People v. Marcy (State Report Title: Matter of Petition of State of Delaware), Docket No. 78-1636
Citation | 91 Mich.App. 399,283 N.W.2d 754 |
Decision Date | 23 July 1979 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 78-1636 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lynn P. MARCY, Defendant-Appellee. * |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward R. Wilson, App. Chief, Asst. Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellant.
Lippitt, Harrison, Perlove, Friedman & Zack by Bernard Feldman and Robert S. Harrison, Southfield, for defendant-appellee.
Before KAUFMAN, P. J., and T. M. BURNS and MAHER, JJ.
The Wayne County Prosecutor appeals by leave of this Court from the denial by Wayne County Circuit Judge Richard D. Dunn of an order to compel the attendance of Lynn P. Marcy as a witness at a grand jury investigation in the state of Delaware. Marcy cross appeals.
Delaware sought the assistance of the courts of Michigan under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, enacted in Michigan as M.C.L. §§ 767.91-767.95; M.S.A. §§ 28.1023(191)-(195), and in Delaware as 11 Del.Code §§ 3521-3526. The part of the act which is material to this case is M.C.L. § 767.92; M.S.A. § 28.1023(192), which provides in part:
Pursuant to the statutory provision quoted above, the Superior Court for Kent County, Delaware, issued a certificate stating that Marcy is a material witness in the grand jury investigation into the death of Sarita Ann Hughes. The certificate, along with affidavits attached thereto, was duly presented to Judge Dunn of Wayne County Circuit Court. Marcy filed an answer in opposition with supporting affidavits, and a hearing was held before Judge Dunn on February 1, 1978. No testimony was taken at the hearing, but oral argument was heard on behalf of both petitioner and respondent. Following argument, the court denied the petition, and an order was entered to that effect. This appeal by the prosecutor, on behalf of the petitioner, ensued.
The events which precipitated the conflict out of which this appeal arises began with the murder of Sarita Ann Hughes in Milford, Delaware, on August 31, 1976. 1 Mrs. Hughes' husband, Robert, was a suspect, but was apparently not prosecuted because of lack of evidence. Thereafter, on October 1, 1976, respondent Lynn P. Marcy conducted a polygraph examination of Robert D. Hughes at the request of Hughes' Delaware attorney, Jack R. Dunlap. The examination was conducted at Marcy's Dearborn, Michigan, offices. 2 Marcy told Hughes prior to the examination that any communications made therein were confidential and would be disclosed only to Hughes' attorney.
On July 20, 1977, Marcy was a guest lecturer at a polygraph training course in Chicago attended by John P. Bisbee, a Delaware State Police Officer. According to the affidavit of Officer Bisbee, Marcy distributed polygraph charts and background information sheets relating to homicide cases in which Marcy had allegedly obtained confessions. One of the charts was for Robert D. Hughes, whose name and date of birth, along with the name and date of birth of his wife, were on the background sheet. Officer Bisbee alleged that he detected "falsehoods on the part of Robert D Hughes concerning * * * his involvement in the death of his wife". Bisbee asked Marcy about the chart, and was allegedly told, "This is the guy who killed his wife". Marcy, in his affidavits, denied having said that he obtained a confession from Hughes or that Hughes killed his wife.
Upon returning to Delaware, Bisbee informed his superiors of the events in Chicago. Eventually, the Delaware Attorney General's office contacted Marcy, asking him to reveal any information in his possession regarding the murder of Sarita Hughes. When Marcy refused on grounds of privilege, Delaware instituted proceedings under the uniform act.
In his answer in opposition to the petition filed by Delaware, Marcy alleged, Inter alia, that any information in his possession regarding the Hughes case was privileged either under the statutory Michigan polygrapher privilege or the attorney-client privilege, or both. Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that the polygrapher privilege did not apply to Delaware proceedings and that applicability of the attorney-client privilege was a question for a Delaware court, not for the Michigan court. In ruling on the petition following argument of counsel, the court below said:
It is clear that the lower court based its decision in part on the privilege established by M.C.L. § 338.1728; M.S.A. § 18.186(28), which provides in part:
"Any communications, oral or written, furnished by a professional man or client to a licensed examiner, or any information secured in connection with an assignment for a client, shall be deemed privileged with the same authority and dignity as are other privileged communications recognized by the courts of this state."
The court's comment that anything Marcy could testify to in Delaware would be privileged leads us to believe that the court also found that the attorney-client privilege applied to the polygraph examination. We think that the court's decision was correct under either analysis, and affirm.
The prosecutor urges upon us the view that it is Delaware law, not Michigan law, which governs and that the determination whether the information in Marcy's possession is privileged is not for Michigan courts to make. 3 He asks us to require Mr. Marcy to travel to Delaware and to assert his claim of privilege before the courts of that state. We decline to do so for several reasons.
Preliminarily, we note that other courts have held that because the Uniform Act authorizes a drastic infringement upon the liberty of the witness, it must be strictly construed to prevent injustice. See People v. McCartney, 38 N.Y.2d 618, 381 N.Y.S.2d 855, 345 N.E.2d 326 (1976), In re Grothe, 59 Ill.App.2d 1, 208 N.E.2d 581 (1965).
Beginning our analysis of the case before us, we note that the polygraph examination during the course of which Marcy obtained the allegedly privileged information, was conducted in Michigan by a Michigan-licensed polygrapher at the request of an attorney in the course of providing legal advice and assistance to a client. We think that this is a situation which clearly falls within the letter and spirit of the polygrapher privilege statute. That statute represents a declaration by the Legislature...
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