People v. Marsh
| Citation | 403 Ill. 81,85 N.E.2d 715 |
| Decision Date | 11 May 1949 |
| Docket Number | No. 30936.,30936. |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. MARSH. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Circuit Court, Winnebago County; William M. Carroll, judge.
Glenn Nathan Marsh was convicted of murder and he brings error.
Judgment affirmed.
Knight, Haye & Keegan, of Rockford (B. Jay Knight, of Rockford, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.
Ivan. A. Elliott, Atty. Gen. and Robert R. Canfield, State's Atty., of Rockford (Dale F. Conde, and H. Emmett Folgate, Jr., both of Rockford, of counsel), for the People.
Upon a jury trial in the circuit court of Winnebago County, the defendant, Glenn Nathan Marsh, was found guilty of the murder of Grant Muhrlein. His punishment was fixed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of 199 years. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled and judgment entered upon the verdict.
To reverse the judgment of the trial court defendant contends: (1) The trial court erred in overruling his motion for a continuance which required defendant to proceed to trial under unfair and prejudicial circumstances. (2) The trial court erred in permitting a witness for the People to testify when such witness's incompetence had been shown. (3) The trial court erred in giving and refusing certain instructions. (4) The trial court erred in refusing the defendant's instruction on manslaughter and in refusing to give the manslaughter verdict tendered by defendant. (5) The defendant was not given the fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the constitution of the United States and by the constitution of the State of Illinois.
The defendant, on November 7, 1947, the day of the homicide, was 28 years of age and resided with his wife and two children north of Rockford on U. S. Highway 51. He had lived at this location for about a year and a half prior to that date. In March, 1947, Vernon Anderson, his wife, Katherine (‘Kit’) Anderson and their three children moved into the house next to the defendant. The two families became acquinted and during the summer of 1947, the defendant and Kit Anderson began seeing each other and indulging in sexual intimacies, some of which occurred in the Anderson home. Around October 1, 1947, after defendant's wife, Audrey, and Vernon Anderson both became suspicious, defendant and Mrs. Anderson talked it over and agreed they would get divorces and be married. In the latter part of October, Grant Muhrlein, father of Kit Anderson, came down from Michigan and took her and two of the children back to his home so she could think it over and decide what she was going to do. During the time she was in Michigan considerable correspondence was carried on between defendant and Mrs. Anderson, which was introduced in evidence and disclosed their infatuation and sordid affections. On November 5, 1947, Mrs. Anderson's father, her stepmother, Charlotte, the two children and Kit, drove back to Rockford, arriving at the Anderson home on North Second Street Road around 2:30 in the morning of November 6. Shortly thereafter the defendant returned from work and saw the Muhrlein car at the Anderson home. He went into his house, secured a key which Kit Anderson had given him to her back door and went over to the Anderson house. After going in and handing the key to Mrs. Anderson, he asked her if she had made up her mind what she was going to do and she answered that she had not quite made up her mind. He went back to his home and talked with his wife about the affair, about getting a divorce, division of property and who was to get the children. Later in the morning defendant again went to the Anderson home while Vernon Anderson was there and at that time Anderson told the defendant that he knew he had been having an affair with his wife and that the defendant would have to get out. In the afternoon of that same day, Kit Anderson and her husband consulted an attorney in Rockford concerning a divorce and after this conference they went to the home of Vernon Anderson's parents at 611 Sixth Street in Rockford, where they remained the night of the 6th. During their absence the defendant called at their home and told Charlotte Muhrlein that he would like to talk to Mr. Muhrlein and tell him he wanted to marry his daughter. He was told that Mr. Muhrlein was busy in the basement and was asked by Charlotte to go away and leave them alone. Defendant then left. On the morning of November 7, Charlotte called Audrey Marsh to the Anderson home and Grant Muhrlein told her he wanted her to know his daughter was not going to break up her home, that Kit and her husband were back together again and to tell her husband that. Shortly after noon Mrs. Marsh told defendant of this conversation, at which time he appeared to be stunned and dazed and said nothing for a few minutes. He then said, ‘She can't do this to me,’ and went to a chest of drawers in the bedroom, took some shells therefrom and drove away. He then went to his place of employment, got his pay check and later redeemed a thirty-two calibre revolved which he had left as security on November 6 with a tavern owner for a loan of $5. About 5:30 p. m. defendant appeared at the back door of the home of Vernon Anderson's parents in Rockford just about the time preparations were being made for supper. Present in the home were Vernon Anderson, his wife, mother, sister Melba Anderson, Grant Muhrlein, the deceased, and the children. The defendant knocked at the back door which was locked and secured by a chain arrangement. Gertrude Anderson, Vernon's mother, went to the door and started to open it. The first thing she saw was a black gun. She screamed and several of those present rushed to the door and attempted to push defendant out, but he rushed in, gun in hand and almost immediately started shooting. He shot and killed Vernon Anderson and Grant Muhrlein. In the meantime, Kit Anderson ran into a front bedroom, broke a window and started screaming. She was then forced by defendant into his automobile, and after driving around for several hours, he stopped at a tourist cabin and left the car, at which time she escaped taking the gun with her. She went to a place called ‘Bright Spot’ northwest of Morris, Illinois, on Route 6, and there about 11:45 p. m. on November 7, reported the matter to Sheriff Enrietta of Grundy County, turning the gun over to him. She was dressed in a house dress, had lacerations on her face and arms and was in a hysterical condition.
Defendant contends that the overruling of his motion for continuance constituted prejudicial error for the reason that about the time the cause was set down for trial there appeared, in Rockford newspapers, articles containing a history of the case which purported to state as a fact that the defendant kidnapped or abducted Kit Anderson after Grant Muhrlein and Vernon Anderson had been shot. Also, that the newspaper articles contained statements that the State's Attorney had promised the defendant's counsel that if defendant would enter a plea of guilty to the indictment the death penalty would not be requested, the defendant offering affidavits of his counsel that neither the State's Attorney, nor any of his assistants, nor any person purporting to represent the State's Attorney ever discussed the question of the entry of such a plea of guilty with defendant or his counsel. It is urged by the defendant that the grand jury which returned the indictment charging the defendant with the murder of Grant Muhrlein also returned an indictment charging him with the murder of Vernon Anderson; that immediately after the jury returned a verdict of not guilty in the Anderson case, which was in January, 1948, the State's Attorney began pressing for a trial under the indictment charging the murder of Muhrlein; that the defendant, in order to protect his rights, filed on February 2, 1948, a motion for continuance and attached thereto certain articles which had appeared in the Rockford newspapers, which contained certain statements disapproving the action of the jurors in the Anderson case. This motion was granted and the cause continued to April 12, 1948. Later, another motion for continuance was filed, by reason of the illness of an attorney, so that the trial date was moved to May 24. On this date another motion for continuance was filed by the defendant, alleging, as we have above pointed out, the matters alleged to be prejudicial, which appeared in the Rockford publications, along with the alleged improper statements of the State's Attorney as to a guilty plea.
Defendant cites the case of People v. Murawski, 394 Ill. 236, 68 N.E.2d 272, which reversed a conviction because of the publication of facts disclosed by the State's Attorney, and it is contended that the basis of the court's reversal in that case is not nearly as prejudicial as in the instant case. We are of the opinion, however, that the instant case presents an entirely different situation with reference to the articles as published in the newspapers when compared with such publication in the Murawski case. In the Murawski case the jury was permitted to separate overnight and on the convening of the court the next day the defendant by her counsel presented a motion in which the court was asked to order and declare a mistrial. To the motion was attached the affidavit of her attorney which disclosed that in the morning issue of a local newspaper, published and circulated in that vicinity, a certain article appeared concerning the proceedings of the trial on the previous day; that the article referred to certain alleged criminal charges made against the defendant on prior occasions, and was highly prejudicial to the defendant. Under the circumstances there it can readily be seen there was no full opportunity for defendant's counsel to ascertain whether any juror had been prejudiced and to have the juror either excused for cause or peremptorily dismissed. An examination...
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