People v. Magnant
| Decision Date | 30 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | SC 159373,SC 159371 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERALD MAGNANT, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN FRANCIS DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Argued on application for leave to appeal January 6, 2021.
Bridget M. McCormack, Chief Justice: Brian K. Zahra David F Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch Justices:
Gerald Magnant and John F. Davis were each charged with violating MCL 205.428(3) of the Tobacco Products Tax Act (the TPTA) MCL 205.421 et seq., for transporting 3, 000 or more cigarettes without the transporter's license required by MCL 205.423(1). Defendants were nonsupervisory employees of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community (KBIC). On December 11, 2015, the Michigan State Police pulled over a KBIC-owned pickup truck for speeding. The driver, Davis, consented to a search of the utility trailer attached to the truck, representing to the trooper that it contained "supplies" and "chips." The trailer actually contained 56 cases holding over 600, 000 "Seneca" cigarettes marked with KBIC stamps but not with the Michigan Department of Treasury tax stamps required by the TPTA. The trooper told Davis, "[Y]ou knew that stuff was back there," to which Davis replied, "I'm just a worker." The truck's passenger, Magnant, admitted that he had helped load the trailer. The parties stipulated that Davis, Magnant, and the KBIC were not licensed to transport tobacco products under the TPTA. Davis and Magnant were each charged with violating MCL 205.428(3), and after a preliminary examination, the district court bound the case over as to each defendant. In the circuit court, defendants jointly moved to quash the bindover, arguing that MCL 205.428(3) required the prosecution to show that defendants knowingly violated the TPTA licensing requirement. Defendants also jointly moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the relevant statutes are unconstitutionally vague because they do not give individual employees, as opposed to businesses, adequate notice that they are subject to the TPTA licensing requirement for transporting cigarettes. The Ingham Circuit Court, Louise Alderson, J., denied defendants' motion to quash the bindover, ruling that the prosecution need only show that defendants knowingly transported 3, 000 or more cigarettes and that defendants were not licensed, irrespective of their knowledge of the licensing requirement. The circuit court also denied defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that the language of the TPTA provided adequate notice that an "individual" can be a "transporter" subject to the licensing requirement. The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases on appeal. In an unpublished opinion issued on February 5, 2019 (Docket Nos. 341621 and 341627), the Court of Appeals, Swartzle, P.J., and Sawyer, J. (Ronayne Krause, J., dissenting), affirmed, holding that because MCL 205.428(3) is a general-intent offense, the only criminal intent the prosecution must show is the actor's knowledge that they possessed 3, 000 or more cigarettes. The Court of Appeals also held that the TPTA provides sufficient notice to individual employees that they must be licensed if they are "transporters" of tobacco products. Defendants each sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court ordered consolidated oral argument on the applications. 505 Mich. 1000 (2020).
In an opinion by Justice Welch, joined by Chief Justice McCormack and Justices Bernstein and Clement, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:
MCL 205.428(3) of the Tobacco Products Tax Act, MCL 205.421 et seq., applies to nonsupervisory employees and is not unconstitutionally vague. MCL 205.428(3) requires the prosecution to show that defendants (1) knew they were transporting 3, 000 or more cigarettes and (2) knew of facts that conferred "transporter" status or knew of the specific licensing requirement of MCL 205.423(1). In this case, the district court's bindover decision was invalid because the district court did not consider whether each defendant in this case knew facts that, at a minimum, bestowed transporter status on them.
1. MCL 205.428(3) provides, in relevant part, that a person who possesses, acquires, transports, or offers for sale contrary to the TPTA 3, 000 or more cigarettes is guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine of not more than $50, 000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both. MCL 205.423(1) provides, in relevant part, that a person shall not purchase, possess, acquire for resale, or sell a tobacco product as a transporter in this state unless licensed to do so. MCL 205.422(y) defines "transporter" as a person importing or transporting into this state, or transporting in this state, a tobacco product obtained from a source located outside this state, or from any person not duly licensed under this act. MCL 205.422(y) also provides that a transporter does not include an interstate commerce carrier licensed by the Interstate Commerce Commission (the ICC) to carry commodities in interstate commerce or a licensee maintaining a warehouse or place of business outside of this state if the warehouse or place of business is licensed under this act. Furthermore, MCL 205.422(o) provides that a "person" is an individual, partnership, fiduciary, association, limited-liability company, corporation, or other legal entity. Therefore, an individual is a transporter if the individual is engaged in conduct described in MCL 205.422(y). The TPTA thus provides clear notice of when an individual, including a nonsupervisory employee, holds the status of "transporter" and, consequently, when the individual is subject to the licensing requirement of MCL 205.423(1). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err by holding that MCL 205.428(3) applies to nonsupervisory employees and that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. However, the Court of Appeals erred to the extent it held that an individual must have a personal transporter license any time the individual transports large quantities of tobacco. Under the plain language of MCL 205.422(y), an individual qualifies as a "transporter"-and thus is subject to the transporter licensing requirement of MCL 205.423(1)-only if the individual is transporting tobacco from "a source located outside this state" or "from any person not duly licensed under this act" and the individual is not an ICC licensee or an out-of-state licensee under the TPTA. It is not the quantity of tobacco transported but the source of the tobacco that confers "transporter" status and the transporter licensing requirement. Therefore, under the plain language of MCL 205.422(y), when an individual employee's source of tobacco is a duly licensed employer, the individual employee is not a "transporter" and does not need a personal transporter license.
2. There is a longstanding presumption, traceable to the common law, that unless otherwise stated in a statute, a Legislature intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable mental state regarding each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct. In this case, the Legislature did not intend MCL 205.428(3) to impose strict liability. However, the text of MCL 205.428(3) provides no express criminal-intent provision and, therefore, no express guidance as to what wrongful state of mind is required or which elements of the offense it must be directed toward. Rehaif v United States, 588 U.S. at ___; 139 S.Ct 2191 (2019), provided the appropriate framework for resolution of this issue. Rehaif held that, under a statute prohibiting undocumented immigrants from possessing firearms, the defendant's immigration status was the crucial element separating innocent from wrongful conduct. Similarly, status is the crucial element separating innocent from wrongful conduct under MCL 205.428(3) as charged in this case. Because the prosecution had to show that a person charged with violating MCL 205.428(3) knew the facts that made his or her conduct illegal, a violation of MCL 205.428(3) requires, at a minimum, proof that the actor knew facts that conferred a status that subjected him or her to the regulatory requirements of the TPTA. Because defendants were charged with acting as "transporters" and because there was no allegation that they fell into any other category of "person" under the TPTA, MCL 205.428(3) required the prosecution to show that defendants (1) knew they were transporting 3, 000 or more cigarettes and (2) knew of facts that conferred "transporter" status or knew of the specific licensing requirement of MCL 205.423(1). Under MCL 205.422(y), an individual qualifies as a "transporter," and thus is subject to the licensing requirement, only if the individual is transporting tobacco from "a source located outside this state" or "from any person not duly licensed under this act" and the individual is not a licensed ICC carrier or an out-of-state licensee under the TPTA. These are the facts that confer transporter status and, therefore, the facts that an individual must know to be liable for violating MCL 205.428(3). This holding does not require a showing that defendants were aware of the particular statutes that applied to their conduct or, specifically, that they were required to be licensed, although either would be sufficient to establish that defendants knew facts that made their conduct unlawful. Rather, this holding requires a minimal showing that defendants knew that they were transporting a tobacco product obtained from a source located outside this state or from a person not duly licensed under the TPTA. In this case, the district court bound defendants over but did not consider...
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