People v. Madison

Decision Date11 March 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-476,80-476
Citation49 Ill.Dec. 549,418 N.E.2d 193,93 Ill.App.3d 922
Parties, 49 Ill.Dec. 549 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dollie MADISON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Robert J. Agostinelli, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for defendant-appellant.

John A. Barra, State's Atty., Peoria, Kenneth A. Wilhelm, John X. Breslin, State's Attys., Appellate Service Commission, Ottawa, for plaintiff-appellee.

STOUDER, Justice.

Following a bench trial the defendant, Dollie Madison, was found guilty of pandering in violation of Illinois Revised Statutes 1979, chapter 38, section 11-16(a)(2). She was sentenced to a determinate term of one and one-half years imprisonment.

The offense of pandering is defined as follows:

"Pandering.

(a) Any person who performs any of the following acts for money commits pandering (1) Compels a female to become a prostitute; or

(2) Arranges or offers to arrange a situation in which a female may practice prostitution. " (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, § 11-16(a)).

In the case at bar the indictment charged the defendant under subparagraph (a) (2) of the statute, alleging that she arranged a situation in which a female, Marcia Logue, might practice prostitution. On appeal the defendant contends that she was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where the evidence failed to establish that she arranged a situation in which Marcia Logue might practice prostitution. The defendant asserts that the evidence established only that she arranged a situation in which Marcia Logue might practice as an escort.

We disagree. The evidence clearly establishes the type of managerial activities on the part of the defendant which constitute the essential elements of the crime of pandering.

The defendant's testimony established that she was in charge of Cherie's Escort Service and that she was responsible for all the money. When undercover police officer Loren Marion telephoned Cherie's Escort Service at approximately 3 p. m. on December 11, 1979, from a room in the Town House Motel, the defendant answered the phone and made the sales pitch and arrangements. The defendant stated that she offered a basic service for $75 and a liberal service for $100. The defendant then described the two girls working for her and told Officer Marion that he would not be sorry for calling Cherie's.

A few minutes later, the defendant returned the officer's call to state that she would arrive at his hotel room in fifteen to twenty minutes. Within that span of time, the defendant arrived with Marcia Logue, whom the defendant introduced to Officer Marion as Amber. The defendant asked Marion if he wanted the basic or the liberal service. In response to his request for the liberal service, the defendant took $100 from him, in spite of the officer's request to pay the money to Amber. The defendant then explained that a tip was customary, and Officer Marion paid her another $10. The arrangements made between Marion and the defendant were that Amber was to spend one hour with Marion in the hotel room.

After the money was paid, Amber and the defendant held a brief discussion in the back room. According to their testimony, the liberal service allowed the "escort" to drink with a customer, and their discussion involved a warning to Amber from the defendant not to drink too much.

The defendant then left the motel room. No sex acts occurred between Officer Marion and Amber in the motel room, despite repeated requests by the officer. However, Amber asked the police officer to unbutton her dress and to remove it....

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3 cases
  • State v. Williams, 65124
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • 20 Enero 1982
    ...... See, e.g., People v. Bradshaw, 31 Cal.App.3d 421, 425, 107 Cal.Rptr. 256, 259 (1973) (under statute defining pandering as using any device to cause, induce, persuade, or encourage another to become prostitute, act of prostitution not necessary element of offense proscribed by word "encourage"); People v. Madison, 93 Ill.App.3d 922, 924, 49 Ill.Dec. 549, 418 N.E.2d 193, 194 (1981) (under statute defining pandering as arranging or offering to arrange situation ......
  • Visione v. Visione
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 11 Marzo 1981
  • People v. Wiler, 1-88-0208
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 16 Octubre 1989
    ...as the spokesperson for the prostitute, were sufficient to prove that defendant was engaged in pandering. In People v. Madison (1981), 93 Ill.App.3d 922, 49 Ill.Dec. 549, 418 N.E.2d 193, the court found that evidence which showed that defendant (1) was in charge of an escort service that ma......

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