People v. Manskey

Decision Date14 June 2016
Docket NumberNo. 4–14–0440.,4–14–0440.
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jason Bradley MANSKEY, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, and Amanda S. Kimmel, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellant.

Jason Chambers, State's Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and David E. Mannchen, all of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice APPLETON

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In a bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of both counts of the indictment; count I, which charged him with failing to complete his registration as a sex offender, and count II, which charged him with giving a false residential address during his (incomplete) registration. See 730 ILCS 150/3(a)

(West 2012). The court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of 14 years. He appeals.

¶ 2 First, he argues that, although the trial court never found a bona fide doubt as to his fitness, the court erred by proceeding with the sentencing hearing without having received a report from the expert the court had appointed pursuant to section 104–11(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/104–11(b)

(West 2012)) to determine if a bona fide doubt as to defendant's fitness might be raised. We hold this argument to be forfeited, and we are unconvinced that the doctrine of plain error averts the forfeiture.

¶ 3 Second, defendant argues the State failed to prove count II beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree, because the record is devoid of evidence that the address he gave the police was not his “place of residence” within the meaning of section 3(a) of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Act) (730 ILCS 150/3(a)

(West 2012)). This holding renders moot the remaining arguments that defendant makes regarding count II.

¶ 4 Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment in part and reverse it in part: we affirm the conviction on count I, but we reverse the conviction on count II.

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 6 A. The Indictment

¶ 7 The indictment consisted of two counts, each alleging a violation of section 3(a) of the Act (730 ILCS 150/3(a)

(West 2012)).

¶ 8 Count I alleged that defendant “failed to complete his annual registration by [May 24, 2013].”

¶ 9 Count II alleged that, during the period of May 24 through July 15, 2013, he violated section 3(a) in that he “gave false information to the Bloomington police department by saying that he was living at 1212 N. Western Ave[nue], Bloomington, [Illinois,] when he was not living at that address.”

¶ 10 In addition, both counts alleged as an aggravating circumstance that, in People v. Manskey, McLean County case No. 2008–CF–1174, defendant previously was convicted of violating the Act and that, consequently, under section 5–4.5–95 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5–4.5–95 (West 2012)

), he should be sentenced as a Class X offender if found guilty in the present case.

¶ 11 B. The Bench Trial

¶ 12 The trial court held a bench trial on November 15, 2013.

¶ 13 At the beginning of the trial, the parties stipulated that because defendant had been convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse in People v. Manskey, McLean County case No. 2002–CF–855, he was required to register as a sex offender.

¶ 14 1. The State's Case in Chief

¶ 15 In its case in chief, the State called the following witnesses, who testified substantially as follows.

¶ 16 a. Shawn Albert

¶ 17 Shawn Albert was a Bloomington police officer, and one of his assignments was to investigate noncompliance with the registration requirements of the Act.

¶ 18 For residents of Bloomington, such registration was done at the Bloomington police department. Albert knew defendant as someone who previously was registered in Bloomington and who had an ongoing obligation to register every 90 days.

¶ 19 People's exhibit No. 1 was a registration form, dated April 25, 2013, and signed by defendant, in which he represented (among other things) that his “Resident Address” was 1212 North Western Street, Bloomington.

¶ 20 When defendant came into the police station on April 25, 2013, to register, he provided information, such as his residential address, but he did not bring with him everything that section 3 of the Act (730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2012)

) required. He failed to bring (1) identification showing his current residential address, which, he represented at the time, was 1212 North Western Street (the state-issued identification he brought along showed a previous address); (2) an item of mail addressed to him at 1212 North Western Street, to confirm he lived there; and (3) the annual registration fee of $100.

¶ 21 So, even though defendant came in and answered all the questions, his failure to bring along with him those three things put him, “technically,” in noncompliance with the registration requirements of the Act. The practice of the Bloomington police department in such circumstances was to direct the person to come back in 30 days with the missing items (it might take time for mail to arrive at a new place of residence). That is what the Bloomington police told defendant to do. He was to return by May 25, 2013, with those three things.

¶ 22 On May 27, 2013, Albert noticed that defendant had not yet returned to the police station to make good on the registration deficiencies. A few more weeks passed, and Albert went looking for defendant at 1212 North Western Street. The resident there, a man with the last name Mitchell, allowed Albert into the house. Albert “did some sort of a visual inspection to determine whether [defendant] was actually physically present” (we are quoting defense counsel's question, to which Albert answered affirmatively). Albert did not see defendant. Nor did he see any sign that defendant lived there. He testified:

“I didn't see any items belonging to him, I didn't see a bedroom designated for him, there was no mail scattered about with the address listed as being his. There wasn't a vehicle parked at the resident [sic ] registered to him. Other indicator, someone might have property related to their person at the home. So, no, I didn't find any of those things there.”

¶ 23 b. Bruce Mitchell

¶ 24 Bruce Mitchell resided at 1212 North Western Street. As of the date of the trial, he had resided there a year.

¶ 25 He recalled that on three separate occasions (he could not remember the dates) police officers came to 1212 North Western Street and asked him if defendant, a friend of his son, Chris Mitchell, “lived there.” Bruce Mitchell “did not believe” that on any of those occasions defendant “was * * * there,” in the house.

¶ 26 On the first occasion when police officers asked Bruce Mitchell if defendant “lived there,” he “said no.”

¶ 27 Later, police officers returned and asked Bruce Mitchell a second time if defendant “lived there.” He gave them the same answer as before: he “said no.” Also, during this second visit by the police, he wrote and signed an unsworn statement, dated June 12, 2013, which consisted of a single sentence: [Defendant] does not live at my house a[t] 1212 N[orth] Western Ave[nue] and has never lived here.” Pursuant to section 115–10.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115–10.1 (West 2012)

) and without objection by defense counsel, the trial court admitted this statement, People's exhibit No. 2, as substantive evidence.

¶ 28 After the admission of People's exhibit No. 2, the prosecutor asked Bruce Mitchell: “Now, on that date, did [defendant] live with you?” (The prosecutor meant June 12, 2013, the date when Bruce Mitchell signed People's exhibit No. 2.) He answered:

“A. I don't know if he lived there or not on that date.
Q. You don't know if he lived with you or not between the dates of April 25, 2013[,] and July 1st [sic ] of 2013?
A. I don't know how to answer this because I don't know if he ever lived with me. He stayed in the basement.
Q. So during that time frame was he staying in your basement?
A. I have no idea about the time frame.
* * *
Q. And when you say [defendant] would be staying in your basement, how often would he stay there?
A. As often as he wished. I assume every day.
Q. Did he have a key to your house?
A. Yes, the key was outside on the grill.
Q. Did he receive mail at your house?
A. No. You know, there might have been something one time to tell you the truth. I don't know. I think there was something one time.”

¶ 29 On the third occasion when police officers came to 1212 North Western Avenue and asked Bruce Mitchell, yet again, if defendant “lived there,” he “pretty much cussed them out and ran them off and then called the police department to complain about them.”

¶ 30 On cross-examination, Bruce Mitchell explained that, at his son's request, he had given defendant permission to live in the basement of 1212 North Western Street but that he never really checked to see if defendant had taken him up on the offer. Bruce Mitchell could not remember the date when his son made that request, but it would have been on the day, or “very close” to the day, when defendant was required to tell the police his residential address.

¶ 31 In view of Bruce Mitchell's testimony that he had given defendant permission to live in the basement, defense counsel expressed bewilderment to Bruce Mitchell as to why he had previously testified, on direct examination, that he was “not sure whether [defendant] lived there.” In response, Bruce Mitchell explained that the basement of 1212 North Western Street was practically a separate unit:

“A. There's an outside, there's a back door that goes to the basement and another door above it that we keep closed. I've had several homeless people live in that basement other times too, and [defendant] needed a place to live. There's a shower down there, TV, computer, he stayed down there. My son would come in from work and shower, do whatever.
Q. Do you know when you
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1 cases
  • People v. Reed
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • February 13, 2020
    ...balanced or (2) the error was so egregious he was denied a fair sentencing hearing. People v. Manskey, 2016 IL App (4th) 140440, ¶ 80, 55 N.E.3d 776. In Manskey, this court stated "the error has to just about leap off the pages of the record" to constitute a clear or obvious error. Manskey,......

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