People v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 26 March 2015
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals No. 13CA0967
• Citation: 2015 COA 33,350 P.3d 986
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Andrew Joseph MARTINEZ, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

350 P.3d 986

2015 COA 33

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Andrew Joseph MARTINEZ, Defendant–Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. 13CA0967

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

Announced March 26, 2015

George H. Brauchler, District Attorney, Susan J. Trout, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Centennial, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Jon W. Grevillius, Deputy Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellee.

Opinion

Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM

¶ 1 The People appeal from the district court's order dismissing their petition to revoke the Youthful Offender System (YOS) sentence of defendant, Andrew Joseph Martinez, based on its finding that it lost jurisdiction over the case because defendant's YOS sentence had expired. The People also appeal from the district court's order denying their motion to reconsider. We disapprove of those portions of the district court's orders concluding it lacked jurisdiction, but affirm based on the court's discretion to dismiss the revocation proceeding for violation of the YOS statute.

I.

¶ 2 The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. On April 30, 2007, defendant pleaded guilty to first degree assault in Arapahoe County. He received a sentence of eighteen years in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) suspended upon successful completion of a six year sentence to YOS. He received 348 days of presentence confinement, making the expected discharge date of his YOS sentence May 12, 2012.

¶ 3 On January 18, 2012, while serving the community supervision portion of his YOS sentence, defendant walked away from his YOS residential center. On February 22, 2012, defendant was arrested in Denver and subsequently transferred to Larimer County to face a charge of felony escape.¹

¶ 4 On March 1, 2012, while in Larimer County, defendant was served with a notice of charges alleging that he violated the DOC code of penal discipline when he left the YOS facility. On March 6, 2012, after an administrative hearing, defendant was found guilty of escape without force.

¶ 5 May 12, 2012, the date defendant's YOS sentence was set to expire, passed without the prosecution filing any documents related to revocation proceedings against defendant in Arapahoe County.

¶ 6 On November 16, 2012, defendant pleaded guilty in Larimer County to attempted escape and was sentenced to two years in the custody of the DOC. On November 20, 2012, defendant attended a DOC suitability hearing, which resulted in a recommendation that his YOS sentence be revoked. The YOS warden and the DOC executive director subsequently upheld the revocation recommendation.

¶ 7 On December 31, 2012, the prosecution received a request from the DOC seeking the revocation of defendant's YOS sentence and resentencing to eighteen years in the custody of the DOC. The prosecution filed a motion for revocation with the district court on February 11, 2013, requesting a hearing to revoke defendant's YOS sentence prior to April 30, 2013. It appears from the record that the prosecution failed to account for defendant's presentence confinement credit and believed defendant's YOS sentence would expire on April 30, 2013.

¶ 8 Defendant filed two motions to dismiss, alleging that the district court no longer had jurisdiction to revoke his YOS sentence because the sentence had expired on May 12, 2012. The prosecution responded to both motions arguing that defendant's YOS sentence was tolled, but failed to attach any evidence relating to defendant's arrest, the DOC administrative proceedings, or other pertinent matters.

¶ 9 On March 21, 2013, the court held a hearing on defendant's motions and, again, the prosecution failed to present any evidence supporting its argument that defendant's YOS sentence was tolled.

¶ 10 Following the hearing, the district court issued a written order concluding that it had lost jurisdiction over defendant because the revocation proceeding had not been initiated prior to the expiration of defendant's YOS sentence.

This Court is of the opinion that the delay in filing for Defendant's revocation denied him due process under the law. Defendant was picked up for Escape in February 2012. His YOS sentence was set to terminate in May 2012. While the Court understands why the prosecution waited for the outcome on the Escape case before filing charges in the YOS case, the delay was lengthy and resulted in the Motion for Revocation not being filed until eleven months after the incident prompting revocation, and nine months after Defendant's YOS sentence terminated. The People could have, as the prosecution did in [People v. Miller, 25 P.3d 1230 (Colo. 2001) ], filed a detainer, or something, in order to toll the YOS sentence and put the court on notice of an infraction. Instead, they filed nothing and now seek to have a completed sentence revoked and the suspended, and completed, sentence imposed. This the Court cannot do.

The court also concluded it lacked jurisdiction to revoke defendant's sentence because the DOC failed to transport him to county jail for resentencing within thirty-five days of the DOC executive director's upholding the revocation recommendation, as required by section 18–1.3–407(5)(c), C.R.S. 2014.

¶ 11 On May 16, 2013, forty-one days after the district court issued its ruling, the prosecution filed a motion to reconsider and attached nine exhibits containing information pertaining to defendant's arrest and the DOC administrative proceedings followed prior to defendant's YOS sentence expiring.

¶ 12 At an expedited hearing, the prosecution requested a new evidentiary hearing to address the exhibits attached to its motion. The district court granted the prosecution's request for argument, but denied its request to introduce new evidence, concluding that any evidence should have been introduced prior to its initial ruling and would not be considered. After the hearing, defendant filed a “motion to disregard” the proffered exhibits, arguing in part that the applicable criminal and civil rules of procedure barred their introduction as evidence.

¶ 13 On May 20, 2013, the court heard argument on both motions. After the hearing, the court ruled in favor of defendant, concluding that under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), the only applicable rule of procedure available to the prosecution, it was barred from considering new evidence. The court then declined to reconsider its prior order.

II.

¶ 14 The People contend the district court erred when it concluded it did not have jurisdiction to revoke defendant's YOS sentence. Specifically, they argue that by violating conditions of his YOS sentence before the anticipated completion date, defendant did not successfully complete his YOS sentence, and, therefore, his suspended DOC sentence was not complete. Accordingly, the People argue that the district court retained jurisdiction to revoke defendant's YOS sentence and impose the original DOC sentence. We agree.

¶ 15 “[W]e look to the language of the statute to determine the requirements for invoking the jurisdiction of the trial court.” People v. Grell, 950 P.2d 660, 661 (Colo. App. 1997). We review de novo a challenge to the district court's jurisdiction. People v. Efferson, 122 P.3d 1038, 1040 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 16 The YOS statute, section 18–1.3–407, begins by stating the General Assembly's intent to establish “a sentencing option for certain youthful offenders [in] a controlled and regimented environment that affirms dignity of self and others, promotes the value of work and self-discipline, and develops useful skills and abilities through enriched programming.” § 18–1.3–407(1)(a).

¶ 17 When sentenced under the YOS statute, an offender is first sentenced to the DOC pursuant to section 18–1.3–401, C.R.S. 2014, and then the DOC sentence is suspended conditioned upon the offender's completion of a sentence to the YOS program. § 18–1.3–407(2)(a)(I). Only upon “successful completion” of the sentence to the YOS program, including the mandatory period of community supervision, is the offender's DOC sentence completed. § 18–1.3–407(2)(a)(II).

¶ 18 Section 18–1.3–407(5)(c) provides that any offender who cannot complete a YOS sentence must be returned to the district court, and grants discretion to the DOC to implement a procedure for returning such offenders to the district court. Such offenders are not entitled to be discharged from YOS and their suspended DOC sentences are not complete.See Miller, 25 P.3d at 1232 (“Defendant was not entitled to a discharge from his DOC sentence due to his failure to successfully complete the YOS program. The YOS statute clearly provides that an offender who cannot successfully complete his YOS sentence must be returned to the district court.”); Efferson, 122 P.3d at 1041. Thus, a defendant must successfully complete a YOS sentence before a suspended sentence may be considered discharged. Miller, 25 P.3d at 1232.

¶ 19 Further, the arrest and custodial status of an offender alleged to have violated the terms and conditions of a YOS sentence toll the discharge date of the YOS sentence pending resolution of the charges. Efferson, 122 P.3d at 1041.

In Efferson, a division of this court interpreted the plain language of section 18–1.3–407(5)(c) and rejected the “contention that the filing of a complaint or other written motion constitutes the only procedure for initiating a YOS revocation,” noting that “[t]he statute contains no such requirement.” Id. We are persuaded by the reasoning and analysis in Efferson and agree with the People that it is dispositive of the jurisdictional question in this case.

¶ 21 The district court, in concluding that it had lost jurisdiction over defendant, focused on the fact that the prosecution had failed to file a detainer or other documentation with the court prior to the scheduled termination date of defendant's YOS sentence, a fact the court believed distinguished this case from Efferson . We conclude any factual...