People v. Manges

Decision Date07 June 1984
Docket NumberDocket No. 70858
Citation350 N.W.2d 829,134 Mich.App. 49
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jayson Louis MANGES, Defendant-Appellant. 134 Mich.App. 49, 350 N.W.2d 829
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

[134 MICHAPP 51] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Richard S. Murray, [134 MICHAPP 52] Pros. Atty., and Michael A. Nickerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People.

James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender by Terence R. Flanagan, Asst. Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before MacKENZIE, P.J., and BEASLEY and GLASER *, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right his jury conviction of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b(1)(e); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2)(1)(e), and four counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520d(1)(a); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(4)(1)(a). The convictions arose out of a series of sexual assaults upon two 15-year-old girls occurring in the late evening of May 19, 1982, or the early morning of May 20, 1982.

One of the girls, Randee, after being dropped off by the defendant at a friend's house the morning of May 20, called the police. Officer Coffey took a statement from Randee concerning the sexual assaults which had occurred. Later at approximately 4:00 p.m., another officer, Officer Sholander, and Randee drove to the area where the assaults had occurred in search of the other victim, Lenora, who had succeeded in running away from defendant's truck which had been parked in a wooded area. While cruising through the area, Randee spotted defendant's truck driving down the road, and Officer Sholander stopped defendant. Randee identified defendant as the assailant, and Officer Sholander arrested defendant and advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Defendant was asked whether he understood his rights and whether he would be willing [134 MICHAPP 53] to answer questions, and defendant responded in the affirmative to both inquiries. Officer Sholander conveyed to defendant his concern for Lenora's safety and asked defendant when he had last seen her; defendant responded that he saw her about an hour earlier at approximately 3:00 p.m. near Big Lake Road, about 7 or 8 miles away. Officer Sholander asked defendant no other questions.

Pursuant to Officer Sholander's call for assistance, Officers Coffey and Baker arrived on the scene and placed defendant in their patrol car, and Sholander left to search for Lenora. While en route to the county jail, Officer Coffey advised defendant for a second time of his Miranda rights, and defendant stated that he understood his rights and would be willing to answer questions. Officer Baker then asked defendant some questions, such as when he picked up the girls, whether he knew the girls previously, and when and where he had last seen Lenora. Defendant answered these questions, but the officers ceased questioning defendant when defendant indicated that he wanted to talk to Mr. Mather. Officer Baker testified at the suppression hearing that defendant "indicated that maybe he'd better talk with an attorney, and he mentioned Mr. Mather's name". Officer Coffey testified that defendant "said he didn't want to ask any more--answer any more questions, he wanted to talk to Mr. Mather". Mr. Mather was the prosecutor in the county in which defendant was arrested. After arriving at the county jail, the officers contacted Mr. Mather and told him that defendant wanted to speak to him. Mather arrived at the county jail to speak to defendant about two hours after defendant had been given his Miranda warnings a second time.

Defendant asserts on appeal that the trial court [134 MICHAPP 54] erred in ruling that defendant's statements to Officer Sholander and to Officers Baker and Coffey were admissible. Defendant argues that these statements should have been suppressed because, by expressing their concern for the missing girl, the officers unfairly played on defendant's emotions in eliciting the statements from defendant. In support of this contention, defendant relies on Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). However, Brewer is distinguishable since there, prior to the police officers' "Christian burial" speech, the defendant had not indicated a willingness to be questioned in the absence of an attorney and had stated that he would tell the whole story after consulting with his attorney. In the instant case, prior to the police officers' questioning defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights and stated that he understood his rights and was willing to answer questions. Brewer does not stand for the proposition that statements or questions which may arouse the emotions of the defendant require the suppression of the defendant's responses. We find no error; defendant's responses to the questions asked by the police officers were properly admitted at trial.

Defendant also argues that the court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress his statements made to Mr. Mather. On direct examination at the suppression hearing, Mr. Mather testified in pertinent part as follows:

"Q. Do you recall being called to the Baraga County Sheriff's office on the evening of May 20th of this year?

"A. Very clearly.

"Q. Could you tell us basically what happened when you got there?

"A. When I got there, Lieutenant Baker, as I recall, and I think Trooper Coffey, was in the outside room [134 MICHAPP 55] with Sarah Heikkinen and Sheriff Heikkinen and Jayson, whom I recalled from having talked to him in my office some years before.

"Q. Would that be the defendant in this case, Jayson Manges?

"A. Yes, I've known Jayson for some time. And I think Willard Coffey repeated again that Jayson wanted to talk to me; he had called me on the phone and told me that Jayson wanted to talk but only to me. So I remember asking the Sheriff, 'Where's a good place to talk?' He said, 'Go in that room.' And I went in and Jayson followed me in and I remember sitting down in a chair that was somewhat distant from the door to the office and that Jayson had a chair in between me and the office. There was no design or purpose, that just comes back in my mind's eye that that's how we were seated. And I have had the experience of being called by defendants from jail not infrequently and so I wasn't too surprised at this. And I said to Jayson, 'What do you want to talk about, Jayson? Do you want to talk to me?' He said, 'Yes.' And the entire conversation was marked by long pauses, I remember that very definitely. And I'm not sure but what he was quite slow in even replying to that. Whatever he said later, I recall very clearly that he said to me, 'Well,' he says, 'I remember you were very fair with me once or twice before and that's why I want to talk to you.' I said, 'What do you want to talk about?' And he says, 'Well, I'd like to talk to you about making a deal.' And I told him that I thought I knew quite a bit about the case, but I was sure I didn't know all about it, but no matter what I knew, it was insufficient for me to consider making a deal with him. And I clearly recall that he said, 'Well, I could tell you a lot more about it than you know.' And I said, 'I'm sure you can.' And he repeated many times, and I'm sure right again, he said, 'Well, isn't there some way we can make a deal?' And I had to repeat an equal number of times that we couldn't make a deal because--the single reason I gave him is I just didn't know enough about the case to even discuss a deal.

"And then I remember telling him that if he wanted to talk about the case, that's what I was here for and so [134 MICHAPP 56] go ahead and talk about the case. As best I recall, there was a considerable pause after that exchange and he said, 'Well, I wouldn't have done it if I hadn't had so much brandy.' I clearly recall that. And I guess again he brought up the deal because it came up at least eight, ten, twelve times, the topic of the deal. I gave him the same answer.

"He said several times, 'I didn't mean to hurt them.' He said several times that he was worried about the other girl. He referred--he didn't use any name of a girl in talking to me, he kept saying the other girl.

"I listened very intently, interspersed with these pauses, and finally I asked him pointblank, I said, 'Jayson, did you sexually assault those girls?' Long pause. He said, 'Yes, but they really didn't resist very much.' And I said, 'Well, maybe if they didn't resist very much it's because they were very aware of the knife that was on the seat of the truck.' * * * The deal--the topic of the deal came up again, the topic of his being worried about the girl came up again, and I remember that each time he said something that I believed, I told him I believe it.

* * *

"Q. Did you yourself take any of the Miranda warning steps?

"A. None whatsoever. I had been advised that he'd been--I remember that very explicitly; I remember asking Trooper Coffey over the phone if that had been the case, and he said yes and he repeated that he'll talk, but he only wants to talk to me."

In addition, Mr. Mather's testimony on cross-examination at the hearing included the following:

"Q. Mr. Mather, you said--testified that you've known Jayson for quite some time. Is that through your position as Baraga County Prosecutor?

"A. Exclusively.

"Q. Do you feel that Mr. Manges approached you because he--or wanted to talk to you because he knew you and trusted you?

[134 MICHAPP 57] "A. Yes.

"Q. And, in fact, Mr. Manges has been before the Baraga County Court before. And has there been plea bargaining?

"A. Yes, there has.

* * *

"Q. And from the gist of your testimony, it appears that he--Mr. Manges was talking about a deal before ever talking about the incident, is that correct?

"A. Was talking about the...

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4 cases
  • People v. Stevens
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • April 25, 2000
    ...v. Butler, 193 Mich.App. 63, 483 N.W.2d 430 (1992); People v. Heffron, 175 Mich.App. 543, 438 N.W.2d 253 (1988); People v. Manges, 134 Mich.App. 49, 350 N.W.2d 829 (1984). Contrary to the implication of the dissent, People v. Jones, 416 Mich. 354, 331 N.W.2d 406 (1982), does not control thi......
  • People v. Dunn
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • August 26, 1994
    ...attorneys.5 See also People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704, 744, 365 N.W.2d 648 (1984) (opinion of Williams, C.J.); People v. Manges, 134 Mich.App. 49, 59-60, 350 N.W.2d 829 (1984).6 The court also ruled that MRE 410 was inapplicable because it only applied to government attorneys, not law enforce......
  • State v. Galli
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • June 16, 1998
    ...attorney is not equivalent to an invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda, equivocal or otherwise. See People v. Manges, 134 Mich.App. 49, 350 N.W.2d 829, 832 (1984) (defendant's request to speak to an attorney he knew to be the prosecutor was not even an ambiguous invocation of the......
  • People v. Arroyo
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • January 7, 1985
    ...in interrogating the defendant. Thus, we conclude that Brewer, supra, is not applicable to this case. See People v. Manges, 134 Mich.App. 49, 350 N.W.2d 829 (1984). The more pertinent issue on appeal is the voluntariness[138 MICHAPP 256] of defendant's confession. An involuntary confession ......

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