People v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 14 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | 2018-0447 |
| Citation | 82 N.Y.S.3d 841,61 Misc.3d 383 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Miguel MARTINEZ, Defendant. |
| Court | New York County Court |
For the People: SANDRA DOORLEY, ESQ., Monroe County District Attorney BY: GREG CLARK, ESQ., Assistant District Attorney, 47 South Fitzhugh Street, Rochester, New York 14614
For the Defendant: TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, ESQ., Monroe County Public Defender BY: HELEN SYME, ESQ., Assistant Public Defender, 10 North Fitzhugh Street, Rochester, New York 14614
Defendant seeks an order granting judicial diversion with respect to the above-referenced indictment charging him with two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree ( Penal Law § 220.16[1] ) and one count criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree ( Penal Law § 220.39[1] ) all in conjunction with events allegedly occurring on or about May 6, 2018 in the County of Monroe, State of New York. The offenses charged considered together with defendant's criminal history1 render him legally eligible for alcohol and substance abuse treatment in accordance with the Judicial Diversion Program ("Program") (see generally Criminal Procedure Law [CPL] § 216.00[1] ). For that reason, upon defendant's request, he was assessed by a court-approved entity pertaining to his history and diagnoses for substance abuse (see CPL § 216.05[1] ) and was ultimately recommended for Program participation based upon his clinical eligibility. The Court thereafter conducted a hearing (see generally CPL § 216.05[3] ) to determine if defendant should be permitted entry into the Program. The People vehemently oppose. Now, upon due consideration of the parties' written and oral submissions, the following constitutes the decision of the Court.
The enactment of Article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Law came as part of the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA) which was premised largely upon deconstructing the mandatory one-size-fits-all approach of the Rockefeller Drug Laws and providing "for a more sensible, comprehensive and cost-effective [process] for dealing with lower-level drug offenders and addicts" (2009 NY Assembly News Release [March 4, 2009] [quotations omitted] ). Thus, one of the principal tenets of the Act was to confer upon judges the "discretion to appropriately tailor a sentence to fit [both] the conduct and rehabilitative efforts of each offender of drug-related crimes" . By establishing Article 216, the Legislature "entrusted the judiciary with the power to not only impose much lower, and sometimes even nonincarceratory sentences in felony cases in which addicts have been convicted of selling [or possessing] narcotics, but also ‘diverting’ these individuals from any prison sentence, and placing them into treatment, without first obtaining the prosecutor's consent" ( People v. DeYoung , 95 A.D.3d 71, 940 N.Y.S.2d 306 [2d Dept. 2012] [citations and quotations omitted] ). In addition to receiving a favorable sentence, courts may permit a defendant to receive a disposition other than a felony conviction (e.g. withdrawing one's guilty plea and entering a plea to a misdemeanor or dismissal of the indictment in its entirety) in cases wherein the equities require such an outcome as "this result is consistent with...the purposes of judicial diversion" ( People v. Alston , 161 A.D.3d 472, 77 N.Y.S.3d 17 [1st Dept. 2018] ).
Judicial discretion is never wholly unfettered and undirected. There are a "thousand limitations — the product some of statute, some of precedent, some of vague tradition or of an immemorial technique — [which] encompass and hedge [courts]." (Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 60-61 [1924].) (Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 31 [1978].) On some occasions, the moral code which has been accepted as standards within the community will figure as [one of several] good reasons for a legal decision (Ronald Dworkin, Judicial Discretion , The Journal of Philosophy, vol 60, No. 21, 635 n 9 [1963] ). Thus, a court's discretion is guided in part upon seeking the realization of certain policies and principles (id. at 629) which achieves the best moral interpretation of existing social practices all within the context of the statutory norm (see generally Aharon Barak, Judicial Discretion , 51 [1989] ).
Turning to the rules at hand, the framework in Article 216 for determining the suitability of an eligible defendant2 for Program participation requires the Court to make findings of fact upon consideration of certain statutorily prescribed factors, to wit, whether:
When a court determines, pursuant to these factors, that an eligible defendant should be offered substance abuse treatment, it may permit judicial diversion (see CPL § 216.05[4] ). Thus, it is only after statutory findings are made may a court exercise its discretion to permit or deny entry into the Program (see People v. Smith , 139 A.D.3d 131, 30 N.Y.S.3d 19 [1st Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1031, 45 N.Y.S.3d 382, 68 N.E.3d 111 [2016] ). "If language of a statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses single definite and sensible meaning, words cannot be interpreted and courts have no authority to add to the language of law" (see McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y. Book 1 Statutes § 73, N.Y. Annotations at 43 [2018 ed.], citing Putnam County v. State , 17 Misc. 2d 541, 186 N.Y.S.2d 944 [Ct. Cl. 1959] ). Here, a plain and obvious reading of CPL § 216.05(4) — "an eligible defendant may be allowed to participate" in the Program — indicates that courts retain the ultimate discretion in rendering the final determination as to Program participation notwithstanding the findings relative to the enumerated factors (see CPL § 216.05[4] [emphasis added]; see also Clarke , 155 A.D.3d 1242, 65 N.Y.S.3d 578 ).
Although judicial discretion is a fundamental principle of Article 216, recent jurisprudence suggests that it is somewhat encumbered in that should a defendant meet the statutory criteria, he should presumptively be permitted entry into the Program (see generally People v. Cora , 135 A.D.3d 987, 22 N.Y.S.3d 655 [3d Dept. 2016] []; People v. Alston , 161 A.D.3d 472, 77 N.Y.S.3d 17 []; People v. DeYoung , 95 A.D.3d 71, 940 N.Y.S.2d 306 [] ). Thus, courts are not limited to considering only the statutorily prescribed factors. To be certain, a court may consider circumstances — insomuch as they exist — that are otherwise not accounted for by the statute yet bear significant relevance in determining the propriety of admission into the Program (see generally People v. Powell , 110 A.D.3d 1383, 973 N.Y.S.2d 870 [3d Dept. 2013] ; People v. Driscoll , 147 A.D.3d 1157, 48 N.Y.S.3d 522 [3d Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1078, 64 N.Y.S.3d 168, 86 N.E.3d 255 [2017] ; People v. Clarke , 155 A.D.3d 1242, 65 N.Y.S.3d 578 [3d Dept. 2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1114, 77 N.Y.S.3d 339, 101 N.E.3d 980 [2018] ). Although not explicitly articulated by the Legislature, in determining Program eligibility, a court must consider, inter alia, the facts and circumstances encompassing the charged crimes in order to ascertain whether judicial diversion will best serve the interests of justice.3 Accordingly, a court should consider, in relevant part, the ( CPL §§ 170.40 ; 210.40) in determining Program admission.
In consideration of the above — the Legislature's explicit and implicit intent to authorize and expand judicial discretion, the permissive directive of the statute itself and the manner in which the Departments of the Appellate Division have interpreted Article 216 — screening courts should employ a two-prong approach in assessing an eligible defendant for judicial diversion. First, an inquiry with respect to the enumerated statutory factors must be undertaken. If each of the statutory factors militates in a defendant's favor, the screening court should nevertheless consider the totality of the circumstances, identifying any aggravating or mitigating factors not accounted for by the statute, in determining whether a defendant's admission to this Program would serve the interests of justice. It is the secondary component of this analysis which authorizes a court to deny judicial diversion to an otherwise statutorily eligible defendant wherein a particularly egregious factor enters into the equation, e.g. the sale of fentanyl.
The onslaught of the heroin epidemic which has been exacerbated by its proliferating offspring, fentanyl (the massively concentrated synthetic opioid that delivers up to 50 times the...
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