People v. Maestas

Decision Date24 December 1973
Docket NumberNo. 25505,25505
Citation517 P.2d 461,183 Colo. 378
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Manuel Ramijo MAESTAS, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., Jack E. Hanthorn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

Michael L. Bender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.

DAY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a verdict of guilty and a life sentence for first-degree murder returned by a jury in the Adams County district court. We affirm.

The facts established at trial showed that appellant Maestas, with three other men, Kicked a cabdriver to death outside a Commerce City bar. Appellant was tried jointly with one codefendant, Gerald Medina.

Maestas presents four grounds for reversal. Because few of the facts which form the basis for each issue are interrelated, each point of argument will be discussed separately in the context of the appropriate facts.

I.

The first issue presented is whether the trial court erred in refusing Maestas a separate trial. It is argued that the admission into evidence of a fingerprint and bloody clothes of the codefendant Medina, which were inadmissible against appellant, so prejudiced this defendant that he was denied a fair trial. Crim.P. 14. We do not agree.

A motion for a separate trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Trujillo, Colo., 509 P.2d 794 (1973). But discretion may be abused. In Eder v. People, Colo., 498 P.2d 945 (1972), therefore, we adopted the guidelines for severance of codefendants set forth in the American Bar Association Standards of Criminal Justice Relating to Joinder and Severance § 2.3(b)(i) (1968). The necessity of severance is tested by the standard that it must be 'deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of a defendant.' That abstract principle, in turn, is tested by the following: (1) Whether the number of defendants or the complexity of the evidence is such that the jury will probably confuse the evidence and law applicable to each defendant; (2) whether evidence inadmissible against one defendant will be considered against the other defendant despite admonitory instructions; (3) whether there are antagonistic defenses. ABA Standards, Supra, Commentary to § 2.3(b)(i). Accordingly, in Eder, supra, we reversed a conviction where the second and third elements were present. In that case, it was shown (1) the defenses were antagonistic (2) one defendant took the stand and his attorney could not comment on the other defendant's silence; (3) one defendant, if tried first, could conceivably testify on behalf of the other at a subsequent trial; (4) the evidence was largely circumstantial and stronger against one defendant. See also People v. Robles, Colo., 514 P.2d 630 (1973).

Viewing this record in light of these principles, however, we fail to see how severance would have promoted a demonstrably fairer determination of guilt or innocence than that obtained here. Neither the number of the defendants nor the complexity of the evidence would precipitate jury confusion. The fingerprint and clothes of Medina were admitted, but the necessary admonitory instructions were given. Furthermore, the record contradicts any argument that the defendants were placed in an antagonistic posture. Indeed, they both testified at trial and presented essentially congruent evidence. The proof of each defendant's guilt, moreover, is not discernibly disparate. In short, we perceive no meaningful prejudice which would have been eliminated by a separate trial.

II.

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying defense a motion for discovery of felony records of witnesses for the People, Crim.P. 16(c), and a motion for discovery of witness' statements, Crim.P. 16(i).

Taking up first the request for records of any witness' felony conviction, if any, there were two crucial lay eye-witnesses to the crime who testified for the People; the others were policemen, experts, the wife of the deceased, and three persons who did not see the crime. Before trial, Maestas' counsel made a broad motion for discovery, requesting the prosecution to furnish 'any record of prior felony convictions of persons listed on the information as witnesses for the People.' The motion was denied after a hearing on the merits. Though the motion was not renewed at any subsequent time, appellant now contends the failure to grant discovery of the felony records of the two crucial witnesses is reversible error.

Crim.P. 16(c), addressed to 'other matters' is the section of the rule governing requests of this type. As we have held in the past, the trial court must exercise sound discretion in permitting such discovery, guided by the standards suggested in subsection (2) of Crim.P. 16(c). People ex rel. Shinn v. District Court, 172 Colo. 23, 469 P.2d 732 (1970). To show an abuse of discretion on appeal, however, the facts must reveal that the defendant was prejudiced. The record in this case strongly suggests that the defendant was not prejudiced. We note that defense counsel never asked the witnesses on cross-examination whether they had been convicted of a felony. There is a total absence of any suggestion of prior felony convictions.

On the matter of the statements, defense counsel made a motion under Crim.P. 16(i) prior to trial which was denied. As in the case of the felony records, we can find no indication that witnesses' statements were withheld by the People or that they existed in written form. The record shows that all police records, notes and statements were readily made available to Maestas. Of the two lay witnesses who witnessed the crime, one admitted making prior statements on cross-examination by defense counsel. Those statements, however, were not made to the police and there is nothing in the record that suggests that the People had such statements in their possession. Thus, we perceive no prejudice attributable to the trial court's denial of the motion.

III.

Appellant contends next that the trial court erred in its failure to declare a mistrial, to grant a motion to strike, or to preclude prosecutorial comment because of a non-responsive answer by a witness for the People.

The People called an FBI employee as an expert witness. The purpose of his testimony was to establish that the...

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30 cases
  • Chancey v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 13, 1986
    ...precaution of the court? 3. Are the defenses of the defendants antagonistic to each other or to each other's rights? See, People v. Maestas, 517 P2d 461 (Colo.1973). If the defendant can show the court by some facts that failure to sever will prejudice him under one or more of these conside......
  • People v. Horne
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • November 3, 1980
    ...is to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more defendants. People v. Warren, supra; People v. Maestas, 183 Colo. 378, 517 P.2d 461 (1973); see section 16-7-101, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8); Crim.P. 14. Where, as here, there is no showing that denial of a moti......
  • Reaves v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 21, 1978
    ...precaution of the court? 3. Are the defenses of the defendants antagonistic to each other or to each other's rights? See People v. Maestas, 517 P.2d 461 (Colo.1973). If the defendant can show the court by some facts that failure to sever will prejudice him under one or more of these conside......
  • People v. Gonzales
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • August 6, 1974
    ...delicti has been established. We recognize that the Corpus delicti must be corroborated independently of the confession. People v. Maestes, Colo., 517 P.2d 461 (1973); Martin v. People, 179 Colo. 237, 499 P.2d 606 (1972) and cases cited therein. The corroboration may be either direct or Her......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Give the Witness Some Elbow Room
    • United States
    • ABA General Library Litigation No. 46-4, July 2020
    • July 1, 2020
    ...for some purpose, courts can allow it to stand even if it strays beyond the precise scope of the question. In People v. Maestas , 183 Colo. 378, 385 (1973), the Colorado Supreme Court, crediting Wigmore, cited that principle when it allowed an expert witness’s volunteered information to sta......

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