v. Young, 107 P.3d 393, 396 (Colo.2005).

III. Analysis

¶ 7 As we explain in People v. Nelson, which we also issue today, a trial court must have statutory authority to order a refund from public funds.³ See 2015 CO 68, ¶ 1, 362 P.3d 1070. None of the statutes governing the costs, fees, and restitution that Madden was ordered to pay address whether the court may draw on those funds. Similarly, procedural rules for defendants seeking post-conviction relief do not address whether a court may order refunds from public funds. See C.R.C.P. 60(b) ; Crim. P. 35(a). Moreover, sections 13–65–101 to –103, C.R.S. (2015) ("the Exoneration Act" or "the Act") "created an exclusive process for exonerated defendants seeking a refund of costs, fees, and restitution." Nelson, ¶ 44. Therefore, because the trial court did not have statutory authority to draw on public funds—outside of the procedures created in the Exoneration Act—it did not have authority to refund costs, fees, and restitution to Madden.

¶ 8 The power to collect, manage, and distribute public funds is inherently legislative, and the court may not intrude on those powers without constitutional or statutory authority. Nelson, ¶ 40 (citing Colo. Const. art. III ); see also People v. Dist. Ct., City & Cty. of Denver, 808 P.2d 831, 835 (Colo.1991) (noting that a monetary award "payable from public funds implicates sensitive budget and funding considerations, and authority to intrude into these areas is not to be lightly implied" and holding that such an award "is beyond the authority of the trial court"). For this reason, a trial court must have statutory authority to order a refund from public funds. Nelson, ¶ 41.

¶ 9 None of the statutes supporting the costs, fees, and restitution that Madden paid contemplate a trial court issuing refunds to defendants. Madden incurred many of the same fines as the defendant in Nelson, and we determined that none of the statutes governing those fees and restitution allow for a refund. See ¶ 44 (determining that statutes governing the victim compensation fund, VAST fund, docket fees, time payment fees, and restitution do not authorize a court to order refunds from public funds).

¶ 10 Madden incurred several additional fees as well, but the statutes governing these fees also do not contemplate refunding the fees to defendants. First, the court ordered Madden to pay a sex offender surcharge, which, once collected, is transmitted to the state treasurer to fund the sex offender surcharge fund. See § 18–21–103(2)(b), C.R.S. (2015). The General Assembly may appropriate money from this fund for the identification, evaluation, and treatment of adult sex offenders. § 16–11.7–103, C.R.S. (2015). Second, Madden was charged a special advocate surcharge. See § 24–4.2–104(1)(a)(II), C.R.S. (2003). Funds raised by this surcharge are added to the VAST fund in the judicial district where the offense occurred. Id. Third, Madden was charged "drug standardized assessment" and "drug testing" fees for services to monitor his substance use. See §§ 16–11.5–102, 18–1.3–209, C.R.S. (2015). Finally, he was charged a $128.00 sex offender identification fee. See § 16–11–102.4, C.R.S. (2015). Sex offender identification fees are deposited into the offender identification fund, located in the state treasury. §§ 16–11–102.4(4), 24–33.5–415.6, C.R.S. (2015). The legislature appropriates money in this fund for genetic testing of sex offenders. § 24–33.5–415.6.

¶ 11 All of these statutes governing costs, fees, and restitution explain when the fines should be imposed, how they should be collected, and how that money may be used. See Nelson, ¶ 39 ; see also, e.g., § 18–1.3–209 (noting that drug standardized assessments are conducted "at the expense of the person assessed"); § 24–33.5–415.6 (describing the offender identification fund and how that money may be used). Here, Madden paid $757.75 as restitution, which was paid to the victim's counseling service; and $1,220.00 in costs and fees, which went to the victim compensation fund and the VAST fund. See § 16–18.5–110, C.R.S. (2015) (listing the order for crediting payments to different funds); § 24–4.2–104(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2015) (directing that the special advocate surcharge be deposited into the VAST fund). Because these statutes clearly state how money in these funds is to be used—and do not address the possibility of refunds—they do not permit the trial court to order a refund from these funds. See Nelson, ¶¶ 37–39.

¶ 12 The parties point to two procedural rules that allow a court to grant a party post-conviction relief, suggesting that these provisions authorize a court to issue refunds.See C.R.C.P. 60(b) ; Crim. P. 35(a). However, neither rule addresses the court's authority to order a refund. C.R.C.P. 60(b) permits a court to "relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" under certain conditions, including:

(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;

(3) the judgment is void;

(4) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which

...