People v. Maher

• Decision Date: 21 June 1976
• Docket Number: Cr. 19216
• Citation: 550 P.2d 1044,17 Cal.3d 196,130 Cal.Rptr. 508
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 550 P.2d 1044 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Richard Thomas MAHER, Defendant and Respondent

Page 508

130 Cal.Rptr. 508

17 Cal.3d 196, 550 P.2d 1044

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Richard Thomas MAHER, Defendant and Respondent.

Cr. 19216.

Supreme Court of California

June 21, 1976.

Joseph P. Busch and John K. Van de Kamp, Dist. Attys., Harry B. Sondheim and Jay J. Becker, Deputy Dist. Attys., for plaintiff and appellant.

Richard S. Buckley, Public Defender, Harold E. Shabo, Robert J. Levy and Martin Stein, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

At noontime on August 13, 1973, Officer Shirah of the Los Angeles Police Department observed defendant alternately staggering along a downtown street and leaning against buildings for support. Noting defendant's bloodshot eyes and the odor of alcohol, the officer concluded that defendant was inebriated and arrested him for the misdemeanor offense of public intoxication (Pen.Code, § 647, subd. (f). Officer Shirah called for a 'B-wagon' to transport the defendant, and searched him before placing him in the vehicle. The officer first conducted a pat-down, but felt nothing resembling a weapon. He then undertook a full body search of defendants' clothing, and in a jacket pocket found a cellophane bag containing marijuana. At the preliminary hearing the officer testified he was looking for concealed weapons and had not suspected defendant of carrying contraband.

Defendant was held to answer on a charge of violating section 11357 of the Health and Safety Code (possession of marijuana). His motion to set aside the information (Pen.Code, § 995) was submitted on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. The motion was granted on the ground that the only material evidence of the charged offense was seized as the result of an illegal search. The People appeal. (Pen.Code, § 1238, subd. (a)(1).)

We conclude that the search of defendant's person beyond the scope of a patdown was unlawful under article I, section 13, of the California Constitution, and hence that the information was properly set aside by the trial court. The full body search of defendant was invalid under the principles set forth by this court in People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943, 123 Cal.Rptr. 297, 538 P.2d 753. Longwill is the most recent in a series of opinions in which we developed the criteria for determining the permissible scope of a search of an arrestee being transported by police officers. (People v. Norman (1975) 14 Cal.3d 929, 123 Cal.Rptr. 109, 538 P.2d 237; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099; People v. Superior Court (Simon) (1972) 74 Cal.3d 186, 101 Cal.Rptr. 837, 496 P.2d 1205.) Beginning with Simon, we have classified the offense in terms of the possible disposition of the arrest, i.e., whether the arrestee is to be cited and immediately released, or taken before a magistrate or other official and given the opportunity to post bail, or booked and incarcerated. (Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d at p. 536, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099.) The rule to be distilled from these decisions is that a full body search incident to arrest is impermissible when the person is arrested for an offense for which he will merely be cited or released on bail. In Brisendine we also adopted the view originally expressed by the Chief Justice in his concurring opinion in Simon, i.e., that the limited intrusion of a pat-down is permissible before such a person is transported to the stationhouse or other place for further disposition. (13 Cal.3d at p. 537, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099, citing Simon, 7 Cal.3d at p. 214, 101 Cal.Rptr. 837, 496 P.2d 1205.)

In Longwill we were specifically concerned with the permissible scope of the pretransportation search of an individual arrested for public intoxication. The defendant in that case was charged with narcotics offenses on the basis of contraband recovered in a full body search before he was placed in a patrol car. We held that a full search was forbidden until such time as the arrestee was actually to be incarcerated in a jail or committed to a civil detoxification center. Noting the various dispositional alternatives available to the arresting officer, we observed that such an arrestee is often not incarcerated. It was therefore concluded that a full body search at the time of arrest could not be justified as an 'accelerated booking search.' (14 Cal.3d at p. 948, 123 Cal.Rptr. 297, 538 P.2d 753.) Applying the rule of Brisendine, however, we stated that a pretransportation pat-down for weapons would be permissible. (Id. at pp. 949--950, 123 Cal.Rptr. 297, 538 P.2d 753.)

Longwill is plainly dispositive of the case now before us. The only factual distinction between the two cases is that Longwill was placed in the back seat of a patrol car whereas defendant here was placed in the back of a B-wagon. The People contend that a B-wagon is a 'mobile jail' and therefore the full body search should be upheld as a 'jailhouse search' made immediately before defendant was 'incarcerated.' It is argued that the considerations which justify the full search of a person being booked prior to incarceration are also present when an arrestee is placed in a B-wagon.

We do not agree. In stating our conclusions in Longwill, we referred broadly to 'the police vehicle.' (14 Cal.3d at pp. 949--951, 123 Cal.Rptr. 297, 538 P.2d 753.) A B-wagon is a police vehicle. Being fully aware of the use of B-wagons by police departments, we neither expressed nor intimated an intention to limit the effect of our decision to transportation in patrol cars.

The People fail to satisfactorily explain what significant physical differences between a B-wagon and patrol car justify treating the former but not the latter as a jail. The record does not indicate whether defendant was handcuffed, or whether he was the only arrestee in the B-wagon. Even assuming that defendant was not handcuffed and that he remained in the presence of other arrestees without an accompanying officer, we are not persuaded that a jail environment was created.

The B-wagon is a van-like vehicle commonly used by police to patrol areas frequented by public inebriates. It has a separate locked compartment where a small group of arrestees may be isolated from the officers while being transported to the central detention facility; the practice of handcuffing arrestees or placing an officer in the back compartment presumably varies in different jurisdictions and according to the circumstances of the particular arrest. Similarly, a patrol car typically has a barrier between the front and back seats to separate the officers from persons taken into custody, and special rear doors that lock from the outside. The only real distinction between the two vehicles is that the B-wagon can transport several more persons. This factor alone, however, does not transform a B-wagon into a mobile jail. Arrestees who are locked in a B-wagon are no more 'incarcerated' than their counterparts who are locked in the back seat of a patrol car.

An examination of the policy underlying jailhouse searches demonstrates that an arrestee's brief sojourn in a B-wagon or ohter type of police vehicle cannot be considered incarceration for purposes of search and seizure law. Traditionally it was recognized that a person being processed for incarceration could be searched. The purpose was threefold: to maintain jail security, to discover evidence pertaining to the crime charged, and to safeguard the prisoner's personal belongings. At common law the search was not necessarily related to the right to search incident to arrest, but was considered a lawful and customary jail detention routine. (Gardner & Manian, Principles and Cases of the Law of Arrest, Search, and Seizure (1974) p. 200.) Courts today still employ the same rationale in upholding these searches, citing the need to provide for the safety of police personnel and other prisoners, to prevent the introduction of weapons and contraband into the jail, and to inventory the entering prisoner's property. (People v. Munsey (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 440, 448, 95 Cal.Rptr. 811; People v. Superior Court (Fuller) (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 935, 945, 92 Cal.Rptr. 545; see People v. Ross (1967) 67 Cal.2d 64, 70, 60 Cal.Rptr. 254, 429 P.2d 606, revd. on other grounds sub nom. Ross v. California (1968) 391 U.S. 470, 88 S.Ct. 1850, 20 L.Ed.2d 750.) The rationale behind these security measures is obvious: in a jail setting, a substantial number of persons are involuntarily confined for varied periods throughout a vast facility where constant supervision is not feasible. These circumstances do not prevail when one or at most a few persons are placed in a closed vehicle for the relatively short journey to the stationhouse. In sum, a B-wagon, like other police vehicles, is not a jail.

The People next suggest that the full body search was justified here because defendant was 'temporarily detained.' The People rely on a series of decisions in which a person arrested for a bailable offense was searched before being placed in jail because he could not post bond. (People v. Gilliam (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 181, 116 Cal.Rptr. 317; People v. Collin (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 416, 110 Cal.Rptr. 869; People v. Rhodes (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 257, 100 Cal.Rptr. 487.) But these cases are not relevant because they involve situations in which the defendants were actually introduced into the jail community. Insofar as these authorities reflect the distinctive policy underlying the jailhouse search, they strengthen our conclusion that a full body search of the occupant of a B-wagon is not permissible.

It is also urged that the threat to the safety of police officers and other arrestees is greater when more than one arrestee is placed in a B-wagon and that a full body search is therefore necessary in these circumstances. The People point out that a police officer may be found civilly liable for injuries suffered by an arrestee while in his custody. (Gov.Code, § 844.6, subd. (d); cf...