People v. Manges
Decision Date | 07 June 1984 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 70858 |
Citation | 350 N.W.2d 829,134 Mich.App. 49 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jayson Louis MANGES, Defendant-Appellant. 134 Mich.App. 49, 350 N.W.2d 829 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[134 MICHAPP 51] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Richard S. Murray, [134 MICHAPP 52] Pros. Atty., and Michael A. Nickerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People.
James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender by Terence R. Flanagan, Asst. Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant on appeal.
Before MacKENZIE, P.J., and BEASLEY and GLASER *, JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury conviction of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b(1)(e); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2)(1)(e), and four counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520d(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(4)(1)(a). The convictions arose out of a series of sexual assaults upon two 15-year-old girls occurring in the late evening of May 19, 1982, or the early morning of May 20, 1982.
One of the girls, Randee, after being dropped off by the defendant at a friend's house the morning of May 20, called the police. Officer Coffey took a statement from Randee concerning the sexual assaults which had occurred. Later at approximately 4:00 p.m., another officer, Officer Sholander, and Randee drove to the area where the assaults had occurred in search of the other victim, Lenora, who had succeeded in running away from defendant's truck which had been parked in a wooded area. While cruising through the area, Randee spotted defendant's truck driving down the road, and Officer Sholander stopped defendant. Randee identified defendant as the assailant, and Officer Sholander arrested defendant and advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Defendant was asked whether he understood his rights and whether he would be willing [134 MICHAPP 53] to answer questions, and defendant responded in the affirmative to both inquiries. Officer Sholander conveyed to defendant his concern for Lenora's safety and asked defendant when he had last seen her; defendant responded that he saw her about an hour earlier at approximately 3:00 p.m. near Big Lake Road, about 7 or 8 miles away. Officer Sholander asked defendant no other questions.
Pursuant to Officer Sholander's call for assistance, Officers Coffey and Baker arrived on the scene and placed defendant in their patrol car, and Sholander left to search for Lenora. While en route to the county jail, Officer Coffey advised defendant for a second time of his Miranda rights, and defendant stated that he understood his rights and would be willing to answer questions. Officer Baker then asked defendant some questions, such as when he picked up the girls, whether he knew the girls previously, and when and where he had last seen Lenora. Defendant answered these questions, but the officers ceased questioning defendant when defendant indicated that he wanted to talk to Mr. Mather. Officer Baker testified at the suppression hearing that defendant "indicated that maybe he'd better talk with an attorney, and he mentioned Mr. Mather's name". Officer Coffey testified that defendant "said he didn't want to ask any more--answer any more questions, he wanted to talk to Mr. Mather". Mr. Mather was the prosecutor in the county in which defendant was arrested. After arriving at the county jail, the officers contacted Mr. Mather and told him that defendant wanted to speak to him. Mather arrived at the county jail to speak to defendant about two hours after defendant had been given his Miranda warnings a second time.
Defendant asserts on appeal that the trial court [134 MICHAPP 54] erred in ruling that defendant's statements to Officer Sholander and to Officers Baker and Coffey were admissible. Defendant argues that these statements should have been suppressed because, by expressing their concern for the missing girl, the officers unfairly played on defendant's emotions in eliciting the statements from defendant. In support of this contention, defendant relies on Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). However, Brewer is distinguishable since there, prior to the police officers' "Christian burial" speech, the defendant had not indicated a willingness to be questioned in the absence of an attorney and had stated that he would tell the whole story after consulting with his attorney. In the instant case, prior to the police officers' questioning defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights and stated that he understood his rights and was willing to answer questions. Brewer does not stand for the proposition that statements or questions which may arouse the emotions of the defendant require the suppression of the defendant's responses. We find no error; defendant's responses to the questions asked by the police officers were properly admitted at trial.
Defendant also argues that the court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress his statements made to Mr. Mather. On direct examination at the suppression hearing, Mr. Mather testified in pertinent part as follows:
In addition, Mr. Mather's testimony on cross-examination at the hearing included the following:
[134 MICHAPP 57] "A. Yes.
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